Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
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The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
Work With The Zambian Economist: Advertise With Us | List With Us | Submit an Article
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
Work With The Zambian Economist: Advertise With Us | List With Us | Submit an Article
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
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Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
Work With The Zambian Economist: Advertise With Us | List With Us | Submit an Article
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
Work With The Zambian Economist: Advertise With Us | List With Us | Submit an Article
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
Work With The Zambian Economist: Advertise With Us | List With Us | Submit an Article
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
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Tourism must also be understood as trade in services, because this explains why price, competition, and consumer movement matter so directly for Zambia’s growth. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), consumption abroad, Mode 2, is the primary mode used for international tourism (World Trade Organization, 1994). Arguably, Mode 2 is defined under GATS Article I:2(b) as a service supplied in the territory of one WTO member to a service consumer from another WTO member (World Trade Organization, 1994). In this case, the consumer travels to another country to obtain the service while the service provider remains at home (World Trade Organization, 1994). For instance, a United Kingdom tourist consumes hotel services, food, tour guide services, local transport, and cultural attractions in Zambia, Mauritius, or Dubai. According to the World Trade Organization, the Middle East posted the strongest gains relative to 2019, with nearly 100 million arrivals in 2025, 39 percent above 2019, while Africa recorded 81 million arrivals in 2025, 8 percent year on year higher, and Asia and the Pacific continued catching up with 331 million arrivals in 2025, 6 percent year on year higher but still 9 percent below 2019 (World Tourism Organization, 2025). This pattern shows that global tourism demand has returned, but that consumers are choosing where to consume, and they are choosing on price, quality, and ease of access. This is the situation described by Paul Krugman, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2008 and author of The Return of Depression Economics, who argued that trade, including trade in services, creates global growth because it allows consumers to access better value and producers to specialise, expand markets, and raise productivity (Krugman, 2008). When Zambia’s Mode 2 particularly tourism prices are too high, Zambia loses that trade to competitors, even though the service itself, Victoria Falls, wildlife, and culture, is world class. The same point is made by the famous German book author Klaus Schwab, author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution, who argued that in a services driven global economy, competitiveness depends not on natural endowment alone, but on connectivity, innovation, openness, and affordable access to experiences (Schwab, 2016). The same insight is explained by the famous Indian book author Jagdish Bhagwati, author of In Defense of Globalization, who argued that open trade in services is a powerful engine for national development and poverty alleviation, because it creates jobs, earns foreign exchange, spreads skills, and connects poor communities to global markets (Bhagwati, 2004). For Zambia, this means tourism is not a luxury sector. It is a tradeable service, a source of livelihood, and a pathway out of poverty, but only if Zambians and foreigners can afford to consume it.
Pricing the gap: purchasing power parity
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com © 2026 The Zambian Economist.
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Comparing Zambia, Mauritius, and Dubai in terms of growth in tourist arrivals provides the empirical foundation for Melu’s argument. It is important from the onset to examine the performance of the three destinations under comparison. It is also important to note that two of them, Zambia and Mauritius, are countries, while Dubai is a city within the United Arab Emirates. For purposes of comparison, consideration is given to the destination of arrival, which is what the tourist actually experiences and pays for. A close look through the lens of tourist headcount growth reveals the following pattern. In Zambia, international tourist arrivals grew by 358.2 percent, rising from 502,000 in 2020 to a record 2.3 million in 2025, recovering sharply from pandemic border closures (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). The key drivers were, inter alia, visa reforms, marketing, and campaigns (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). In Mauritius, tourist arrivals rose by 364.8 percent, climbing from 308,980 in 2020 to a record 1,436,250 in 2025, representing a 3.9 percent increase year on year (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, accommodation, and earnings, supported by high end, eco-friendly luxury tourism (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). In Dubai, international overnight tourism grew by roughly 255.5 percent, rising from 5.51 million visitors in 2020 to a record 19.59 million in 2025 (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, expanded source markets, and hotel performance (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). Zambia has therefore grown, but from a lower base and with less depth in product, connectivity, and price competitiveness than its comparators.
