Since independence in 1964, Zambia has occupied a unique position in Africa, noted Dr. Kelvin Kamayoyo, a Zambian economist and researcher. Zambia sits at the crossroads of Southern, Central and Eastern Africa, and geographically shares borders with eight countries. Zambia has hosted peace, provided transit corridors, and carried the torch of regional solidarity. Yet for six decades Zambia has not fully harnessed this geographic advantage.

The reason is not only policy or capital, but also the deeper structural barrier attributed to social dynamics. Unquestionably, Zambia has not invested enough in the human infrastructure that makes trade possible, which is precisely language.

Notwithstanding, trade does not move on tariffs alone. It moves on trust, understanding, and the ability to sit at the same table and be understood. In international trade law, this is recognized in the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”, implying that “agreements must be kept” (Vattel, 1758). But before an agreement can be kept, it must first be negotiated, explained, and believed. That is where language becomes law in practice.

For purposes of this article, it is critical to highlight any such theories that could explain the importance of language in international trade. The theories that attempts to give a clear explanation is Transaction Cost Economics and Linguistic Capital. One of the most relevant frameworks is Transaction Cost Economics, advanced by Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase (1937) and Oliver Williamson (1981, 1985). The theory argues that the cost of doing business is not just the price of goods, but the cost of searching, negotiating, contracting, monitoring, and enforcing agreements. Within this theory, it is clear that language is not a soft skill, but is a direct cost reducer.

Arguably, when traders, lawyers, and officials share a language, contracts are clearer, disputes are fewer, and trust is built faster. On the otherhand, Linguists and economists now refer to this as linguistic capital which implies the economic value embedded in the ability to communicate across cultures (Grin, 2003). It is therefore more compelling to arrive at the conclusion that without it, integration remains on paper.

To highlight an example for clarity: A Zambian exporter negotiating cobalt sales with a buyer in Lubumbashi, DRC, will close the deal faster if both can work in French. The same exporter dealing with a logistics firm in Dar es Salaam will save days if they can clarify customs documentation in Swahili. Each avoided mistranslation is a transaction cost saved.

This explains Zambia’s current reality. Zambia and Tanzania should be trading at triple the current volume. Zambia and Tanzania share the TAZARA line, the port of Dar es Salaam, and common history (COMESA, 2022). Yet different working languages slow down customs procedures, legal interpretation, and business relationships.

The same applies to the Democratic Republic of Congo and China. The DRC holds critical minerals. China holds capital, technology, and the world’s largest market (World Bank, 2023). Zambia sits between DRC and China with copper, cobalt, water, and stability. Imagine a four-country economic and investment toolbox comprising Zambia, DRC, Tanzania and China, while speaking each other’s languages. With Swahili as the regional bridge, French for DRC and much of West and Central Africa, Arabic for North Africa and Gulf investors, and Mandarin for China, Zambia and its partners could experience unprecedented proportional growth before the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals deadline. Arguably each country brings a niche: minerals, oil, arable land, technology, transit passages, and peace. What Zambia and the region lack is the connective tissue.

This brings me to the question of why these four languages, and why the emphasis now? It is critical to assert that the choice of languages is strategic, not sentimental. The four languages are today spoken by over 2 billion people worldwide, signifying both social and economic value by population headcount standards.

Swahili is widely recognized as a major lingua franca of trade, commerce, and culture across East, Central, and Southern Africa. With over 200 million speakers, it is the language of markets across East, Central, and Southern Africa (UNESCO, 2022). French is the working language of 29 African countries and key regional bodies like SADC, COMESA and the African Union (African Union [AU], 2023). The language spans every inhabited continent, from France, Belgium, and Switzerland in Europe to Canada and Haiti in the Americas and dozens of African nations. About 321 million people speak French worldwide as of 2026 (Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie [OIF], 2024).

Arabic is the gateway to North Africa, the Middle East, and growing Gulf investment in African infrastructure and agriculture. For example, UAE and Saudi Arabia have pledged over USD 30 billion in African agri-food projects since 2021, much of it negotiated in Arabic (FAO, 2022).

Mandarin is the language of the world’s second largest economy and Zambia’s largest bilateral trading partner. China consistently ranks as one of Zambia’s top two direct export partners, absorbing around 20% of total Zambian export earnings, frequently tracking near Switzerland (Bank of Zambia [BOZ], 2024; Zambia Statistics Agency [ZAMSTATS], 2024).

Therefore, becoming literate in these four languages will do three things for Zambians. First, it will make Zambians competitive for jobs and contracts across the continent and beyond. Second, it will allow Zambians to exploit the digital economy with ease. Artificial intelligence and global social networking often reward those who can create content in multiple languages. A Zambian innovator who can pitch in Mandarin on TikTok, negotiate in French on LinkedIn, and explain value in Swahili on WhatsApp builds a personal brand that is secure, appealing, and bankable. Third, language accelerates the transfer of knowledge and technology. Civilization advances when ideas move. Cooperation deepens when people feel seen and understood (Sen, 1999).

It is definitely better late than never to learn Arabic, French, Mandarin and Swahili. This applies to many Zambians. Undoubtedly, many Zambians must confront delay without shame. There is a Chinese proverb that has guided generations of reformers: “lt is not too late to mend” or “making up for lost time”. The phrase appears in classical texts such as the “Shiji” by Sima Qian and was popularized in modern leadership discourse in China to encourage action despite past delay (Liu, 2018). This speaks directly to Zambia. Even if Zambia did not prioritize multilingualism in the last six decades, Zambia can start today, and it is still fine.

The cost-benefit analysis theory is also clear (Becker, 1964). The cost of learning four languages – in time, in schools, in adult programs, is far less than the cost of lost trade, misinterpreted contracts, and missed partnerships. The potential benefit for Zambia is access to markets of over 2 billion people, faster negotiations, and win-win outcomes grounded in mutual respect.

For example: Under AfCFTA, a Zambian firm that can present its product pitch in French to buyers in Abidjan, lvory Coast and in Arabic to buyers in Cairo, Egypt doubles its addressable market without opening a new office. That is return on linguistic investment for Zambia.

Today, most African countries belong to different Regional Economic Communities and speak different languages. This leads to different interpretations of concepts and principles, and it is capable of slowing down the Africa We Want: Agenda 2063. Africa cannot build a continental free trade area if countries cannot speak to each other easily and faster.

This takes Zambians to the “edge of a cliff” that demands that they endeavour to embrace the four languages and maximize the obvious benefits they bring. Zambia has the opportunity to break the six-decade barrier. By choice, Zambia can decide, as a nation, to make Swahili, French, Arabic or Mandarin part of Zambia’s school curriculum, Zambia’s civil service training, and Zambia’s business incentives.

The leverage to harness global economic growth and the digital economy lies in the number of languages one can speak and the cultures one can enter with confidence.

Let Zambia treat language as infrastructure, just like roads and fibre optic cables. Let Zambia prioritize language as a catalyst for economic transformation, cultural harmonization, and social cohesion.

Zambia is ready and the region is too. The world is listening and what Zambia needs to do now is to speak.

For comments contact the researcher and author on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com

References

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