<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Parliament &#8211; The Zambian Economist | Your Brand. Our Platform. Maximum Impact.</title>
	<atom:link href="https://zambianeconomist.com/tag/parliament/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://zambianeconomist.com</link>
	<description>Your Bridge to Zambia&#039;s Economic Future.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:39:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.1.5</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Kawina Takes the Chair at Public Accounts Committee, Succeeding Mwambazi</title>
		<link>https://zambianeconomist.com/poho-kawina-public-accounts-committee-chairperson/</link>
					<comments>https://zambianeconomist.com/poho-kawina-public-accounts-committee-chairperson/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Zambian Economist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 13:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Auditor General Explained]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Business & Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Leadership & Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[14th National Assembly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Auditor General]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Auditor General Zambia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Member of Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National Assembly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Public Accounts Committee]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://zambianeconomist.com/poho-kawina-public-accounts-committee-chairperson/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Solwezi Central MP Poho Kawina has been elected chairperson of the Public Accounts Committee, succeeding Warren Mwambazi, with the Auditor General's 2025 report as his first test.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Solwezi Central MP Poho Kawina has taken over the chair of Parliament&#8217;s Public Accounts Committee, the body that examines how government spends public money, succeeding Bwana Mkubwa MP Warren Mwambazi.</strong></p>



<p class="tze-byline wp-block-paragraph"><strong>By The Zambian Economist Analyst</strong></p>



<div class="wp-block-group key-takeaways-box has-pale-yellow-background-color has-background is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-e86b207e wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained" style="border-left-color:#f0b429;border-left-width:4px;padding-top:20px;padding-right:24px;padding-bottom:20px;padding-left:24px;background-color:#fff8e1">

<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Key takeaways</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list" style="list-style-type:disc;padding-left:1.4em;margin-left:0.4em;list-style-position:outside">
<li style="display:list-item">Solwezi Central MP Poho Kawina has been appointed to the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) by the Speaker and elected its chairperson for the Fourteenth National Assembly.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">He succeeds Bwana Mkubwa MP Warren Mwambazi, who chaired the committee from 2021 and was known for tough questioning of controlling officers.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">Kawina was elected to Parliament in August 2026 as an independent candidate.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">His first test will be the Auditor General&#8217;s 2025 report, which flags K3.56 billion in health arrears and K626.64 million in uncollected mining penalties.</li>
</ul>

</div>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kawina announced his appointment on Tuesday, 20 October, as the Fourteenth National Assembly completed its sessional committee line-ups. He said he had been appointed to the committee by the Speaker and then elected chairperson by its members.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">&#8220;This appointment is a great responsibility, and I remain committed to serving with integrity, accountability, and dedication in the best interests of the people and our nation,&#8221; he said in a statement.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the Public Accounts Committee does</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The PAC is the House&#8217;s main check on public spending. It takes the Auditor General&#8217;s reports on the accounts of the Republic and calls in controlling officers, usually permanent secretaries, to explain unretired imprests, irregular payments, missing stores and procurement that broke the rules. Its reports go to the full House for debate, and the Treasury is expected to respond with action taken on each query.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">In practice, the committee is where audit findings either gain consequences or fade. A strong chair can turn a line in an audit report into a recovery of funds, a disciplinary case or a change in how a ministry handles cash.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Big shoes to fill</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kawina takes over from Warren Mwambazi, a lawyer, chartered accountant and former internal auditor, who chaired the PAC from 2021. Mwambazi built a reputation for blunt hearings, including sending a Ministry of Agriculture delegation away over more than US$108 million in fertiliser and seed contracts, according to press coverage. He was re-elected in Bwana Mkubwa in August on the UPND ticket.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Kawina comes to the chair as an independent. He won Solwezi Central in the 13 August general election, having said during the post-election period that he would work with government where cooperation benefits his constituency.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The first test: the 2025 audit</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The committee&#8217;s immediate workload is the Auditor General&#8217;s report for the financial year ended 31 December 2025. Our analysis found <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-auditor-general-report-2025-findings/">K3.56 billion in health arrears and K626.64 million in uncollected mining penalties</a> among its findings. For an MP from Solwezi, at the centre of North-Western Province&#8217;s copper belt, the mining revenue questions are close to home.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For readers who want the plain-language version, see <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/where-did-our-money-go-zambia-audit-2025-citizens-guide/">Where did our money go? A citizens&#8217; guide to Zambia&#8217;s 2025 audit</a>, part of our Auditor General Explained series.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What to watch</h2>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table><thead><tr><th>Issue</th><th>Why it matters</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Hearing schedule</td><td>How quickly the committee starts calling controlling officers on the 2025 report</td></tr><tr><td>Recoveries</td><td>Whether queried amounts are recovered or written off</td></tr><tr><td>Treasury Minutes</td><td>Government&#8217;s formal response to PAC recommendations, and whether it is followed through</td></tr><tr><td>Mining revenue</td><td>Follow-up on uncollected penalties and royalties flagged by the Auditor General</td></tr></tbody></table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/kangombe-energy-water-tourism-committee-2026/">Kangombe Returns to Energy, Water and Tourism Committee, This Time as a Member</a> | <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/auditor-general-explained/">Auditor General Explained</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/access-to-information-act-zambia-citizens-accountability/">The Window to Accountability: How the Access to Information Act Empowers Citizens</a></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/jacqueline-sabao-pac-deputy-chairperson-re-elected/">Sabao Re-elected Deputy Chairperson of Public Accounts Committee, Unopposed</a></p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="has-text-color wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#c00000"><strong>WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-color wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#c00000"><strong>WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: <a href="mailto:info@zambianeconomist.com">info@zambianeconomist.com</a><br>© 2026 The Zambian Economist.</strong></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Work With The Zambian Economist</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/advertise/">Advertise With Us</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/directory/">List With Us</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/submit-article/">Submit an Article</a></li>
</ul>

