By Kelvin Chisanga

A deal that tests more than supply

The planned sale of 540,000 tonnes of maize to Kenya, about 10.6% of Zambia’s productive output base this season, demonstrates growing regional demand for Zambian maize and strengthens Zambia’s position under the African Continental Free Trade Area. It follows Kenyan grain trader Baita Trading’s own approach to Zambia for surplus stock, a sign that Zambia’s harvest recovery has put it back on the radar of buyers across the region.

But the policy question is not simply how much maize Zambia exports. It is how much value Zambia captures from every tonne that leaves the country.

Value capture, not volume, is the real measure

A tonne of maize sold as raw grain earns Zambia one price. The same tonne, milled into mealie meal, processed into animal feed, or refined into starch or maize oil, earns considerably more, and keeps the jobs created by that processing inside Zambia rather than in the buyer’s country. Judged only on export volume, the Kenya deal looks like a success. Judged on value capture, it is a reminder of how much of Zambia’s agricultural potential still leaves the country unprocessed.

Export incentives should increasingly reward processed and higher-value agricultural products, rather than simply rewarding bulk commodity exports. A trade policy that treats a tonne of raw maize and a tonne of maize oil the same way has no mechanism for shifting the country up the value chain.

The case for agro-processing investment

Government must accelerate investment in agro-processing, particularly milling, animal feed, starch, maize oil and other maize-based industries. Zambia has the raw material base to support this: a 5.1 million tonne harvest this season, plus more than 1.6 million tonnes carried over from the previous one. What it lacks is enough processing capacity to turn a larger share of that surplus into finished or semi-finished products before it is sold.

Building that capacity is also the more durable route to the jobs and business growth that a maize surplus should deliver. A milling plant, a feed mill or a starch processor employs people continuously. A grain export deal, however large, is a single transaction.

A grain reserve for a climate-exposed harvest

At the same time, Zambia needs a national grain-reserve framework that sets minimum strategic stocks and protects supplies against drought, floods, pests and other climate shocks. Zambia’s maize output has swung sharply between poor and bumper seasons in recent years, and a surplus this year is no guarantee of one next year.

Export decisions should be based on transparent production, consumption and reserve data, not on the size of an opportunity in front of government at any given moment. Without a published reserve threshold, there is no public benchmark against which to judge whether an export commitment of this size is prudent or leaves the country exposed if the next harvest falls short.

What government has to build

Government should also establish regional market-intelligence and export systems, improve rail and border logistics, expand certified storage and irrigation, and facilitate private-sector financing for aggregation and processing. Storage in particular has already proven a constraint this season, with slow depots and shortfalls at Food Reserve Agency collection points turning parts of the bumper harvest into a logistics problem rather than a straightforward gain.

Most importantly, the 10-million-tonne maize production target must be matched with measurable targets for storage, processing capacity, exports, jobs and value addition. A production target on its own says nothing about whether the maize grown under it strengthens Zambia’s industrial base or simply passes through as an unprocessed export.

From granary to agro-industrial power

Zambia should not aim merely to become Africa’s maize granary, a reliable source of raw grain for other countries’ mills and factories. The policy objective must be to become a regional agro-industrial powerhouse, turning every tonne produced into higher incomes, jobs, exports, resilience and industrial capacity.

The Kenya deal is a useful test of that ambition. Zambia can take the export earnings and move on, or it can use deals like this one to justify the storage, processing and reserve investment that would let the next surplus create more value than this one did.

Related reading: Kenya Ready to Buy Zambian Maize as Baita Trading Seeks 10.8 Million Bags, FRA’s Slow Depots and Storage Shortfall Are Turning Zambia’s Bumper Harvest Into a Logistics Problem, Njala Insurance: The Case for Paying Zambia’s Drought Cover in Maize, Not Kwacha and FRA Maize Floor Price 2026: K347 a Bag, and What It Costs.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

By The Zambian Economist Analyst

A season split in two

Government launched the National Seasonal Rainfall Forecast Outlook for the 2026/2027 season on Friday at the Radisson Blu Hotel in Lusaka, setting out a forecast that splits the country roughly into three. The Northern Belt is expected to receive above-normal to normal rainfall. The Central Transition Zone faces changing conditions through the season. The Southern Belt is forecast to receive below-normal rainfall and a delayed onset of the rains, the combination that did the most damage to crops and water supplies in the last major dry spell.

Secretary to the Cabinet Patrick Kangwa, delivering the outlook, directed ministries, provincial administrations and local authorities to activate their contingency measures without delay. The instruction was explicit about timing: the country should use the climate information it already has to prepare, rather than wait for a disaster to force the response.

Why El Niño is back in the conversation

Kangwa named El Niño as the main driver of Zambia’s weather this season. Forecasters and the World Meteorological Organisation put the probability of it developing above 90%, a figure that carries weight because of what the last episode cost. The 2023/2024 El Niño-induced dry spell triggered emergency relief for more than 5.8 million people. Of the 2.27 million hectares of maize planted that season, nearly a million hectares were lost outright.

Those numbers are the baseline against which this season’s forecast has to be read. A season with a similar probability of El Niño, and a similar regional rainfall pattern in the south, is why government moved to activate contingency plans on the day the outlook was launched rather than waiting for the rains to under-deliver first.

The food security numbers

Government estimates that approximately 1.2 million people could face severe food shortages between October 2026 and March 2027, roughly 7% of the population in the 93 districts assessed. Set against that risk is a run of progress it does not want to lose: the number of people requiring humanitarian emergency food assistance has fallen by 79.3% over the past two growing seasons. Kangwa framed the current planning cycle as an effort to protect that gain, not simply to react to the coming season on its own terms.

What government has directed

Permanent Secretaries and Provincial Administration Heads have been instructed to put their contingency plans into action immediately, with responses tailored to the different conditions expected in each part of the country. For farmers in the drier southern and central areas, the advice is to consider early-maturing and drought-tolerant crops and to wait for confirmation from the Zambia Meteorological Department on the onset of the rains before planting, rather than planting to the calendar.

Government has also called for closer monitoring of dam levels, water conservation and power generation, given the anticipated reduction in water inflows into parts of the Zambezi. The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Division and the Ministry of Health have been directed to prepare for the hazards specific to each region: heat and water shortages in the south, and the higher risk of disease outbreaks and flooding in the north.