Tourism is trade in services
Tourism must also be understood as trade in services, because this explains why price, competition, and consumer movement matter so directly for Zambia’s growth. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), consumption abroad, Mode 2, is the primary mode used for international tourism (World Trade Organization, 1994). Arguably, Mode 2 is defined under GATS Article I:2(b) as a service supplied in the territory of one WTO member to a service consumer from another WTO member (World Trade Organization, 1994). In this case, the consumer travels to another country to obtain the service while the service provider remains at home (World Trade Organization, 1994). For instance, a United Kingdom tourist consumes hotel services, food, tour guide services, local transport, and cultural attractions in Zambia, Mauritius, or Dubai. According to the World Trade Organization, the Middle East posted the strongest gains relative to 2019, with nearly 100 million arrivals in 2025, 39 percent above 2019, while Africa recorded 81 million arrivals in 2025, 8 percent year on year higher, and Asia and the Pacific continued catching up with 331 million arrivals in 2025, 6 percent year on year higher but still 9 percent below 2019 (World Tourism Organization, 2025). This pattern shows that global tourism demand has returned, but that consumers are choosing where to consume, and they are choosing on price, quality, and ease of access. This is the situation described by Paul Krugman, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2008 and author of The Return of Depression Economics, who argued that trade, including trade in services, creates global growth because it allows consumers to access better value and producers to specialise, expand markets, and raise productivity (Krugman, 2008). When Zambia’s Mode 2 particularly tourism prices are too high, Zambia loses that trade to competitors, even though the service itself, Victoria Falls, wildlife, and culture, is world class. The same point is made by the famous German book author Klaus Schwab, author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution, who argued that in a services driven global economy, competitiveness depends not on natural endowment alone, but on connectivity, innovation, openness, and affordable access to experiences (Schwab, 2016). The same insight is explained by the famous Indian book author Jagdish Bhagwati, author of In Defense of Globalization, who argued that open trade in services is a powerful engine for national development and poverty alleviation, because it creates jobs, earns foreign exchange, spreads skills, and connects poor communities to global markets (Bhagwati, 2004). For Zambia, this means tourism is not a luxury sector. It is a tradeable service, a source of livelihood, and a pathway out of poverty, but only if Zambians and foreigners can afford to consume it.
Pricing the gap: purchasing power parity
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
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Why national agendas spread and why stakeholder engagement matters is the next logical question. Notwithstanding debate about its targets, the Grow Zambia Agenda has rapidly spread like wildfire. It is now in everyone’s vocabulary, and every corporate institution is realigning its forecasts to national priorities. This is not accidental. National development frameworks succeed when they create shared expectations and coordinate behaviour across government, business, and citizens. This phenomenon is explained by Robert Shiller, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2013 and author of Narrative Economics, who showed that economic outcomes are powerfully shaped by narratives, stories that spread, influence confidence, and change decisions (Shiller, 2019). A national agenda becomes powerful when people believe in it and act on it (Shiller, 2019). The Grow Zambia Agenda has become such a narrative. Its importance lies in stakeholder engagement. When banks, manufacturers, farmers, tourism operators, and investors align to a common story, investment follows, confidence rises, and implementation becomes easier (Shiller, 2019; Romer, 1990). The risk is that if the narrative is not matched by tangible reforms in cost, competition, and service delivery, confidence will fade (Shiller, 2019; Tirole, 2017).
Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai by the numbers
Comparing Zambia, Mauritius, and Dubai in terms of growth in tourist arrivals provides the empirical foundation for Melu’s argument. It is important from the onset to examine the performance of the three destinations under comparison. It is also important to note that two of them, Zambia and Mauritius, are countries, while Dubai is a city within the United Arab Emirates. For purposes of comparison, consideration is given to the destination of arrival, which is what the tourist actually experiences and pays for. A close look through the lens of tourist headcount growth reveals the following pattern. In Zambia, international tourist arrivals grew by 358.2 percent, rising from 502,000 in 2020 to a record 2.3 million in 2025, recovering sharply from pandemic border closures (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). The key drivers were, inter alia, visa reforms, marketing, and campaigns (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). In Mauritius, tourist arrivals rose by 364.8 percent, climbing from 308,980 in 2020 to a record 1,436,250 in 2025, representing a 3.9 percent increase year on year (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, accommodation, and earnings, supported by high end, eco-friendly luxury tourism (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). In Dubai, international overnight tourism grew by roughly 255.5 percent, rising from 5.51 million visitors in 2020 to a record 19.59 million in 2025 (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, expanded source markets, and hotel performance (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). Zambia has therefore grown, but from a lower base and with less depth in product, connectivity, and price competitiveness than its comparators.