<p><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/oag-2027-2031-strategic-plan-grow-zambia-agenda/">Five Years, One Mission: OAG Opens 2027-2031 Strategic Plan Talks</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://zambianeconomist.com/poho-kawina-public-accounts-committee-chairperson/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Zambia&#8217;s Most Representative Parliament Now Has to Earn It</title>
		<link>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-parliament-representation-women-youth-disability/</link>
					<comments>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-parliament-representation-women-youth-disability/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Zambian Economist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 05:46:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Leadership & Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Youth & Women Empowerment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[14th National Assembly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disability Inclusion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[election 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Grow Zambia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hakainde Hichilema]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proportional Representation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Women in Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Youth Representation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://zambianeconomist.com/?p=3408</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Forty proportional representation seats will seat record numbers of women, young people and Zambians with disabilities when the National Assembly opens on 9 October. Who sits in the chamber has changed. What citizens get out of it is the test that follows.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><em>Forty proportional representation seats will seat record numbers of women, young people and Zambians with disabilities when the National Assembly opens on 9 October. Who sits in the chamber has changed. What citizens get out of it is the test that follows.</em></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>By The Zambian Economist Analyst | Lusaka | 24 September 2026</strong></p>



<div class="wp-block-group key-takeaways-box is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-411a3c67 wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained" style="border-left-color:#F0B429;border-left-style:solid;border-left-width:4px;background-color:#FFFFFF;padding-top:20px;padding-right:24px;padding-bottom:20px;padding-left:24px;margin-top:0px;margin-bottom:32px">

<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>


<ul class="wp-block-list" style="line-height:1.6">

<li>Zambia&#8217;s 13 August election filled the first 40 proportional representation seats in the National Assembly&#8217;s history: 20 reserved for women, 15 for youth and 5 for persons with disabilities, shared between parties according to their presidential vote.</li>


<li>Women won only 32 of the 226 constituency seats, about 14 percent, close to the share they held in the last Assembly. The reserved seats lift the number of women in the new House to at least 52, the highest on record.</li>


<li>President Hakainde Hichilema has framed the change as a responsibility for all citizens to “GROW ZAMBIA TOGETHER”; the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities has welcomed the five disability seats.</li>


<li>The First Session of the 14th National Assembly opens on 9 October, when members elect a Speaker and take up committee assignments.</li>


<li>The seats will count only if they change output: laws, budgets and scrutiny that improve access to services, credit and markets for groups the chamber has long missed.</li>

</ul>

</div>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zambia&#8217;s next Parliament will seat more women, more young people and more Zambians with disabilities than any House before it. The Electoral Commission of Zambia completed the allocation of 40 new proportional representation seats in September, and President Hakainde Hichilema has cast the moment as a call for every citizen to help GROW ZAMBIA. The harder question begins after the swearing in: what will the new members actually pass, scrutinise and change?</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The seats exist because of Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 7 of 2025, which Parliament passed in December 2025. The law expanded the Assembly to 226 constituency seats and added 40 list seats reserved for three groups: 20 for women, 15 for youth and 5 for persons with disabilities. Parties receive the seats based on the national vote their presidential candidates won, then fill them from candidate lists lodged before polling day.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The reform responded to a stubborn pattern. In the constituencies, almost nothing moved. Women won 32 of the 226 directly elected seats declared after the 13 August poll, about 14 percent, close to the 15 percent share they held across the last Assembly, where 25 women sat in a House of 167. With the reserved seats added, the new Assembly opens with at least 52 women among its 266 constituency and list members, just under one in five, before the President&#8217;s nominations are announced.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">How the 40 seats were shared</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The UPND, which won the presidential election with 61.3 percent of the vote and 137 constituency seats, took 32 of the 40 list places. The NRPUP of runner-up Brian Mundubile took the remaining 8. Smaller parties and independents, which won 28 constituency seats between them, did not qualify for list seats.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-table"><table class="has-fixed-layout">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th scope="col">Reserved category</th>
<th scope="col">UPND</th>
<th scope="col">NRPUP</th>
<th scope="col">Total</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons with disabilities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table></figure>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The presidential result itself remains disputed. Mr Mundubile rejected it, and European Union observers described a competitive race on an uneven playing field. The seat allocations, however, rest on the certified returns and on the December 2025 amendment, and the parties have seated their list members.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why the numbers only moved by statute</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zambian women have contested seats at a similar rate for two decades, and the ballot box never fixed the imbalance. The Inter-Parliamentary Union put the world average for women in national parliaments at 27.5 percent in January 2026. Zambia&#8217;s new Assembly, at just under 20 percent even with the reserved seats, remains below that mark.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The gap is wider for age. United Nations estimates put Zambia&#8217;s median age at about 17, one of the youngest national populations in the world, yet the chamber that writes the rules on education financing, apprenticeships and first jobs has rarely reflected it. The 15 youth seats give that cohort a voting presence for the first time.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For Zambians with disabilities, the change is more basic. Until this year, a disabled Zambian typically reached the National Assembly only through presidential nomination. Five reserved seats now guarantee the group a place regardless of who occupies State House.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the President said</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mr Hichilema set out the stakes in a message posted after the list was confirmed, and the Ministry of Finance circulated it with a challenge of its own: representation must mean opportunity for ordinary citizens, measured in better laws, stronger accountability and improvements people can feel.</p>