Kangwa asked farmers to work with agricultural extension officers and to follow advisories from the Zambia Meteorological Department, and directed ministries, provincial administrations and local authorities to make sure the seasonal outlook reaches planners and decision-makers at every level, not just at the centre. He credited cooperating partners, including the SCRALA project supporting climate resilience among farming communities in 16 vulnerable districts, for backing the preparedness plan and the launch of the outlook.

What this means for business and planning

For agribusiness and input suppliers, the regional split in the forecast is the detail worth acting on early: demand for early-maturing and drought-tolerant seed varieties is likely to concentrate in the Southern Belt and parts of the Central Transition Zone, while the Northern Belt’s more favourable outlook keeps it the safer bet for standard maize varieties. Insurers and lenders exposed to agricultural risk, including through weather-indexed products, have a season to plan around rather than a surprise to absorb after the fact.

For energy planners, the direction to increase monitoring of dam levels and water conservation points to the same pressure point that shaped the 2023/2024 crisis: reduced inflows into the Zambezi affect both irrigation and power generation, and any tightening this season would arrive on top of a power system still working through the effects of the last drought.

The 79.3% reduction in people needing humanitarian food assistance is the figure government has the most riding on. It is evidence that the response to the last El Niño built real capacity, and the emphasis on early contingency action this time is an attempt to show that capacity holds up against a repeat, rather than being reset by it.

Related reading: El Nino Warning: Zambia Told to Fix Its Power Gap Before the Drought Bites, Njala Insurance: The Case for Paying Zambia’s Drought Cover in Maize, Not Kwacha, FRA Maize Floor Price 2026: K347 a Bag, and What It Costs and Zambia’s Power Deficit and the Real Cost to Business.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Delegates compare notes on a shared problem

Zambia’s Public-Private Sector Dialogue on Anti-Money Laundering, Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Counter-Proliferation Financing (AML/CFT/CPF) ran for two days at Sandy’s Creations in Chilanga, bringing together government agencies, banks, mining companies and other private-sector players from across Zambia. International delegates from Liberia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, the United States and the European Union joined the sessions to share how their own jurisdictions handle similar risks.

Financial crime rarely stays inside one country’s borders. A launderer moving proceeds through a Zambian bank account, a regional trading company or a cross-border property deal can just as easily be operating out of Harare or Johannesburg, which is part of why the dialogue was built around comparing practical approaches rather than presenting a single national plan.

Three priorities, stated plainly

Attorney General and Anti-Money Laundering Authority Chairperson Mulilo Kabesha used his address to narrow the partnership’s mandate to three tasks: stronger and faster information sharing, converting that information into actionable intelligence, and coordinated action to protect Zambia’s economy and mineral wealth from criminal exploitation.

Kabesha described financial crime as, in large part, a battle for information. Banks, professional service providers, regulators, civil society, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, the judiciary and businesses each hold a different piece of the picture, and no single institution sees the whole chain. He urged participants to make sure the dialogue produced practical, measurable results rather than a further round of talks.

He also called on businesses to treat AML/CFT/CPF compliance as an investment in the economy’s long-term integrity rather than a regulatory box to tick, and asked regulators to keep supervision risk-based and proportionate to the size and nature of the institutions they oversee.

Manza: illicit flows work against the Grow Zambia Agenda

Ministry of Finance and National Planning Accountant General Nsandi Manza, who chairs the National AML/CFT/CPF Task Force, told the dialogue that the partnership supports the Grow Zambia Agenda, which places prudent financial management, domestic resource mobilisation, investment and job creation at the centre of the government’s economic plan.

Illicit financial flows cut into the money available for development and work against sustainable, inclusive growth, Manza said, which is why tackling them needs coordinated action rather than separate efforts by government and business. She described the private sector’s role as identifying and reporting suspicious transactions, with government responsible for the policy, regulatory, supervisory, intelligence and enforcement frameworks around that reporting. She said the forum should move past discussion toward concrete information sharing, capacity building, joint initiatives and practical solutions.

FIC: mining supply chains are the exposed link

Financial Intelligence Centre Director General Clement Kapalu said the launch marks an important step in strengthening Zambia’s AML/CFT/CPF framework, and pointed specifically to mining sector financial flows and supply chains as vulnerable to corruption, fraud, tax evasion, smuggling and money laundering.

That vulnerability is what makes the dialogue’s exchange of information on emerging risks, typologies and trends more than an academic exercise. Kapalu said the partnership’s success will ultimately depend on whether participating institutions can turn information into intelligence, and intelligence into action, echoing Kabesha’s own framing of the challenge.

Why the mineral link matters beyond the conference room

Zambia’s push to expand copper output and position itself in minerals used for electric vehicles and renewable energy also expands the value moving through the accounts, contracts and shipments that financial criminals target. Revenue lost to laundering, tax evasion or smuggling in that chain is revenue that does not reach the treasury, and by extension does not fund public services or the infrastructure the Grow Zambia Agenda is meant to finance.

For banks, auditors, commodity traders and logistics firms operating in the mineral value chain, the priorities set out this week point toward closer reporting obligations and faster cooperation with the Financial Intelligence Centre. For investors weighing Zambia’s mining sector, a functioning AML/CFT/CPF framework is also a governance signal: it speaks to whether the institutions around the resource, not just the resource itself, can be relied on.

What happens next

Kabesha’s call for practical and measurable results sets a bar the partnership will be judged against once the delegates have gone home. International experience-sharing is only useful if it changes how quickly a Zambian bank flags a suspicious transaction, how fast the Financial Intelligence Centre can act on it, and whether a resulting case reaches court. Zambia’s improved standing with the Financial Action Task Force gives the partnership a credible starting point, but Kapalu’s own measure, information turned into intelligence and intelligence turned into action, is the one that will determine whether this week’s dialogue changes outcomes or simply adds to the record of meetings held.

Related reading: Attorney General Kabesha Launches Public-Private Partnership to Fight Money Laundering and Mining Licences Surge: 2,375 Issued in 2025, and What’s Driving the Boom.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

By The Zambian Economist Analyst | 7–11 September 2026

The week’s biggest economic event was not a statistic. It was a seating arrangement. On Monday morning, 224 men and women filed into the Chamber of the National Assembly on Independence Avenue to be sworn in as Members of Zambia’s Thirteenth Parliament, four weeks after the 12 August general election returned President Hakainde Hichilema to office with 60.49 percent of the vote and gave the UPND a fresh majority in the House. By the end of the week, that same government was in a room with one of the country’s largest copper investors, and a Lusaka research institute was publishing evidence that the recovery still has not reached the family shopping basket.