Tourism is trade in services
Tourism must also be understood as trade in services, because this explains why price, competition, and consumer movement matter so directly for Zambia’s growth. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), consumption abroad, Mode 2, is the primary mode used for international tourism (World Trade Organization, 1994). Arguably, Mode 2 is defined under GATS Article I:2(b) as a service supplied in the territory of one WTO member to a service consumer from another WTO member (World Trade Organization, 1994). In this case, the consumer travels to another country to obtain the service while the service provider remains at home (World Trade Organization, 1994). For instance, a United Kingdom tourist consumes hotel services, food, tour guide services, local transport, and cultural attractions in Zambia, Mauritius, or Dubai. According to the World Trade Organization, the Middle East posted the strongest gains relative to 2019, with nearly 100 million arrivals in 2025, 39 percent above 2019, while Africa recorded 81 million arrivals in 2025, 8 percent year on year higher, and Asia and the Pacific continued catching up with 331 million arrivals in 2025, 6 percent year on year higher but still 9 percent below 2019 (World Tourism Organization, 2025). This pattern shows that global tourism demand has returned, but that consumers are choosing where to consume, and they are choosing on price, quality, and ease of access. This is the situation described by Paul Krugman, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2008 and author of The Return of Depression Economics, who argued that trade, including trade in services, creates global growth because it allows consumers to access better value and producers to specialise, expand markets, and raise productivity (Krugman, 2008). When Zambia’s Mode 2 particularly tourism prices are too high, Zambia loses that trade to competitors, even though the service itself, Victoria Falls, wildlife, and culture, is world class. The same point is made by the famous German book author Klaus Schwab, author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution, who argued that in a services driven global economy, competitiveness depends not on natural endowment alone, but on connectivity, innovation, openness, and affordable access to experiences (Schwab, 2016). The same insight is explained by the famous Indian book author Jagdish Bhagwati, author of In Defense of Globalization, who argued that open trade in services is a powerful engine for national development and poverty alleviation, because it creates jobs, earns foreign exchange, spreads skills, and connects poor communities to global markets (Bhagwati, 2004). For Zambia, this means tourism is not a luxury sector. It is a tradeable service, a source of livelihood, and a pathway out of poverty, but only if Zambians and foreigners can afford to consume it.
Pricing the gap: purchasing power parity
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
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The Grow Zambia Agenda as an economic framework must be understood first, because it provides the context within which Melu’s concern arises. The Agenda was launched in September, 2026 by His Excellency Mr. Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, as a clear and impressive economic framework to spur economic transformation and sustainable development over the next five years. It is an attempt to reposition Zambia from a low growth, high vulnerability economy towards a diversified, productive, and resilient economy. The Agenda is anchored on eight interlinked products, namely maize, electricity, tourism, copper, soyabeans, wheat, sugar and beef, supported by cross cutting infrastructure and technology including reforms in governance, fiscal discipline, and private sector participation. Tourism is deliberately positioned as a priority discipline because of its capacity to create jobs, earn foreign exchange, support rural livelihoods, and promote Zambia’s natural heritage (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). This framework is illuminated by the work of Paul Romer, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2018, who argued that sustained economic growth is driven by ideas, innovation, and the deliberate accumulation of knowledge, not by natural endowments alone (Romer, 1990). His endogenous growth theory is highly relevant here. Zambia has Victoria Falls, wildlife, rivers, and culture, but endowments alone do not create growth. Growth comes when ideas are converted into investable products, efficient services, affordable packages, and reliable infrastructure (Romer, 1990). The Agenda matters because it seeks to turn endowment into enterprise.
Why narratives drive national agendas
Why national agendas spread and why stakeholder engagement matters is the next logical question. Notwithstanding debate about its targets, the Grow Zambia Agenda has rapidly spread like wildfire. It is now in everyone’s vocabulary, and every corporate institution is realigning its forecasts to national priorities. This is not accidental. National development frameworks succeed when they create shared expectations and coordinate behaviour across government, business, and citizens. This phenomenon is explained by Robert Shiller, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2013 and author of Narrative Economics, who showed that economic outcomes are powerfully shaped by narratives, stories that spread, influence confidence, and change decisions (Shiller, 2019). A national agenda becomes powerful when people believe in it and act on it (Shiller, 2019). The Grow Zambia Agenda has become such a narrative. Its importance lies in stakeholder engagement. When banks, manufacturers, farmers, tourism operators, and investors align to a common story, investment follows, confidence rises, and implementation becomes easier (Shiller, 2019; Romer, 1990). The risk is that if the narrative is not matched by tangible reforms in cost, competition, and service delivery, confidence will fade (Shiller, 2019; Tirole, 2017).
Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai by the numbers
Comparing Zambia, Mauritius, and Dubai in terms of growth in tourist arrivals provides the empirical foundation for Melu’s argument. It is important from the onset to examine the performance of the three destinations under comparison. It is also important to note that two of them, Zambia and Mauritius, are countries, while Dubai is a city within the United Arab Emirates. For purposes of comparison, consideration is given to the destination of arrival, which is what the tourist actually experiences and pays for. A close look through the lens of tourist headcount growth reveals the following pattern. In Zambia, international tourist arrivals grew by 358.2 percent, rising from 502,000 in 2020 to a record 2.3 million in 2025, recovering sharply from pandemic border closures (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). The key drivers were, inter alia, visa reforms, marketing, and campaigns (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). In Mauritius, tourist arrivals rose by 364.8 percent, climbing from 308,980 in 2020 to a record 1,436,250 in 2025, representing a 3.9 percent increase year on year (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, accommodation, and earnings, supported by high end, eco-friendly luxury tourism (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). In Dubai, international overnight tourism grew by roughly 255.5 percent, rising from 5.51 million visitors in 2020 to a record 19.59 million in 2025 (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, expanded source markets, and hotel performance (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). Zambia has therefore grown, but from a lower base and with less depth in product, connectivity, and price competitiveness than its comparators.