<blockquote class="wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow">

<p class="wp-block-paragraph">“We ALL have a responsibility to help GROW ZAMBIA. Working late this evening, thinking about every person living with a disability in Zambia, every young person with leadership ambition, every woman working to improve the lives of others; They are now represented in Parliament more than ever before so let&#8217;s all work hard and smart to GROW ZAMBIA TOGETHER!”</p>

<cite>President Hakainde Hichilema</cite>
</blockquote>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities welcomed the disability seats. Student unions and civic groups that received the new members in September urged them to champion the Grow Zambia agenda rather than settle quietly into the chamber.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The citizen test: laws, budgets and follow through</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">A seat changes little on its own. Three tests will show whether representation is working.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Can the five disability members move money? The Persons with Disabilities Act of 2022 promises accessible public services on paper. Ministry budget lines, not statements, decide whether a rural clinic gets a ramp or a sign language interpreter. If the disability bloc cannot defend those allocations through the budget cycle, the seats will have been ceremonial.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Can the youth members touch the credit system? The test is whether they shift practical levers: apprenticeship funding, procurement set-asides for small firms, and the terms on which young Zambians can borrow to start a business.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Can the women members get committee power? Legislation lives in committees. The Public Accounts Committee, whose interrogation of Auditor General findings we track in our <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/auditor-general-explained/">AG Reports hub</a>, is where ministry spending is questioned line by line. Chairmanships and membership matter as much as headcounts.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The business and investor read</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For employers and investors, a broader chamber should produce workable rules. Members who have run market stalls, managed disability services or searched for their first job tend to write procurement, licensing and credit rules that smaller firms can actually follow.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The cost is real too. The House has grown from 164 members in the last term to 266 constituency and list members before nominations, with salaries, gratuities and constituency offices to match. As our <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-emoluments-commission-economic-role/">analysis of the Emoluments Commission</a> set out, the bill for public office should be judged against the output it buys. Citizens will be entitled to ask what the larger Parliament delivered by 2028.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Legislative stability is the other variable investors price. The Speaker election on 9 October and the handling of the first legislative programme will signal whether the expanded House can process business, or whether it adds friction.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What to watch from 9 October</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The First Session of the 14th National Assembly opens on Friday 9 October. Watch four things: who is elected Speaker, an office Nelly Mutti held as its first woman in the last Assembly; which committees the new members chair; how the youth, women and disability blocs vote when their interests diverge from party lines; and whether their fingerprints appear in the 2027 Budget, the first spending plan of the new term, which we have <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-budget-2027-jobs-productive-investment/">argued should put jobs and productive investment first</a>.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The seats are won. Zambia will judge its most representative Parliament by what leaves the chamber: laws, budgets and oversight that citizens can feel.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Sources and related reading</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">

<li><a href="https://www.elections.org.zm/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Electoral Commission of Zambia: 2026 general election results</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Assembly of Zambia</a></li>


<li><a href="https://data.ipu.org/parliament/ZM/ZM-LC01/data-on-women/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">IPU Parline: Zambia, women in parliament data</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.lusakatimes.com/2026/09/21/ngos-students-hail-40-new-mps-as-parliament-widens-under-mmpr" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Lusaka Times: NGOs, students hail 40 new MPs as Parliament widens under MMPR, 21 September 2026</a></li>


<li><a href="https://www.electionguide.org/elections/zambia/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">IFES Election Guide: Zambian National Assembly 2026 general</a></li>


<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-election-major-economic-event/">Zambia&#8217;s 2026 Election Is a Major Economic Event</a></li>


<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/hichilema-second-term-economy-international-outlook-2026/">Zambia After the Oath: The Economic and Diplomatic Tests of Hichilema&#8217;s Second Term</a></li>


<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-2027-2031-medium-term-revenue-strategy-consultations/">Zambia to Launch 2027-2031 Revenue Strategy Consultations</a></li>


<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/category/youth-women-empowerment/">Youth and Women Empowerment coverage</a></li>

</ul>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#C00000"><strong>WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.</strong></p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#C00000"><strong>WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com<br>© 2026 The Zambian Economist.</strong></p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Work With The Zambian Economist</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">

<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/advertise/">Advertise With Us</a></li>


<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/list-company/">List With Us</a></li>


<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/submit-article/">Submit an Article</a></li>