A new House takes its seat

Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation coverage and the National Assembly’s own feed confirmed the swearing-in ceremonies ran through Monday, with Vice President Mutale Nalumango, who retained her parliamentary seat, among the first group to take the oath. The Clerk of the Assembly then began the procedural work of constituting the new House, with the election of a Speaker and Deputy Speakers as the first substantive business of the term. Newly sworn-in MPs used their first public statements to set out constituency priorities rather than national ones: Sesheke West’s Frederick Misebezi raised the lack of fuel stations and banking services in his district, Mwandi’s Iris Kaingu pointed to water access and road rehabilitation, and Lima’s Kelvin Kaunda named clean water, sanitation and skills training as his focus.

What stands out about this Parliament is its inexperience, and that is not an insult. A large share of members are serving for the first time, a turnover rate consistent with Zambia’s recent elections but unusually high this cycle. The National Assembly has scheduled a three-day orientation seminar at Parliament Buildings to walk the newcomers through legislative procedure, committee work and, importantly for readers of this publication, the budget process.

Why does that matter for the economy? Because this particular House inherits an unusually heavy legislative agenda. The 2027 National Budget, which Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane is expected to present in late September or early October, must be debated and passed by these new MPs within weeks of their swearing-in. So must the 2027–2031 Medium-Term Revenue Strategy, the document that will shape tax policy for the next five years. A House still learning its standing orders will be approving the government’s spending and taxation plans for the year ahead.

The economy they inherit

The numbers waiting on their desks are the best in years. Annual inflation eased to 6.2 percent in August, down from 6.5 percent in July and the lowest print since February 2018, according to ZamStats data. That keeps inflation inside the Bank of Zambia’s 6 to 8 percent target band, where it has now sat for several months, and it is the main reason food price pressure has quietly disappeared from front pages.

Growth is doing its part too. First-quarter GDP expanded 7.7 percent year on year, driven largely by mining, and Fitch currently projects full-year growth of about 6.1 percent for 2026. Copper, the engine behind those figures, is holding above $13,000 a tonne even though domestic output rose only 0.45 percent in the first half to 447,182 tonnes. The sector has also attracted reported investment commitments in the region of $10 billion, a sign that capital is betting on Zambian copper even before the tonnes arrive.

Government presses Vedanta on power and copper output

That bet was on display on Thursday, when President Hichilema met Vedanta Resources’ Head of Strategy and Growth, Pushpender Singla, at Community House in Lusaka, alongside representatives of Konkola Copper Mines and CopperTech Metals. The message from the government side was direct: mining expansion cannot outrun the power supply it depends on. “We encouraged Vedanta to expedite their plans to also invest in power generation to support their mining operations and contribute to our 10 gigawatt target,” the President said after the meeting.

KCM’s own target is 500,000 tonnes of copper production, a slice of the national ambition of 3 million tonnes a year set out under the Grow Zambia Agenda, the government’s 10-10-5-3-3-1-1-1 framework for agriculture, energy, tourism and exports that officials say could support more than 2 million jobs if delivered. Singla confirmed the company’s commitment, telling the President that “KCM and CopperTech Metals remain committed to partners in Zambia’s growth,” and the visiting team presented a commemorative copper plaque to mark the exchange.

The exchange is a reminder of where the real constraint on Zambia’s copper ambitions sits. Ore bodies and smelters are only part of the equation; without enough reliable power, expansion plans on paper stay on paper. A national target of 10,000 megawatts of generation capacity gives a sense of the scale government believes is needed to support both mining growth and the wider economy, and this week’s meeting was as much about keeping mining houses’ own generation plans moving as it was ceremonial.

Household budgets: cost of living climbs even as headline inflation eases

The tension between the macro numbers and the lived experience of ordinary households came into sharp relief on Thursday, when the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection released its August Basic Needs and Nutrition Basket. The cost of feeding, housing and clothing a family of five in Lusaka rose to K12,000.94 in August, up K302.52 from K11,698.42 in July, even as the national inflation rate eased to an eight-year low over the same period. JCTR Executive Director Fr Daniel Mutale said the increase “reflects the continued high cost of living and the growing difficulty many households face in meeting their basic needs with limited incomes.”

Lusaka remained the most expensive of the cities JCTR tracks, ahead of Ndola at K10,444.93 and Solwezi at K10,365.22. The gap between a falling inflation rate and a rising household basket is not a contradiction so much as a reminder of what the inflation rate measures: the pace of price change, not the level of prices households actually pay, and not how far wages have kept up with either. For a Parliament that will spend its first weeks debating a budget and a five-year revenue strategy, the JCTR figures are a concrete measure of the gap between macroeconomic stability and household affordability that policy still has to close.

The kwacha and fuel: steady through the week

The currency spent the week in a narrow band. The kwacha traded between roughly K19.07 and K19.37 per dollar, opening near K19.09 on Monday and settling around K19.24 by the end of the week, according to market trackers, a mild softening but well within the calmer range the currency has kept through the election period. The Energy Regulation Board’s decision at the end of August to hold September pump prices, petrol at K25.29 per litre, diesel at K26.86 and kerosene at K27.02, carried through the week unchanged, citing the stable kwacha and suspended taxes on petroleum products. For transport operators, millers and households using kerosene, it is the second consecutive month without a price adjustment, a run that has helped keep August’s inflation print low even as JCTR’s basket data shows other costs still rising.

What to watch

• Speaker and committee elections: the composition of the Public Accounts Committee and the Budget Committee will signal how much scrutiny the new majority will actually apply to public spending.
• 2027 Budget presentation: expected late September or early October. Watch for the growth-enabling lines, energy, transport and irrigation, and for how the Grow Zambia Agenda is funded.
• MPC meeting, 30 September: the first rate decision of the new term. With inflation at 6.2 percent and the policy rate at 13.25 percent, the real question is how quickly the Bank cuts, and what that means for loan repayments and, eventually, the JCTR basket.
• Copper concentrate export duty, 30 September: the reported 10 percent duty takes effect the same day the MPC meets. Miners and smelters are watching whether it is implemented, deferred or amended.
• Vedanta’s power investment plans: whether this week’s meeting translates into announced generation projects, and on what timeline, will say a lot about how quickly the 10-gigawatt target is more than an aspiration.