Tourism is trade in services
Tourism must also be understood as trade in services, because this explains why price, competition, and consumer movement matter so directly for Zambia’s growth. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), consumption abroad, Mode 2, is the primary mode used for international tourism (World Trade Organization, 1994). Arguably, Mode 2 is defined under GATS Article I:2(b) as a service supplied in the territory of one WTO member to a service consumer from another WTO member (World Trade Organization, 1994). In this case, the consumer travels to another country to obtain the service while the service provider remains at home (World Trade Organization, 1994). For instance, a United Kingdom tourist consumes hotel services, food, tour guide services, local transport, and cultural attractions in Zambia, Mauritius, or Dubai. According to the World Trade Organization, the Middle East posted the strongest gains relative to 2019, with nearly 100 million arrivals in 2025, 39 percent above 2019, while Africa recorded 81 million arrivals in 2025, 8 percent year on year higher, and Asia and the Pacific continued catching up with 331 million arrivals in 2025, 6 percent year on year higher but still 9 percent below 2019 (World Tourism Organization, 2025). This pattern shows that global tourism demand has returned, but that consumers are choosing where to consume, and they are choosing on price, quality, and ease of access. This is the situation described by Paul Krugman, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2008 and author of The Return of Depression Economics, who argued that trade, including trade in services, creates global growth because it allows consumers to access better value and producers to specialise, expand markets, and raise productivity (Krugman, 2008). When Zambia’s Mode 2 particularly tourism prices are too high, Zambia loses that trade to competitors, even though the service itself, Victoria Falls, wildlife, and culture, is world class. The same point is made by the famous German book author Klaus Schwab, author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution, who argued that in a services driven global economy, competitiveness depends not on natural endowment alone, but on connectivity, innovation, openness, and affordable access to experiences (Schwab, 2016). The same insight is explained by the famous Indian book author Jagdish Bhagwati, author of In Defense of Globalization, who argued that open trade in services is a powerful engine for national development and poverty alleviation, because it creates jobs, earns foreign exchange, spreads skills, and connects poor communities to global markets (Bhagwati, 2004). For Zambia, this means tourism is not a luxury sector. It is a tradeable service, a source of livelihood, and a pathway out of poverty, but only if Zambians and foreigners can afford to consume it.
Pricing the gap: purchasing power parity
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
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The concern by Mizinga Melu, Managing Director of Absa Bank Zambia, that local tourism in Zambia is more expensive than tourism in Dubai and Mauritius, despite government targeting five million tourists under the Grow Zambia Agenda (Melu, 2026), deserves serious and honest reflection. Speaking during the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda event, Melu observed that Zambia still has a lot of work to do to promote local tourism, even though it is “extremely” viable (Melu, 2026). When asked which of the Grow Zambia disciplines was her favourite, she responded that tourism was her favourite because she loves holidays, and that five million tourists is achievable if the fundamentals are addressed (Melu, 2026). The concern by Melu is unequivocal and unambiguous. It is not abstract theory. It is grounded in lived experience and in purchasing power parity theory. People know what they pay, what they receive, and what they could have received elsewhere for the same amount of money. When a Zambian family finds it cheaper to fly to Dubai or Mauritius for a holiday than to visit Livingstone, Mfuwe, or Lower Zambezi, that experience shapes behaviour, and behaviour shapes markets. This article supports the argument by Melu through economic theory, comparative evidence, and competition analysis. It argues that Zambia may struggle to attain and sustain five million tourist arrivals per annum unless the structural cost of tourism is addressed, competition is strengthened, and value for money is restored.
The Grow Zambia Agenda and why the framework matters
The Grow Zambia Agenda as an economic framework must be understood first, because it provides the context within which Melu’s concern arises. The Agenda was launched in September, 2026 by His Excellency Mr. Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, as a clear and impressive economic framework to spur economic transformation and sustainable development over the next five years. It is an attempt to reposition Zambia from a low growth, high vulnerability economy towards a diversified, productive, and resilient economy. The Agenda is anchored on eight interlinked products, namely maize, electricity, tourism, copper, soyabeans, wheat, sugar and beef, supported by cross cutting infrastructure and technology including reforms in governance, fiscal discipline, and private sector participation. Tourism is deliberately positioned as a priority discipline because of its capacity to create jobs, earn foreign exchange, support rural livelihoods, and promote Zambia’s natural heritage (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). This framework is illuminated by the work of Paul Romer, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2018, who argued that sustained economic growth is driven by ideas, innovation, and the deliberate accumulation of knowledge, not by natural endowments alone (Romer, 1990). His endogenous growth theory is highly relevant here. Zambia has Victoria Falls, wildlife, rivers, and culture, but endowments alone do not create growth. Growth comes when ideas are converted into investable products, efficient services, affordable packages, and reliable infrastructure (Romer, 1990). The Agenda matters because it seeks to turn endowment into enterprise.