</ul>


<p><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/hichilema-official-opening-parliament-2026-what-to-watch/">Hichilema Opens Zambia&#8217;s Largest Parliament Today. Here Is What the Economy Needs to Hear</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-parliament-representation-women-youth-disability/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Looming Fiscal Cliff: Rebuilding Zambia&#8217;s Political Retirement Architecture for Fiscal Sustainability</title>
		<link>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-political-pension-reform-pobrs/</link>
					<comments>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-political-pension-reform-pobrs/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Zambian Economist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 10 Sep 2026 06:12:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Leadership & Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Macroeconomy & Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emoluments Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiscal sustainability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gratuities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[POBRS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political Pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Political Retirement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[public finance]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://zambianeconomist.com/the-looming-fiscal-cliff-rebuilding-zambias-political-retirement-architecture-for-fiscal-sustainability/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Zambia has moved to protect former Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Speakers from post-service economic insecurity. The harder question is how it pays for that protection without quietly building an unfunded political pension liability.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-size:1.15em;"><em>Zambia has moved decisively to protect former Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Speakers from the economic insecurity that once followed public service. The next question is harder: how the country pays for that protection without quietly building a political pension liability future taxpayers cannot see coming.</em></p>
<p><em>By Steven Mbangu</em></p>

<div style="background:#fdf8ee;border-left:6px solid #d4a03f;padding:22px 26px;margin:28px 0;border-radius:4px;">
<p style="margin-top:0;"><strong>KEY TAKEAWAYS</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The Benefits of Former Presidents and Former Vice-Presidents Act, 2026, and the National Assembly (Speaker&#8217;s Retirement Benefits) Act, 2026, formalise political retirement benefits financed mainly from the Consolidated Fund, creating long-duration fiscal obligations rather than one-off costs.</li>
<li>With 226 constituencies and 116 local authorities, any future extension of retirement protection to Ministers, MPs or local-government office-bearers would multiply that exposure and needs its own fiscal and actuarial assessment, not automatic entitlement.</li>
<li>The paper proposes a prospective Political Office-Bearers Retirement Scheme (POBRS): portable individual accounts, regular employer contributions, actuarially set rates, ring-fenced assets and professional investment management, built on the model the UK, Canada and South Africa already use for political pensions.</li>
<li>The goal is not to eliminate the cost of political retirement but to change its timing and transparency, financing obligations progressively during service rather than leaving them as future claims on the Treasury.</li>
<li>An implementation roadmap in four phases, diagnostic and actuarial assessment, scheme and legal design, legislation, and continuing oversight, would run over roughly three years, anchored in the Emoluments Commission&#8217;s Article 264 mandate.</li>
</ul>
</div>

<h2>1. The Policy Problem</h2>
<p>Zambia&#8217;s historical experience makes the case for political retirement protection compelling. Former political office-bearers have, at different times, experienced significant economic hardship after leaving public service. The broader lesson was that political service without a credible post-service economic transition mechanism represents an institutional weakness.</p>
<p>Zambia subsequently developed statutory arrangements beginning with the Benefits of Former Presidents Act, 1993 (Act No. 40 of 1993), now replaced by the Benefits of Former Presidents and Former Vice-Presidents Act, 2026. The National Assembly (Speaker&#8217;s Retirement Benefits) Act, 2026, reflects a similar approach for former Speakers.</p>
<p>These arrangements address a legitimate social objective: people who devote productive years to public leadership should not necessarily leave office without reasonable economic security. But where benefits are financed primarily from the Consolidated Fund rather than accumulated contributions and investment assets, they can also create long-duration fiscal obligations.</p>
<p>This distinction is important. Current expenditure is not the same as long-term fiscal exposure. A payment may be affordable today while increasing obligations that must be financed for many years. If successive cohorts of former office-bearers receive continuing benefits without corresponding accumulated assets, future taxpayers ultimately bear the financing burden.</p>
<p>The concern, therefore, is not that Zambia has already reached a fiscal cliff. It is that the country could accumulate a political retirement liability whose size and long-term implications are insufficiently visible without proper actuarial assessment.</p>

<h2>2. International Experience</h2>
<p>International experience shows that political retirement can be incorporated into structured pension systems rather than relying exclusively on future Treasury revenues.</p>
<p>The United Kingdom operates the Parliamentary Contributory Pension Fund, covering MPs and Ministers through a funded defined-benefit arrangement supported by member and employer contributions. Canada operates a contributory defined-benefit parliamentary pension plan, with contributions determined actuarially. South Africa provides a particularly relevant regional example through its Political Office-Bearers Pension Fund, which uses a defined-contribution structure for national and provincial political office-bearers.</p>
<p>These systems differ substantially, and Zambia should not simply copy any one model. Their common lesson is more important: political retirement can be funded, actuarially assessed, portable and institutionally managed rather than being treated primarily as an open-ended future claim on taxpayers.</p>
<p>The appropriate Zambian model should therefore be determined by the country&#8217;s fiscal capacity, political tenure patterns, pension infrastructure and desired level of retirement protection.</p>