The bottom line

Stability is now Zambia’s baseline, not its achievement. The inflation number, the fuel hold and the calm kwacha all point the same way, and this week’s Vedanta meeting shows government treating power supply as the binding constraint on the copper growth it wants. What the JCTR basket shows is that stability at the macro level has not yet become affordability at the household level. Converting one into the other is legislative and administrative work: budgets passed on time, revenue policies that do not scare off investment, power investment that keeps pace with mining ambition, and oversight that treats public money as a scarce resource. That work now belongs to 224 people, most of them new to the job, seated this week on Independence Avenue.

Sources: National Assembly of Zambia; Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation; State House; Lusaka Times; News Diggers; Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection; ZamStats; Bank of Zambia; Energy Regulation Board; Trading Economics; Fitch Ratings.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist: Advertise With Us | List With Us | Submit an Article

By The Zambian Economist Analyst

A single table for public and private enforcement

Government has launched a Public-Private Partnership model designed to close the gaps that financial criminals exploit when public agencies and private institutions work in isolation. Attorney General Mulilo Kabesha, who led the launch, stressed the need for stronger coordination between the two sides to combat financial crimes and safeguard the country’s resources.

The model brings regulators, law enforcement, banks and other private-sector players into a shared framework rather than leaving each to police its own corner of the financial system. Money laundering typically moves through several institutions in a single chain, a bank account here, a property transfer there, a shell company somewhere else, so a gap at any one link can undo the work done at the others.

Criminals moving faster with AI

Kabesha cautioned that fraudsters, money launderers and cyber criminals are increasingly leveraging technology and artificial intelligence to move and conceal illicit funds. The warning reflects a shift regulators across the region have flagged in recent years: financial crime is no longer confined to slow, paper-based schemes but now moves through digital channels at a pace traditional oversight was not built for.

That shift is a large part of the case for a formal partnership. Private institutions, particularly banks and payment providers, often see suspicious transaction patterns first. A structure that gets that information to law enforcement and regulators quickly matters more when the underlying crime is moving faster too.

Mineral wealth raises the stakes

Kabesha noted that Zambia stands at a defining moment in ensuring its mineral wealth benefits citizens and contributes to national development. He pointed to the country’s position to benefit from minerals critical to powering electric vehicles, renewable energy and digital infrastructure, resources that make Zambia a more attractive target for the kind of financial crime the partnership is meant to disrupt.

Copper and the other minerals behind that positioning generate the large, cross-border transactions that illicit finance schemes are built to exploit. Protecting that value chain, from mine gate to export receipt, is as much a governance question as a security one.

What the other officials said

Financial Intelligence Centre Director General Clement Kapalu described the establishment of the PPP as a significant milestone in the fight against illicit financial flows, a role that puts the FIC’s own transaction-monitoring work at the centre of how the partnership is expected to function in practice.

Chairperson of the National Anti-Money Laundering Task Force, Nsandi Manza, tied the initiative to the Grow Zambia agenda, emphasising that it calls for the prudent utilisation and protection of national resources. Manza underscored that strengthening measures to protect national resources from financial crime is critical to ensuring that Zambia’s wealth delivers meaningful and lasting benefits to its people.

Building on a recent compliance gain

The PPP launch follows a separate advance in Zambia’s anti-money laundering standing. At the 52nd Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group Task Force of Senior Officials Plenary Meeting and the 26th Council of Ministers meeting, held in Kigali, Rwanda, on 4 September 2026, Zambia secured upgrades in three areas of its framework under Financial Action Task Force standards: transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons, regulation and supervision of financial institutions, and regulation and supervision of designated non-financial businesses and professions. Zambia is now compliant or largely compliant with 38 of the 40 FATF recommendations.

Speaking after that meeting, Kabesha credited the progress to the combined efforts of public and private institutions, the same coordination the PPP now aims to formalise, and challenged Zambian institutions to move beyond meeting compliance requirements to proving those measures actually work.

What comes next

A framework is only as strong as the reporting and enforcement that follow it. For the PPP to be more than a signing ceremony, banks and other private institutions will need clear channels for flagging suspicious activity, the Financial Intelligence Centre will need the capacity to act on what it receives, and prosecutors will need cases that hold up in court. Zambia’s improved FATF standing gives the partnership a credible starting point. Whether it changes outcomes will be judged in the volumes of illicit flows detected and disrupted, not in the improved rating alone.

Related reading: ACC Rejects Claims It Failed to Protect Ministry of Finance Whistleblower and The Looming Fiscal Cliff: Rebuilding Zambia’s Political Retirement Architecture for Fiscal Sustainability.

Update: for the international delegates who joined this launch and the priorities set out on day two, see Zambia’s AML Dialogue Draws International Delegates as Officials Set Three Priorities.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

The National Assembly has asked the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) to submit the names of Members of Parliament entering the House under the Mixed Member Proportional Representation system by 17 September 2026, as Parliament works to bring all newly elected and nominated Members through a single, unified induction process.

Clerk of the National Assembly Loveness Mayaka said the names are needed so that the affected Members can undergo the internal processes that precede their formal entry into Parliament, chief among them induction. She said induction should be conducted together for directly elected Members and those coming through the proportional representation system, so that no form of segregation arises between the two categories of Members.

Ms Mayaka’s remarks were delivered in a speech read on her behalf by Deputy Clerk of the National Assembly for Administration, Sage Samuwika, at the opening of a three day capacity building workshop for the National Assembly’s Research Department. The workshop is focused on disability inclusion.

A milestone for disability representation

Zambia’s Mixed Member Proportional Representation system, introduced for the 2026 general election, reserves five parliamentary seats for Persons with Disabilities alongside the directly elected constituency seats. Ms Mayaka described the reservation as a significant milestone in advancing the political participation and representation of Persons with Disabilities in the country.

She said the presence of Persons with Disabilities in Parliament has to be matched by an institutional environment that allows them to participate effectively, not merely to hold a seat. The National Assembly, she said, is examining its systems, procedures, infrastructure, and information, communication and parliamentary support services to ensure they respond to the diverse needs of all Honourable Members.

An inclusive Parliament, Ms Mayaka said, is one that reflects the diversity of the people it serves and ensures that every Member can discharge their constitutional and parliamentary responsibilities effectively.