Why narratives drive national agendas
Why national agendas spread and why stakeholder engagement matters is the next logical question. Notwithstanding debate about its targets, the Grow Zambia Agenda has rapidly spread like wildfire. It is now in everyone’s vocabulary, and every corporate institution is realigning its forecasts to national priorities. This is not accidental. National development frameworks succeed when they create shared expectations and coordinate behaviour across government, business, and citizens. This phenomenon is explained by Robert Shiller, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2013 and author of Narrative Economics, who showed that economic outcomes are powerfully shaped by narratives, stories that spread, influence confidence, and change decisions (Shiller, 2019). A national agenda becomes powerful when people believe in it and act on it (Shiller, 2019). The Grow Zambia Agenda has become such a narrative. Its importance lies in stakeholder engagement. When banks, manufacturers, farmers, tourism operators, and investors align to a common story, investment follows, confidence rises, and implementation becomes easier (Shiller, 2019; Romer, 1990). The risk is that if the narrative is not matched by tangible reforms in cost, competition, and service delivery, confidence will fade (Shiller, 2019; Tirole, 2017).
Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai by the numbers
Comparing Zambia, Mauritius, and Dubai in terms of growth in tourist arrivals provides the empirical foundation for Melu’s argument. It is important from the onset to examine the performance of the three destinations under comparison. It is also important to note that two of them, Zambia and Mauritius, are countries, while Dubai is a city within the United Arab Emirates. For purposes of comparison, consideration is given to the destination of arrival, which is what the tourist actually experiences and pays for. A close look through the lens of tourist headcount growth reveals the following pattern. In Zambia, international tourist arrivals grew by 358.2 percent, rising from 502,000 in 2020 to a record 2.3 million in 2025, recovering sharply from pandemic border closures (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). The key drivers were, inter alia, visa reforms, marketing, and campaigns (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). In Mauritius, tourist arrivals rose by 364.8 percent, climbing from 308,980 in 2020 to a record 1,436,250 in 2025, representing a 3.9 percent increase year on year (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, accommodation, and earnings, supported by high end, eco-friendly luxury tourism (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). In Dubai, international overnight tourism grew by roughly 255.5 percent, rising from 5.51 million visitors in 2020 to a record 19.59 million in 2025 (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, expanded source markets, and hotel performance (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). Zambia has therefore grown, but from a lower base and with less depth in product, connectivity, and price competitiveness than its comparators.
Tourism is trade in services
Tourism must also be understood as trade in services, because this explains why price, competition, and consumer movement matter so directly for Zambia’s growth. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), consumption abroad, Mode 2, is the primary mode used for international tourism (World Trade Organization, 1994). Arguably, Mode 2 is defined under GATS Article I:2(b) as a service supplied in the territory of one WTO member to a service consumer from another WTO member (World Trade Organization, 1994). In this case, the consumer travels to another country to obtain the service while the service provider remains at home (World Trade Organization, 1994). For instance, a United Kingdom tourist consumes hotel services, food, tour guide services, local transport, and cultural attractions in Zambia, Mauritius, or Dubai. According to the World Trade Organization, the Middle East posted the strongest gains relative to 2019, with nearly 100 million arrivals in 2025, 39 percent above 2019, while Africa recorded 81 million arrivals in 2025, 8 percent year on year higher, and Asia and the Pacific continued catching up with 331 million arrivals in 2025, 6 percent year on year higher but still 9 percent below 2019 (World Tourism Organization, 2025). This pattern shows that global tourism demand has returned, but that consumers are choosing where to consume, and they are choosing on price, quality, and ease of access. This is the situation described by Paul Krugman, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2008 and author of The Return of Depression Economics, who argued that trade, including trade in services, creates global growth because it allows consumers to access better value and producers to specialise, expand markets, and raise productivity (Krugman, 2008). When Zambia’s Mode 2 particularly tourism prices are too high, Zambia loses that trade to competitors, even though the service itself, Victoria Falls, wildlife, and culture, is world class. The same point is made by the famous German book author Klaus Schwab, author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution, who argued that in a services driven global economy, competitiveness depends not on natural endowment alone, but on connectivity, innovation, openness, and affordable access to experiences (Schwab, 2016). The same insight is explained by the famous Indian book author Jagdish Bhagwati, author of In Defense of Globalization, who argued that open trade in services is a powerful engine for national development and poverty alleviation, because it creates jobs, earns foreign exchange, spreads skills, and connects poor communities to global markets (Bhagwati, 2004). For Zambia, this means tourism is not a luxury sector. It is a tradeable service, a source of livelihood, and a pathway out of poverty, but only if Zambians and foreigners can afford to consume it.