<h2>3. Why a Funded and Portable Model Makes Sense for Zambia</h2>
<p>Political office creates a distinctive actuarial challenge. Tenure is uncertain, electoral-cycle driven and frequently interrupted. An individual may serve one term, leave office, return later, become a Minister and subsequently return to Parliament.</p>
<p>A system that creates separate Treasury obligations for each period of service can become difficult to administer and even harder to forecast. A portable retirement account would instead ensure that each period of qualifying service builds upon an identifiable retirement asset.</p>
<p>The central design choice is between defined-benefit (DB) and defined-contribution (DC) arrangements. DB systems predetermine benefits and place significant investment and longevity risks on the sponsoring institution. DC systems predetermine contributions, with retirement outcomes depending on accumulated contributions and investment performance.</p>
<p>Neither is inherently superior. The critical questions are who bears the risks, how the obligation is funded, whether assets accumulate, whether the State&#8217;s exposure is measurable and whether benefits are portable and adequate.</p>
<p>Given the relatively short and uncertain tenure of political office, a funded DC system, potentially supplemented by a carefully designed hybrid element, is likely to be the most transparent and fiscally manageable approach.</p>
<p>An MP serving one term should retain the retirement capital accumulated during that service. If the individual later returns to Parliament, becomes a Minister or enters another qualifying office, contributions should continue into the same account. Leaving political office should ordinarily preserve or transfer accumulated retirement assets rather than create an immediate unfunded Treasury obligation.</p>

<h2>4. The Proposed Political Office-Bearers Retirement Scheme</h2>
<p>Zambia should consider establishing a prospective Political Office-Bearers Retirement Scheme (POBRS) for future qualifying officeholders while protecting accrued rights. Its core principle would be: political service should generate retirement assets, not merely future claims on the Treasury.</p>
<p><strong>Portable individual accounts.</strong> Each qualifying office-bearer would have an individual retirement account that follows the member rather than the office. Contributions and investment returns would remain attached to the member throughout qualifying periods of political service.</p>
<p><strong>Regular contributions.</strong> Government would make regular employer contributions throughout political service. A defined employee contribution could also be considered, subject to affordability and the remuneration framework established by the Emoluments Commission. Contribution rates should be determined actuarially, not politically.</p>
<p><strong>Reforming gratuities.</strong> Where resources are currently provided as end-of-term gratuities, an appropriate portion could be redirected into regular retirement contributions during service. The architecture would therefore move from service, gratuity, large Treasury payment at exit, to service, regular contributions, investment, accumulated retirement asset. This does not automatically reduce the cost of retirement. Rather, it converts part of a future fiscal obligation into an identifiable financial asset. Any gratuity conversion should therefore be undertaken only after actuarial and fiscal modelling establishes that it is affordable and does not materially worsen the State&#8217;s long-term position.</p>
<p><strong>Ring-fenced assets and professional management.</strong> POBRS assets should be legally protected from Government&#8217;s ordinary expenditure and managed by appropriately regulated professional institutions. The scheme should be subject to fiduciary standards, diversification and concentration limits, liquidity requirements, independent governance and regular actuarial valuations. Investment decisions must not be politically directed.</p>
<p><strong>Use existing pension infrastructure.</strong> Zambia should avoid creating an expensive parallel pension bureaucracy. The Pensions and Insurance Authority (PIA) could provide prudential regulatory oversight, while regulated administrators, custodians, investment managers and trustees could provide the operational infrastructure.</p>

<h2>5. Fiscal Sustainability and Development Finance</h2>
<p>The transition requires careful modelling because a funded scheme changes the timing of government expenditure. Under a gratuity model, Government may defer substantial expenditure until the end of a term. Under a funded pension model, contributions begin during service.</p>
<p>Government should therefore establish the current annual cost of political retirement, the present value of accrued and projected liabilities, projected beneficiary numbers, expected political turnover, contribution requirements, the portion of gratuities that could be redirected, transition costs over 5, 10 and 20 years, projected fund assets and the resulting change in unfunded Treasury exposure.</p>
<p>The reform should be accompanied by a long-term fiscal impact statement and stress-tested for investment underperformance, higher inflation, increased turnover, longer life expectancy and possible future expansion of coverage.</p>
<p>The wider pension system also demonstrates why liquidity and actuarial sustainability must not be confused. The relevant question is not simply how much money is available today, but what assets and contributions exist today to finance obligations that may arise decades into the future.</p>
<p>A funded political retirement system could also contribute to domestic capital formation. Accumulated pension assets, subject to fiduciary and risk-management requirements, could participate in commercially viable long-term investments in energy, transport, housing, agriculture, manufacturing, logistics and digital infrastructure. The principle should not be compulsory financing of Government projects. Pension capital should be invested on an arm&#8217;s-length basis in bankable projects capable of delivering appropriate risk-adjusted returns.</p>
<p>The potential cycle is: political service, pension contributions, accumulated assets, investment returns, retirement security, domestic capital formation, economic growth.</p>

<h2>6. Constitutional and Institutional Framework</h2>
<p>The reform can be developed within Zambia&#8217;s existing constitutional and institutional architecture. Article 264 of the Constitution, together with the Emoluments Commission Act, 2022 (Act No. 1 of 2022), provides an important basis for determining emoluments, pensions and retirement benefits of relevant State officers. The objective should therefore be to strengthen existing institutions rather than create new ones.</p>
<p>Responsibilities should be clearly allocated: the Emoluments Commission for remuneration and benefit design within its constitutional and statutory mandate; the Ministry of Finance for fiscal affordability, budget treatment and assessment of long-term State exposure; the Pensions and Insurance Authority for prudential regulation of the pension arrangement and service providers; independent actuaries for contribution requirements, benefit adequacy and periodic valuations; trustees for fiduciary responsibility for scheme assets and members&#8217; interests; and the Auditor-General for appropriate public audit and accountability.</p>
<p>Every new retirement entitlement should answer one fundamental question: what asset or contribution is being created today to finance the benefit promised tomorrow? If the answer is simply &#8220;future taxpayers&#8221;, the policy requires greater scrutiny.</p>