Beyond ramps and lifts

Ms Mayaka cautioned against a narrow reading of accessibility. She said it should not be understood only as the provision of ramps, lifts or other physical infrastructure, but also encompasses communication, information, digital and procedural accessibility. The National Assembly, she added, must also address attitudinal and institutional barriers that can prevent Persons with Disabilities from participating fully in parliamentary processes.

She expressed confidence that the workshop would strengthen the capacity of the Research Department, drawing on the expertise and experience of the facilitators engaged for the programme.

Why it matters

The 17 September deadline is one of the first concrete administrative markers of how Zambia’s new proportional representation system will be operationalised inside Parliament. With five seats reserved for Persons with Disabilities, how quickly and cleanly the ECZ hands over names, and how Parliament integrates those Members alongside constituency MPs, will be an early test of whether the reform delivers substantive inclusion or only formal representation. The accessibility review Ms Mayaka described, covering everything from procedural rules to digital systems, points to changes that go beyond the chamber itself and into how Parliament conducts its daily business.

Related: How Zambia’s Mixed-Member Proportional Representation System Works | HH Widens Gap to 225,971 Votes as ECZ Confirms 105 Constituencies

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

By Steven Mbangu

1. The Policy Problem

Zambia’s historical experience makes the case for political retirement protection compelling. Former political office-bearers have, at different times, experienced significant economic hardship after leaving public service. The broader lesson was that political service without a credible post-service economic transition mechanism represents an institutional weakness.

Zambia subsequently developed statutory arrangements beginning with the Benefits of Former Presidents Act, 1993 (Act No. 40 of 1993), now replaced by the Benefits of Former Presidents and Former Vice-Presidents Act, 2026. The National Assembly (Speaker’s Retirement Benefits) Act, 2026, reflects a similar approach for former Speakers.

These arrangements address a legitimate social objective: people who devote productive years to public leadership should not necessarily leave office without reasonable economic security. But where benefits are financed primarily from the Consolidated Fund rather than accumulated contributions and investment assets, they can also create long-duration fiscal obligations.

This distinction is important. Current expenditure is not the same as long-term fiscal exposure. A payment may be affordable today while increasing obligations that must be financed for many years. If successive cohorts of former office-bearers receive continuing benefits without corresponding accumulated assets, future taxpayers ultimately bear the financing burden.

The concern, therefore, is not that Zambia has already reached a fiscal cliff. It is that the country could accumulate a political retirement liability whose size and long-term implications are insufficiently visible without proper actuarial assessment.

2. International Experience

International experience shows that political retirement can be incorporated into structured pension systems rather than relying exclusively on future Treasury revenues.

The United Kingdom operates the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund, covering MPs and Ministers through a funded defined-benefit arrangement supported by member and employer contributions. Canada operates a contributory defined-benefit parliamentary pension plan, with contributions determined actuarially. South Africa provides a particularly relevant regional example through its Political Office-Bearers Pension Fund, which uses a defined-contribution structure for national and provincial political office-bearers.

These systems differ substantially, and Zambia should not simply copy any one model. Their common lesson is more important: political retirement can be funded, actuarially assessed, portable and institutionally managed rather than being treated primarily as an open-ended future claim on taxpayers.

The appropriate Zambian model should therefore be determined by the country’s fiscal capacity, political tenure patterns, pension infrastructure and desired level of retirement protection.

3. Why a Funded and Portable Model Makes Sense for Zambia

Political office creates a distinctive actuarial challenge. Tenure is uncertain, electoral-cycle driven and frequently interrupted. An individual may serve one term, leave office, return later, become a Minister and subsequently return to Parliament.

A system that creates separate Treasury obligations for each period of service can become difficult to administer and even harder to forecast. A portable retirement account would instead ensure that each period of qualifying service builds upon an identifiable retirement asset.

The central design choice is between defined-benefit (DB) and defined-contribution (DC) arrangements. DB systems predetermine benefits and place significant investment and longevity risks on the sponsoring institution. DC systems predetermine contributions, with retirement outcomes depending on accumulated contributions and investment performance.

Neither is inherently superior. The critical questions are who bears the risks, how the obligation is funded, whether assets accumulate, whether the State’s exposure is measurable and whether benefits are portable and adequate.

Given the relatively short and uncertain tenure of political office, a funded DC system, potentially supplemented by a carefully designed hybrid element, is likely to be the most transparent and fiscally manageable approach.

An MP serving one term should retain the retirement capital accumulated during that service. If the individual later returns to Parliament, becomes a Minister or enters another qualifying office, contributions should continue into the same account. Leaving political office should ordinarily preserve or transfer accumulated retirement assets rather than create an immediate unfunded Treasury obligation.

4. The Proposed Political Office-Bearers Retirement Scheme

Zambia should consider establishing a prospective Political Office-Bearers Retirement Scheme (POBRS) for future qualifying officeholders while protecting accrued rights. Its core principle would be: political service should generate retirement assets, not merely future claims on the Treasury.

Portable individual accounts. Each qualifying office-bearer would have an individual retirement account that follows the member rather than the office. Contributions and investment returns would remain attached to the member throughout qualifying periods of political service.

Regular contributions. Government would make regular employer contributions throughout political service. A defined employee contribution could also be considered, subject to affordability and the remuneration framework established by the Emoluments Commission. Contribution rates should be determined actuarially, not politically.

Reforming gratuities. Where resources are currently provided as end-of-term gratuities, an appropriate portion could be redirected into regular retirement contributions during service. The architecture would therefore move from service, gratuity, large Treasury payment at exit, to service, regular contributions, investment, accumulated retirement asset. This does not automatically reduce the cost of retirement. Rather, it converts part of a future fiscal obligation into an identifiable financial asset. Any gratuity conversion should therefore be undertaken only after actuarial and fiscal modelling establishes that it is affordable and does not materially worsen the State’s long-term position.

Ring-fenced assets and professional management. POBRS assets should be legally protected from Government’s ordinary expenditure and managed by appropriately regulated professional institutions. The scheme should be subject to fiduciary standards, diversification and concentration limits, liquidity requirements, independent governance and regular actuarial valuations. Investment decisions must not be politically directed.