Pricing the gap: purchasing power parity
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
References
- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2012) Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
- Bhagwati, J. (2004) In Defense of Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cassel, G. (1918) The Theory of Social Economy. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Corden, W.M. (1972) Monetary Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Deaton, A. (2013) The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism (2026) Dubai Tourism Performance Report 2025. Dubai: Government of Dubai.
- Government of the Republic of Zambia (2026) Grow Zambia Agenda. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Krugman, P. (2008) The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M. and Melitz, M. (2018) International Economics: Theory and Policy. 11th edn. Boston: Pearson.
- McKinnon, R. (1979) Money in International Exchange: The Convertible Currency System. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Melu, M. (2026) Remarks at the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda Event. Lusaka, November 2026.
- Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the Twenty First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Quiggin, J. (2010) Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Republic of Zambia (2010) Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010. Lusaka: Government Printer.
- Romer, P. (1990) Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), pp. 71-102.
- Schwab, K. (2016) The Fourth Industrial Revolution. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shiller, R. (2019) Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Statistics Mauritius (2026) Tourism Statistics 2025. Port Louis: Ministry of Tourism.
- Stigler, G. (1964) A theory of oligopoly. Journal of Political Economy, 72(1), pp. 44-61.
- Stiglitz, J.E. (2002) Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008) Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tirole, J. (2017) Economics for the Common Good. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- UK Tour Operators Survey (2025) Comparative One Week Holiday Package Prices from the United Kingdom to Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai. London: UK Tour Operators Survey.
- World Bank (2025) Zambia Economic Update. Washington DC: World Bank.
- World Tourism Organization (2025) World Tourism Barometer. Madrid: UN Tourism.
- World Trade Organization (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services. Geneva: World Trade Organization.
- Zambia Tourism Agency (2025) Tourism Statistical Digest 2025. Lusaka: Zambia Tourism Agency.
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| Destination (one week package from the UK) | Typical cost per person |
|---|---|
| Zambia | 2,078 to 4,325 US dollars or more |
| Mauritius | 1,140 to 3,280 US dollars or more |
| Dubai | 1,400 to 3,500 US dollars, averaging about 1,550 US dollars |

KEY TAKEAWAYS
- Absa Bank Zambia Managing Director Mizinga Melu says local tourism costs more than holidays in Dubai or Mauritius, even as government targets five million tourists under the Grow Zambia Agenda.
- One week UK holiday packages to Zambia cost roughly 2,078 to 4,325 US dollars per person, against 1,140 to 3,280 dollars for Mauritius and about 1,550 dollars on average for Dubai.
- Zambia grew arrivals 358.2 percent between 2020 and 2025 to a record 2.3 million, but from a lower base and with weaker price competitiveness than its rivals.
- Dr. Kelvin Kamayoyo argues the five million target is out of reach unless structural costs fall, competition strengthens and a sector wide competition inquiry is held.
By Dr. Kelvin Kamayoyo, Economist and Researcher | 20 November 2026. Published as a reader contribution; the views are the author’s.
The concern by Mizinga Melu, Managing Director of Absa Bank Zambia, that local tourism in Zambia is more expensive than tourism in Dubai and Mauritius, despite government targeting five million tourists under the Grow Zambia Agenda (Melu, 2026), deserves serious and honest reflection. Speaking during the Absa Group Regional Grow Zambia Agenda event, Melu observed that Zambia still has a lot of work to do to promote local tourism, even though it is “extremely” viable (Melu, 2026). When asked which of the Grow Zambia disciplines was her favourite, she responded that tourism was her favourite because she loves holidays, and that five million tourists is achievable if the fundamentals are addressed (Melu, 2026). The concern by Melu is unequivocal and unambiguous. It is not abstract theory. It is grounded in lived experience and in purchasing power parity theory. People know what they pay, what they receive, and what they could have received elsewhere for the same amount of money. When a Zambian family finds it cheaper to fly to Dubai or Mauritius for a holiday than to visit Livingstone, Mfuwe, or Lower Zambezi, that experience shapes behaviour, and behaviour shapes markets. This article supports the argument by Melu through economic theory, comparative evidence, and competition analysis. It argues that Zambia may struggle to attain and sustain five million tourist arrivals per annum unless the structural cost of tourism is addressed, competition is strengthened, and value for money is restored.