<h2>7. Policy Recommendations</h2>
<p>Zambia should undertake an independent actuarial valuation of existing and proposed political retirement benefits and associated long-term fiscal obligations, and establish a prospective, portable and funded POBRS for future qualifying political officeholders while protecting accrued rights.</p>
<p>It should adopt defined contributions as the core architecture, while permitting a limited hybrid element only where it can be actuarially funded and fiscally contained, and redirect an appropriate portion of existing gratuity expenditure into regular retirement contributions, subject to actuarial and fiscal assessment.</p>
<p>Government should require transparent disclosure of long-term fiscal costs whenever new political retirement benefits are proposed, and restrict new open-ended, non-contributory post-service obligations unless their fiscal and actuarial implications have been independently assessed.</p>
<p>It should use the existing regulated pension ecosystem rather than establishing parallel institutions, and permit prudent investment in productive domestic assets, subject to fiduciary, diversification, liquidity and risk-management requirements.</p>
<p>Finally, it should require annual public reporting of membership, contributions, assets, investment performance, benefits and Government expenditure, supported by independent actuarial valuations at least every three years, and treat any future expansion of coverage as a separately modelled policy decision, particularly where Ministers, MPs or local-government office-bearers are concerned.</p>

<h2>8. Implementation Roadmap</h2>
<p>Implementation should proceed in four stages.</p>
<p><strong>Phase 1: Diagnostic and Actuarial Assessment (0 to 6 months).</strong> The Emoluments Commission, Ministry of Finance, Attorney-General and PIA should inventory existing benefits and beneficiaries, map legal entitlements, establish current expenditure and assess accrued and projected liabilities.</p>
<p><strong>Phase 2: Scheme and Legal Design (6 to 12 months).</strong> Independent actuaries should model contribution rates, benefit adequacy, gratuity conversion, coverage, portability and transition options. Government should publish the fiscal implications of the principal alternatives.</p>
<p><strong>Phase 3: Legislation and Operationalisation (12 to 36 months).</strong> The POBRS legal framework should establish eligibility, contributions, portability, preservation of benefits, ring-fencing, governance, investment rules, disclosure and transition arrangements. Individual accounts, trustees, administrators, custodians and investment managers should then be appointed and contributions commenced.</p>
<p><strong>Phase 4: Continuing Oversight.</strong> Annual reports should disclose membership, contributions, assets, investment performance, benefit payments, Government contributions and material changes in fiscal exposure. Independent actuarial valuations should occur at least every three years or sooner where material changes warrant them.</p>

<h2>Conclusion: From Political Pensions to Productive Retirement Assets</h2>
<p>Zambia&#8217;s policy journey has moved from inadequate post-service protection towards increasingly formal political retirement benefits. The historical experience of former political leaders demonstrated the human and institutional costs of leaving political office without adequate economic security. The subsequent expansion of statutory benefits is therefore understandable.</p>
<p>But the solution cannot be the progressive accumulation of larger and longer-term obligations on the Consolidated Fund without corresponding assessment of their actuarial and fiscal implications. The recent statutory expansion of benefits for former Presidents, Vice-Presidents and Speakers provides an opportunity to address the broader architecture before retirement arrangements potentially extend to larger categories of political office-bearers.</p>
<p>The choice is not between dignity for former leaders and fiscal discipline. A well-designed system can achieve both. International experience demonstrates that political office can be incorporated into funded pension arrangements supported by contributions, accumulated assets, professional investment management and actuarial oversight. For Zambia, a portable, funded and predominantly defined-contribution model offers a practical means of achieving that objective while limiting the accumulation of unfunded Treasury liabilities.</p>
<p>The ultimate objective is to transform political retirement from a predominantly future public expenditure into an accumulated financial asset. Such a reform would protect the dignity of those who serve the Republic, improve fiscal transparency and intergenerational equity, strengthen domestic capital markets and potentially create an additional source of long-term investment capital for national development.</p>
<p>Zambia should increasingly fund tomorrow&#8217;s political retirement through contributions and assets accumulated today, rather than relying predominantly on tomorrow&#8217;s taxpayers to finance promises made yesterday. That is not merely pension reform. It is a reform of fiscal sustainability, political governance and domestic development finance.</p>

<p><em>Related reading: <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/emoluments-commission-copperbelt-stakeholder-engagement-pension-laws-2026/">Pension Laws 2026: Emoluments Commission Leads Copperbelt Engagement</a>, <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-emoluments-commission-economic-role/">Beyond Salaries: How the Emoluments Commission Can Strengthen Zambia&#8217;s Economy</a>, <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/emoluments-commission-zcas-salary-harmonisation-2026/">Zambia&#8217;s Emoluments Commission Opens ZCAS Salary Harmonisation as Wage Bill Pressure Builds</a> and <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/napsa-pays-k9-1-million-in-interest-free-pension-advances-within-three-days/">NAPSA Pays K9.1 Million in Interest Free Pension Advances Within Three Days</a>.</em></p>

<p><em>Related: <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-ppp-anti-money-laundering-launch/">Attorney General Kabesha Launches Public-Private Partnership to Fight Money Laundering</a></em></p>