Use existing pension infrastructure. Zambia should avoid creating an expensive parallel pension bureaucracy. The Pensions and Insurance Authority (PIA) could provide prudential regulatory oversight, while regulated administrators, custodians, investment managers and trustees could provide the operational infrastructure.

5. Fiscal Sustainability and Development Finance

The transition requires careful modelling because a funded scheme changes the timing of government expenditure. Under a gratuity model, Government may defer substantial expenditure until the end of a term. Under a funded pension model, contributions begin during service.

Government should therefore establish the current annual cost of political retirement, the present value of accrued and projected liabilities, projected beneficiary numbers, expected political turnover, contribution requirements, the portion of gratuities that could be redirected, transition costs over 5, 10 and 20 years, projected fund assets and the resulting change in unfunded Treasury exposure.

The reform should be accompanied by a long-term fiscal impact statement and stress-tested for investment underperformance, higher inflation, increased turnover, longer life expectancy and possible future expansion of coverage.

The wider pension system also demonstrates why liquidity and actuarial sustainability must not be confused. The relevant question is not simply how much money is available today, but what assets and contributions exist today to finance obligations that may arise decades into the future.

A funded political retirement system could also contribute to domestic capital formation. Accumulated pension assets, subject to fiduciary and risk-management requirements, could participate in commercially viable long-term investments in energy, transport, housing, agriculture, manufacturing, logistics and digital infrastructure. The principle should not be compulsory financing of Government projects. Pension capital should be invested on an arm’s-length basis in bankable projects capable of delivering appropriate risk-adjusted returns.

The potential cycle is: political service, pension contributions, accumulated assets, investment returns, retirement security, domestic capital formation, economic growth.

6. Constitutional and Institutional Framework

The reform can be developed within Zambia’s existing constitutional and institutional architecture. Article 264 of the Constitution, together with the Emoluments Commission Act, 2022 (Act No. 1 of 2022), provides an important basis for determining emoluments, pensions and retirement benefits of relevant State officers. The objective should therefore be to strengthen existing institutions rather than create new ones.

Responsibilities should be clearly allocated: the Emoluments Commission for remuneration and benefit design within its constitutional and statutory mandate; the Ministry of Finance for fiscal affordability, budget treatment and assessment of long-term State exposure; the Pensions and Insurance Authority for prudential regulation of the pension arrangement and service providers; independent actuaries for contribution requirements, benefit adequacy and periodic valuations; trustees for fiduciary responsibility for scheme assets and members’ interests; and the Auditor-General for appropriate public audit and accountability.

Every new retirement entitlement should answer one fundamental question: what asset or contribution is being created today to finance the benefit promised tomorrow? If the answer is simply “future taxpayers”, the policy requires greater scrutiny.

7. Policy Recommendations

Zambia should undertake an independent actuarial valuation of existing and proposed political retirement benefits and associated long-term fiscal obligations, and establish a prospective, portable and funded POBRS for future qualifying political officeholders while protecting accrued rights.

It should adopt defined contributions as the core architecture, while permitting a limited hybrid element only where it can be actuarially funded and fiscally contained, and redirect an appropriate portion of existing gratuity expenditure into regular retirement contributions, subject to actuarial and fiscal assessment.

Government should require transparent disclosure of long-term fiscal costs whenever new political retirement benefits are proposed, and restrict new open-ended, non-contributory post-service obligations unless their fiscal and actuarial implications have been independently assessed.

It should use the existing regulated pension ecosystem rather than establishing parallel institutions, and permit prudent investment in productive domestic assets, subject to fiduciary, diversification, liquidity and risk-management requirements.

Finally, it should require annual public reporting of membership, contributions, assets, investment performance, benefits and Government expenditure, supported by independent actuarial valuations at least every three years, and treat any future expansion of coverage as a separately modelled policy decision, particularly where Ministers, MPs or local-government office-bearers are concerned.

8. Implementation Roadmap

Implementation should proceed in four stages.

Phase 1: Diagnostic and Actuarial Assessment (0 to 6 months). The Emoluments Commission, Ministry of Finance, Attorney-General and PIA should inventory existing benefits and beneficiaries, map legal entitlements, establish current expenditure and assess accrued and projected liabilities.

Phase 2: Scheme and Legal Design (6 to 12 months). Independent actuaries should model contribution rates, benefit adequacy, gratuity conversion, coverage, portability and transition options. Government should publish the fiscal implications of the principal alternatives.

Phase 3: Legislation and Operationalisation (12 to 36 months). The POBRS legal framework should establish eligibility, contributions, portability, preservation of benefits, ring-fencing, governance, investment rules, disclosure and transition arrangements. Individual accounts, trustees, administrators, custodians and investment managers should then be appointed and contributions commenced.

Phase 4: Continuing Oversight. Annual reports should disclose membership, contributions, assets, investment performance, benefit payments, Government contributions and material changes in fiscal exposure. Independent actuarial valuations should occur at least every three years or sooner where material changes warrant them.

Conclusion: From Political Pensions to Productive Retirement Assets

Zambia’s policy journey has moved from inadequate post-service protection towards increasingly formal political retirement benefits. The historical experience of former political leaders demonstrated the human and institutional costs of leaving political office without adequate economic security. The subsequent expansion of statutory benefits is therefore understandable.

But the solution cannot be the progressive accumulation of larger and longer-term obligations on the Consolidated Fund without corresponding assessment of their actuarial and fiscal implications. The recent statutory expansion of benefits for former Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Speakers provides an opportunity to address the broader architecture before retirement arrangements potentially extend to larger categories of political office-bearers.

The choice is not between dignity for former leaders and fiscal discipline. A well-designed system can achieve both. International experience demonstrates that political office can be incorporated into funded pension arrangements supported by contributions, accumulated assets, professional investment management and actuarial oversight. For Zambia, a portable, funded and predominantly defined-contribution model offers a practical means of achieving that objective while limiting the accumulation of unfunded Treasury liabilities.

The ultimate objective is to transform political retirement from a predominantly future public expenditure into an accumulated financial asset. Such a reform would protect the dignity of those who serve the Republic, improve fiscal transparency and intergenerational equity, strengthen domestic capital markets and potentially create an additional source of long-term investment capital for national development.

Zambia should increasingly fund tomorrow’s political retirement through contributions and assets accumulated today, rather than relying predominantly on tomorrow’s taxpayers to finance promises made yesterday. That is not merely pension reform. It is a reform of fiscal sustainability, political governance and domestic development finance.