The Grow Zambia Agenda and why the framework matters
The Grow Zambia Agenda as an economic framework must be understood first, because it provides the context within which Melu’s concern arises. The Agenda was launched in September, 2026 by His Excellency Mr. Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia, as a clear and impressive economic framework to spur economic transformation and sustainable development over the next five years. It is an attempt to reposition Zambia from a low growth, high vulnerability economy towards a diversified, productive, and resilient economy. The Agenda is anchored on eight interlinked products, namely maize, electricity, tourism, copper, soyabeans, wheat, sugar and beef, supported by cross cutting infrastructure and technology including reforms in governance, fiscal discipline, and private sector participation. Tourism is deliberately positioned as a priority discipline because of its capacity to create jobs, earn foreign exchange, support rural livelihoods, and promote Zambia’s natural heritage (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). This framework is illuminated by the work of Paul Romer, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2018, who argued that sustained economic growth is driven by ideas, innovation, and the deliberate accumulation of knowledge, not by natural endowments alone (Romer, 1990). His endogenous growth theory is highly relevant here. Zambia has Victoria Falls, wildlife, rivers, and culture, but endowments alone do not create growth. Growth comes when ideas are converted into investable products, efficient services, affordable packages, and reliable infrastructure (Romer, 1990). The Agenda matters because it seeks to turn endowment into enterprise.
Why narratives drive national agendas
Why national agendas spread and why stakeholder engagement matters is the next logical question. Notwithstanding debate about its targets, the Grow Zambia Agenda has rapidly spread like wildfire. It is now in everyone’s vocabulary, and every corporate institution is realigning its forecasts to national priorities. This is not accidental. National development frameworks succeed when they create shared expectations and coordinate behaviour across government, business, and citizens. This phenomenon is explained by Robert Shiller, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2013 and author of Narrative Economics, who showed that economic outcomes are powerfully shaped by narratives, stories that spread, influence confidence, and change decisions (Shiller, 2019). A national agenda becomes powerful when people believe in it and act on it (Shiller, 2019). The Grow Zambia Agenda has become such a narrative. Its importance lies in stakeholder engagement. When banks, manufacturers, farmers, tourism operators, and investors align to a common story, investment follows, confidence rises, and implementation becomes easier (Shiller, 2019; Romer, 1990). The risk is that if the narrative is not matched by tangible reforms in cost, competition, and service delivery, confidence will fade (Shiller, 2019; Tirole, 2017).
Zambia, Mauritius and Dubai by the numbers
Comparing Zambia, Mauritius, and Dubai in terms of growth in tourist arrivals provides the empirical foundation for Melu’s argument. It is important from the onset to examine the performance of the three destinations under comparison. It is also important to note that two of them, Zambia and Mauritius, are countries, while Dubai is a city within the United Arab Emirates. For purposes of comparison, consideration is given to the destination of arrival, which is what the tourist actually experiences and pays for. A close look through the lens of tourist headcount growth reveals the following pattern. In Zambia, international tourist arrivals grew by 358.2 percent, rising from 502,000 in 2020 to a record 2.3 million in 2025, recovering sharply from pandemic border closures (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). The key drivers were, inter alia, visa reforms, marketing, and campaigns (Zambia Tourism Agency, 2025). In Mauritius, tourist arrivals rose by 364.8 percent, climbing from 308,980 in 2020 to a record 1,436,250 in 2025, representing a 3.9 percent increase year on year (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, accommodation, and earnings, supported by high end, eco-friendly luxury tourism (Statistics Mauritius, 2026). In Dubai, international overnight tourism grew by roughly 255.5 percent, rising from 5.51 million visitors in 2020 to a record 19.59 million in 2025 (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). The key drivers were, inter alia, air connectivity, expanded source markets, and hotel performance (Dubai Department of Economy and Tourism, 2026). Zambia has therefore grown, but from a lower base and with less depth in product, connectivity, and price competitiveness than its comparators.
Tourism is trade in services
Tourism must also be understood as trade in services, because this explains why price, competition, and consumer movement matter so directly for Zambia’s growth. Under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), consumption abroad, Mode 2, is the primary mode used for international tourism (World Trade Organization, 1994). Arguably, Mode 2 is defined under GATS Article I:2(b) as a service supplied in the territory of one WTO member to a service consumer from another WTO member (World Trade Organization, 1994). In this case, the consumer travels to another country to obtain the service while the service provider remains at home (World Trade Organization, 1994). For instance, a United Kingdom tourist consumes hotel services, food, tour guide services, local transport, and cultural attractions in Zambia, Mauritius, or Dubai. According to the World Trade Organization, the Middle East posted the strongest gains relative to 2019, with nearly 100 million arrivals in 2025, 39 percent above 2019, while Africa recorded 81 million arrivals in 2025, 8 percent year on year higher, and Asia and the Pacific continued catching up with 331 million arrivals in 2025, 6 percent year on year higher but still 9 percent below 2019 (World Tourism Organization, 2025). This pattern shows that global tourism demand has returned, but that consumers are choosing where to consume, and they are choosing on price, quality, and ease of access. This is the situation described by Paul Krugman, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2008 and author of The Return of Depression Economics, who argued that trade, including trade in services, creates global growth because it allows consumers to access better value and producers to specialise, expand markets, and raise productivity (Krugman, 2008). When Zambia’s Mode 2 particularly tourism prices are too high, Zambia loses that trade to competitors, even though the service itself, Victoria Falls, wildlife, and culture, is world class. The same point is made by the famous German book author Klaus Schwab, author of The Fourth Industrial Revolution, who argued that in a services driven global economy, competitiveness depends not on natural endowment alone, but on connectivity, innovation, openness, and affordable access to experiences (Schwab, 2016). The same insight is explained by the famous Indian book author Jagdish Bhagwati, author of In Defense of Globalization, who argued that open trade in services is a powerful engine for national development and poverty alleviation, because it creates jobs, earns foreign exchange, spreads skills, and connects poor communities to global markets (Bhagwati, 2004). For Zambia, this means tourism is not a luxury sector. It is a tradeable service, a source of livelihood, and a pathway out of poverty, but only if Zambians and foreigners can afford to consume it.