<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="has-text-color wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#c00000"><strong>WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-color wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#c00000"><strong>WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: <a href="mailto:info@zambianeconomist.com">info@zambianeconomist.com</a><br>© 2026 The Zambian Economist.</strong></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Work With The Zambian Economist</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/advertise/">Advertise With Us</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/directory/">List With Us</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/submit-article/">Submit an Article</a></li>
</ul>

]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-political-pension-reform-pobrs/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Zambia&#8217;s Mixed-Member Proportional Representation System Works</title>
		<link>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-mixed-member-proportional-representation-system/</link>
					<comments>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-mixed-member-proportional-representation-system/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[The Zambian Economist]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 18:18:05 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Election 2026 Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Leadership & Governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Civic Education]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECZ]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MMPR]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Parliament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proportional Representation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zambia elections 2026]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-mixed-member-proportional-representation-system/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Zambia now combines constituency-based first-past-the-post elections with proportional representation seats for women, youths and persons with disabilities. Here is how the system works.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p class="tze-byline wp-block-paragraph"><strong>By The Zambian Economist Analyst</strong></p>



<div class="wp-block-group key-takeaways-box has-pale-yellow-background-color has-background is-layout-constrained wp-container-core-group-is-layout-e86b207e wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained" style="border-left-color:#f0b429;border-left-width:4px;padding-top:20px;padding-right:24px;padding-bottom:20px;padding-left:24px;background-color:#fff8e1">

<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Key takeaways</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list" style="list-style-type:disc;padding-left:1.4em;margin-left:0.4em;list-style-position:outside">
<li style="display:list-item">Zambia&#8217;s mixed-member proportional representation system combines first-past-the-post constituency elections with proportional representation seats.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">Constituency MPs continue to be elected directly by voters in their constituencies.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">Proportional representation seats are intended for women, youths and persons with disabilities, with allocation linked to political parties&#8217; share of valid presidential votes.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">The model also applies at local government level, where ward-based seats remain alongside proportional representation seats for specified groups.</li>
<li style="display:list-item">For voters, the system means a single general election can shape both direct constituency representation and the proportional distribution of reserved representation seats.</li>
</ul>

</div>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zambia&#8217;s electoral framework now combines constituency-based first-past-the-post voting with proportional representation intended to increase the representation of women, youths and persons with disabilities. Here is a practical guide to what the system means for voters, political parties and the composition of Parliament and councils.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This explainer draws on civic education material produced by the Library Development Foundation (LDF Zambia). The artwork is branded and published by LDF Zambia, which names no individual authors, so The Zambian Economist does not attribute the work to persons who cannot be verified.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What changed in Zambia&#8217;s electoral system?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Zambia has moved to a mixed-member proportional representation electoral framework for the National Assembly and councils. The system brings together two methods of choosing representatives. Some seats are filled through first-past-the-post contests in constituencies and wards, while another group of seats is distributed through proportional representation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The constitutional changes were enacted in 2025, while the Electoral Process Amendment Act of 2026 provided the operational framework for the 13 August general election, the first held under the new rules. The Electoral Commission of Zambia spent the months before the poll sensitising political parties and other stakeholders on the new procedures.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">First-past-the-post remains for constituency MPs</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For constituency-based seats in the National Assembly, voters still elect individual candidates using the familiar first-past-the-post method. The candidate who receives the highest number of votes in a constituency wins that seat.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This preserves the direct link between an elected Member of Parliament and a defined constituency. At local government level, mayoral and council chairperson positions and ward-based councillor seats also continue to use first-past-the-post voting.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Where proportional representation comes in</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The proportional representation component is designed to broaden representation for women, youths and persons with disabilities. These seats are not decided in the same way as constituency contests. Instead, they are distributed to qualifying political parties after a general election according to the prescribed rules.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Under the constitutional framework debated and adopted by the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission distributes proportional representation seats to political parties in proportion to the total number of valid votes received by their presidential candidates. The detailed nomination, party list and allocation procedures are governed by electoral legislation and regulations.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">A simple way to understand the model</h2>



<ol class="wp-block-list">
<li>Voters elect constituency representatives. Candidates contest constituency seats and the candidate with the most votes wins.</li>



<li>Presidential votes also affect proportional representation. A political party&#8217;s share of valid presidential votes is used in determining its proportional allocation under the prescribed system.</li>



<li>Parties use approved lists for proportional seats. Political parties participating in the proportional component submit lists in accordance with electoral rules and timelines.</li>



<li>ECZ allocates the proportional seats after the election. The Electoral Commission applies the legal formula and distributes the available seats among qualifying political parties.</li>