Related reading: Pension Laws 2026: Emoluments Commission Leads Copperbelt Engagement, Beyond Salaries: How the Emoluments Commission Can Strengthen Zambia’s Economy, Zambia’s Emoluments Commission Opens ZCAS Salary Harmonisation as Wage Bill Pressure Builds and NAPSA Pays K9.1 Million in Interest Free Pension Advances Within Three Days.

Related: Attorney General Kabesha Launches Public-Private Partnership to Fight Money Laundering

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

By Kelvin Chisanga

A strong base carried into the quarter

Zambia’s economy moved through the second quarter of 2026 on the back of a strong start to the year. GDP grew 7.7% in the first quarter, with agriculture the standout performer, expanding output by 21.4% year on year after a difficult run of poor harvests in preceding seasons. That recovery gave the economy room to absorb the usual second-quarter pressures: a seasonal dip in agricultural marketing activity, continued energy constraints and the fiscal demands of a government still working through its 2026 spending plan.

Q2 did not repeat the first quarter’s growth rate on its own, but the underlying picture held up. Inflation kept falling, the external account strengthened and reserves stayed comfortably above the International Monetary Fund’s usual three-month import cover benchmark.

Inflation eases back inside target

Inflation fell from 6.8% in April to 6.5% in June, settling inside the Bank of Zambia’s 6 to 8% target range for the first time in several years. The decline reflects a steadier kwacha, improved food supply following the stronger agricultural harvest, and the base effects of high prices recorded a year earlier.

The central bank held its policy rate at 13.25% through the quarter. A rate held rather than cut signals the Bank of Zambia is watching for the disinflation trend to prove durable before easing the cost of borrowing further, a caution that matters directly to businesses waiting for cheaper credit to expand.

Trade surplus widens

Zambia recorded a K14.7 billion trade surplus in the second quarter, with exports of K85.2 billion against imports of K70.4 billion. Copper remains the main driver of that export performance, though the scale of the surplus also reflects import compression: businesses and consumers facing tighter budgets tend to buy fewer imported goods, which flatters the trade balance without necessarily reflecting stronger competitiveness.

Reserves stood at around US$6.5 billion, covering approximately 4.4 months of prospective imports, well above the three-month threshold generally considered a minimum safety margin. That buffer gives the Bank of Zambia room to manage kwacha volatility if external conditions turn, whether from a copper price correction or a shift in global interest rates.

The budget: a platform, not a guarantee

The K253.1 billion 2026 Budget gives government the fiscal space to fund the sector priorities that would extend the recovery. But a budget is only as good as its execution, and execution is where the pressure is showing. Certain tax lines have underperformed against target, and grant inflows from cooperating partners have come in lower than projected, both of which narrow the room to spend without adding to debt.

That gap is the difference between a budget that reads well on paper and one that changes what Zambians experience day to day. Revenue mobilisation, particularly VAT administration, needs to close faster than it has to avoid squeezing productive spending in favour of debt servicing and recurrent costs.

Where the risks sit

The main threats to the recovery are not new, but they have not gone away either. Fiscal pressure and debt servicing costs continue to compete with development spending. Energy constraints, still a live issue for industry and mining operations that depend on reliable power, could cap output just as production is recovering. Mining underperformance, whether from operational setbacks or a softer copper price, would hit both export earnings and government revenue directly, given how much of the fiscus depends on the sector. External shocks, from global interest rate moves to shifts in commodity demand, sit largely outside Zambia’s control. And weak household purchasing power means that even as the headline numbers improve, many Zambians are not yet feeling the difference in their monthly budgets.

Five priorities for the second half

Sustaining the improvement through the rest of 2026 depends on where government and the private sector put their effort next. Five priorities stand out: protecting the price stability gained so far rather than treating it as achieved and settled; strengthening domestic revenue mobilisation and closing gaps in VAT administration; steering spending toward productive investment rather than consumption; accelerating energy and infrastructure projects that remove current bottlenecks to production; and creating a more attractive environment for private investment and job creation.

On the sector side, the priorities are agricultural productivity and agro-processing to convert this year’s harvest recovery into lasting capacity, higher copper production with more local value addition, reliable energy supply, manufacturing growth, stronger SME access to finance, and continued investment in infrastructure and digitalisation.

What this means for business, investors and households

For businesses: a policy rate held steady and inflation inside target suggest the cost of borrowing may ease later in the year if the trend holds, making it worth preparing expansion or working-capital plans now rather than waiting for a rate cut that is not yet confirmed.

For investors: a widening trade surplus and reserves near 4.4 months of import cover point to a more stable kwacha in the near term, though the surplus partly reflects weaker import demand rather than pure export strength, a distinction worth factoring into any assessment of underlying competitiveness.

For households: lower inflation should translate into slower price increases at the till, but the improvement is gradual and starts from a high base after several years of cost-of-living pressure. Wages and incomes have not moved at the same pace as the headline numbers, which is the gap the recovery still has to close.

Stability is won. Growth still has to be felt

Zambia has largely won the stabilisation battle: inflation is inside target, the trade account is in surplus, reserves are healthy and the fiscal framework for the year is in place. The harder task is turning that stability into production, investment, jobs and higher incomes, the things that show up in a household budget rather than a Bank of Zambia press release.

A stable economy that stays a number on paper is not the outcome anyone set out to achieve. The test for the second half of 2026 is whether the gains recorded in Q2 start reaching the people the statistics are meant to describe.

Related reading: Zambia’s 7.7% GDP Growth: Why It Doesn’t Feel Like It, Strong Grounds for Take-Off: Zambia Is Entering a Sweet Spot of Economic Positivity, Zambia’s Inflation Eases to 6.2% as Food Price Growth Slows and What the Bank of Zambia Policy Rate Means for Your Loan.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Munsanje was among the elected members Speaker Nelly Mutti swore in at Parliament Buildings in Lusaka on 8 September, as the National Assembly worked through the roughly 224 constituency and nominated seats returned from the 13 August general election. The exercise followed Vice President Mutale Nalumango’s own oath a day earlier, which formally opened the chamber’s 2026-2031 term.

A second term for Mbabala’s UPND MP

Munsanje represents Mbabala, a 12-ward constituency in the northern part of Choma District in Southern Province. He first won the seat for the UPND in 2021, succeeding a line of MPs that includes Emmanuel Hachipuka and Ephraim Belemu, both of whom also sat for the party. Tuesday’s oath returns him for a second term after the 13 August general election, in which President Hakainde Hichilema was also re-elected.

Parliament’s own biographical record lists Munsanje’s qualifications as a Grade 12 certificate, a Bachelor of Social Work, an MPhil in Development Studies and a Certificate in Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, with a professional background as a development specialist and social worker. He was born on 14 February 1973 and is married.

A constituency left intact by this year’s boundary review

Mbabala’s borders were a live question earlier in 2026. During February’s delimitation sittings, stakeholders adopted a model that created a new Choma South constituency by dividing neighbouring Choma Central, an arrangement that left Mbabala intact. The distinction matters locally: Choma South’s first MP, Trevor Mwiinde, was sworn in this week too, but Munsanje’s own constituents kept the same ward boundaries and Constituency Development Fund allocation they had going into the election.

That continuity carries into the new term’s priorities. Mbabala’s local economy is predominantly agricultural, and the constituency’s CDF allocation has previously supported health infrastructure alongside the roads, schools and water projects typical of rural Southern Province seats. What Munsanje’s second term adds to that record is now the practical test facing his constituents.

What comes next

The National Assembly’s swearing-in continues over several sittings before members proceed to elect a Speaker and hear the presidential address that formally opens the legislative programme for 2026 to 2031. Munsanje joins a UPND caucus that returned with a substantial majority of the roughly 224 seats declared following the 13 August poll.

Related coverage

• Mwiinde Sworn In as Choma South MP, Renews Call to Respect Election Outcomes
• Jacqueline Sabao Sworn In for Second Term as Chikankata MP
• HH Widens Gap to 225,971 Votes as ECZ Confirms 105 Constituencies

Explore The Zambian Economist

Discover more ways to connect with Zambia’s business and economic community:

• Browse the Business Directory
• Explore upcoming events
• Advertise with The Zambian Economist
• Submit an article

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

Trevor Mwiinde raised his right hand and took the oath of office as Member of Parliament for Choma South on 8 September, one of 112 MPs sworn in at Parliament Buildings in Lusaka by Speaker Nelly Mutti. Choma South is a new constituency, carved out in the 2025 delimitation exercise, and Mwiinde’s swearing-in formally closes out a contest he had already spent the past three weeks talking about from the other side of the podium: as UPND deputy national youth chairman urging losing candidates elsewhere to accept theirs.

“Let us respect the outcome”

Speaking on One Love Radio in Lusaka days before his own swearing-in, Mwiinde had appealed to candidates who lost Zambia’s 13 August general election to let the process stand. “With due respect, let us respect the outcome of the immediate past elections and give the newly elected Members of Parliament an opportunity to serve,” he said.

He was speaking directly to the backlog of election petitions that losing candidates have filed against the results, and he singled out one group he wants protected from the disruption: newly elected youthful and female MPs, who he said should be allowed to work, serve their constituents and deliver on their mandates without “unnecessary distractions.”

Inside the petitions backlog

The numbers explain why Mwiinde felt the appeal was necessary. Once the 14-day window to file after the 13 August vote closed, 67 parliamentary election petitions had landed in Zambia’s High Courts, touching close to 30% of the 224 parliamentary seats the Electoral Commission of Zambia declared. Lusaka High Court alone is carrying 41 of them. Losing candidates cite grounds ranging from vote buying to defamation and political violence.

Zambian electoral law gives an MP whose election is challenged the right to keep the seat while the petition runs its course, and it requires each case to be heard and determined in open court within 90 days of filing. That timeline means most of the current backlog should be resolved by early December, but it also means dozens of newly elected MPs are governing under a live legal cloud for their first months in office. Not every petition survives that long: Kanchibiya’s Sunday Chanda withdrew his own challenge this month, citing a doubled Constituency Development Fund allocation that followed from the same delimitation exercise that created seats like Choma South.

A crowded day of oaths

Mwiinde was in good company on 8 September. The Speaker also swore in Jacqueline Sabao for a second term as Chikankata MP, Kakubo for a third term as Kapiri Mposhi West MP, Romeo Kangombe for a third term as Sesheke East MP, and independent MP Iris Kaingu for the Mwandi seat. For Mwiinde, a first-time MP taking up a constituency that did not exist at the last election, the day carried a different weight: it was both his own first appearance on the order paper and, in his telling, evidence that the process he had been defending on air actually delivers a working Parliament.

What Choma South is asking for

Mwiinde used his first remarks as MP to lay out what the constituency needs rather than dwell on the campaign. He pointed to farmers who depend on dams for gardening and livestock and struggle through drought years, and pledged to push for better road networks and the reopening of the dormant Masuku railway line to support animal husbandry in the area. On social infrastructure, he was blunt: “Choma South, Choma Rural has never had a hospital,” and the constituency has no mortuary and only one government secondary school. He said he would lobby for a hospital, mortuary facilities and a tertiary technical training institution.

Why it matters beyond Choma South

A parliamentary term that opens with roughly a third of its seats under legal challenge is not, on its own, a governance crisis: the law anticipates exactly this scenario and builds in a fixed clock to resolve it. But it does mean donors, investors and civil servants dealing with the new intake in Southern Province and elsewhere should expect some MPs’ authority to carry an asterisk until their petitions clear, and it puts a premium on the courts meeting the 90-day deadline rather than letting cases drift. Mwiinde’s appeal, echoed by other UPND figures since the election, is as much about protecting the functioning of the Ninth Assembly as it is about individual seats.

Related coverage

• Jacqueline Sabao Sworn In for Second Term as Chikankata MP
• Kakubo Sworn In as MP for Kapiri Mposhi West, His Third Parliamentary Term
• Sesheke East’s Romeo Kangombe Sworn In for a Third Term, Says Development “Has No Finish Line”
• Independent MP Iris Kaingu Takes Mwandi Seat: What Her Win Means for Western Province’s Economy
• Sunday Chanda Withdraws Kanchibiya Election Petition, Cites Doubled CDF From Delimitation
• The Economics of Zambia’s 2026 Election
• 2026 Zambia Election Results Dashboard

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
© 2026 The Zambian Economist.

Work With The Zambian Economist

• Advertise With Us
• List With Us
• Submit an Article

Related: Joseph Munsanje Sworn In for Second Term as Mbabala MP