<li>The final legislature combines both types of representatives. The National Assembly therefore contains directly elected constituency MPs together with members entering through proportional representation.</li>
</ol>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Why was the mixed system introduced?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The stated objective of the reform is to improve representation in elected institutions, especially for groups that have historically been under-represented. Parliamentary records identify women, youths and persons with disabilities as the groups targeted by the proportional representation component.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Supporters of the reform argue that first-past-the-post elections can produce legislatures that do not fully reflect the diversity of the electorate. A proportional element gives political parties another route through which specified groups can enter Parliament and councils.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What does it mean for political parties?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Political parties must now pay closer attention to both constituency contests and the proportional representation rules. Their presidential vote share can affect the number of proportional seats they receive, while compliance with party-list requirements determines who is eligible to fill those seats.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">This gives national vote performance an additional institutional consequence beyond the presidential race itself. It also places greater scrutiny on how parties select and rank candidates from the groups covered by proportional representation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What does it mean for voters?</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For voters, the most important point is that Zambia has not abolished constituency representation. Citizens still choose constituency MPs directly. What has changed is that the final composition of Parliament and councils now also includes a proportional component.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">That makes civic education particularly important. A voter may understand who won a constituency but still need to know why additional members enter Parliament through party lists after the election. Explaining that second layer is central to understanding the new system.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the system does not mean</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Mixed-member proportional representation does not mean every parliamentary seat is filled from a party list. It also does not remove constituency voting. Zambia&#8217;s model combines direct constituency elections with a separate proportional mechanism for specified representation seats.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The economic and governance angle</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Electoral rules can affect the quality and composition of public decision-making. Broader representation may bring more varied experiences into debates on the national budget, public services, employment, business regulation and social policy. The practical impact, however, will depend on how political parties nominate candidates and how effectively elected representatives use their positions.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">For businesses and investors, the immediate issue is institutional clarity. Clear electoral rules and transparent seat allocation reduce uncertainty around the formation of the legislature after an election.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Civic education will remain essential</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Library Development Foundation&#8217;s civic education campaign ran ahead of the 13 August poll, the first general election held under the mixed-member proportional system. With constituency results declared, attention now turns to how the proportional seats are filled, and public understanding will depend on simple explanations of how direct seats, party lists and proportional allocation fit together.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The Electoral Commission, civil society organisations, political parties, media houses and civic education organisations therefore have a shared responsibility to explain the system accurately and consistently.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Source and attribution</h2>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">The image shared in this article is the property of the Library Development Foundation (LDF Zambia) and is reproduced with full source attribution for civic education.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Original civic education material: Library Development Foundation (LDF Zambia), “Civic Education: Understanding Zambia&#8217;s Mixed Member Proportional System.” Contact details shown on the artwork include www.ldfzambia.org and info.ldfzambia@gmail.com.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Editorial adaptation: The Zambian Economist. The article has been independently rewritten and expanded for explanatory journalism. The legal and procedural context has been checked against National Assembly of Zambia records and reporting on Electoral Commission of Zambia stakeholder sensitisation.</p>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph">Authorship note: The LDF Zambia artwork does not name individual authors. No individual author has therefore been invented or assigned.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">References used for verification</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://ldfzambia.org/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Library Development Foundation (LDF Zambia), official website</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.parliament.gov.zm/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">National Assembly of Zambia, Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, 2025 and parliamentary debates on the mixed-member proportional representation provisions</a></li>



<li><a href="https://www.zanis.gov.zm/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ZANIS, “ECZ Sensitises Stakeholders on New Electoral Process Act” (2026)</a></li>
</ul>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Related coverage</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/economics-of-zambias-2026-election/">The Economics of Zambia 2026 Election</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/election-results-2026/">2026 Zambia Election Results Dashboard</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/ldf-observers-report-calm-voting-in-lusaka-turnout-growing-at-some-polling-stations/">LDF Observers Report Calm Voting in Lusaka</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/iris-kaingu-mwandi-resilience-women-in-politics-2026/">The Stone the Builders Rejected: Iris Kaingu&#8217;s Long Road to Mwandi</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/imanga-wamunyima-jr-nalolo-youth-politics/">Youths in Politics: Imanga Wamunyima Jr and Nalolo&#8217;s Test of a Generational Promise</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/ecz-suspends-vote-counting-nationwide-after-reports-of-violence-and-ballot-theft/ecz-suspends-vote-counting-nationwide/">ECZ Lifts Vote-Count Suspension as Zambia&#8217;s Election Stays Unsettled Between Rival Claims</a></li>
</ul>



<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/national-assembly-sets-17-september-deadline-for-ecz-to-name-proportional-representation-mps/">National Assembly Sets 17 September Deadline for ECZ to Name Proportional Representation MPs</a></p>


<p><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/hichilema-official-opening-parliament-2026-what-to-watch/">Hichilema Opens Zambia&#8217;s Largest Parliament Today. Here Is What the Economy Needs to Hear</a></p>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/article-106-3-presidential-term-limits-undemocratic/">An Undemocratic Constitutional Provision: the case against Article 106(3)</a></p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p class="has-text-color wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#c00000"><strong>WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.</strong></p>



<p class="has-text-color wp-block-paragraph" style="color:#c00000"><strong>WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: <a href="mailto:info@zambianeconomist.com">info@zambianeconomist.com</a><br>© 2026 The Zambian Economist.</strong></p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Work With The Zambian Economist</h3>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/advertise/">Advertise With Us</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/directory/">List With Us</a></li>



<li><a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/submit-article/">Submit an Article</a></li>
</ul>


<p class="wp-block-paragraph"><strong>Related:</strong> <a href="https://zambianeconomist.com/hichilema-nominates-five-mps-haimbe-chilengi-nkhoma-siame-anakoka/">Hichilema Nominates Five MPs, Including Ex-Foreign Minister Haimbe</a></p>]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://zambianeconomist.com/zambia-mixed-member-proportional-representation-system/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