Pricing the gap: purchasing power parity
The purchasing power parity, vehicle currency, and the cost of tourism must then be defined. This is because the cost of tourism performance across the three destinations can be exposed on a measuring scale of purchasing power parity, to compare the cost of consuming tourism services in each market jurisdiction based on a standard currency unit, in this case using the United States Dollar as the vehicle currency. Purchasing power parity, as defined by the famous Swedish economist Gustav Cassel, is the theory that exchange rates should equalize the price of an identical basket of goods and services across countries when expressed in a common currency (Cassel, 1918). In other words, the same dollar should buy the same value, wherever it is spent, if markets are efficient (Cassel, 1918). The Nobel Laureate in Economics Angus Deaton, who was awarded the prize in 2015 for his analysis of consumption, poverty, and welfare, refined this understanding by showing that what matters is not nominal income, but what income can actually buy in real life (Deaton, 2013). Deaton’s work on purchasing power and household welfare demonstrates that high prices reduce real welfare, even when nominal incomes appear reasonable (Deaton, 2013). A tourist does not consume a nominal price. A tourist consumes nights, meals, transport, guides, and experiences. A vehicle currency, as explained by the American scholar Ronald McKinnon (1979) and further elaborated by Australian economist and trade scholar Max Corden (1972), is a currency widely used to invoice and settle international transactions, even when neither buyer nor seller is from the issuing country (McKinnon, 1979; Corden, 1972). The United States Dollar performs this role in global tourism (McKinnon, 1979; Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz, 2018). Tourists may compare packages in dollars, even when they originate in the United Kingdom, Zambia, or the United Arab Emirates.
Using this lens, the evidence is striking. A one week tourism package and stay in Zambia from the United Kingdom typically costs around 2,078 to 4,325 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Mauritius, a one week, seven night holiday package from the United Kingdom, including return flights and accommodation, typically costs 1,140 to 3,280 dollars or more per person (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). In Dubai, a one week, seven day tourism package and stay departing from the United Kingdom typically costs between 1,400 and 3,500 dollars or more per person, averaging around 1,550 dollars for standard vacation packages (UK Tour Operators Survey, 2025). Based on this comparison, it is unambiguous that tourism packages in Zambia are more expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius today. The Zambian tourist pays more and often receives less in terms of connectivity, variety, and service consistency. This situation is precisely the one described by Angus Deaton, of the United Kingdom and United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2015 and author of The Great Escape, who showed how high prices and unequal access to quality services limit wellbeing and escape from poverty (Deaton, 2013). His argument supports Melu’s concern. When tourism is expensive, it is not only international tourists who are excluded. Local Zambians are excluded first. Tourism becomes a luxury for foreigners and a distant dream for citizens, which undermines domestic demand, local ownership, and inclusive growth (Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). The same consumer reaction is explained by the famous French book author Thomas Piketty, author of Capital in the Twenty First Century, who argued that when the cost of accessing opportunity rises faster than incomes, inequality deepens and participation narrows (Piketty, 2014). Consumers react rationally (Piketty, 2014; Stigler, 1964). When the cost of consuming a particular service is expensive, they substitute, they postpone, or they exit to cheaper alternatives (Piketty, 2014). This is what Zambian consumers are doing. They substitute Livingstone with Dubai, and Lower Zambezi with Mauritius, not because they love foreign destinations more, but because the price signal tells them to do so. Price is a message, and the Zambian market is sending the wrong message.
Structural and behavioural barriers
Structural and behavioural barriers in Zambian tourism help to explain why this price gap persists. In Zambia, tourism has for over 25 years been among the priority sectors for development. However, the sector has never been immune from structural barriers and behavioural barriers, despite rigorous reforms implemented under the 1990s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and subsequent economic reforms.
A structural barrier must be defined precisely, because it is different from a temporary difficulty. Joseph Stiglitz, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2001 and author of Globalization and Its Discontents, defined structural barriers as deep, systemic constraints embedded in institutions, infrastructure, market structures, and rules, which systematically limit access, raise costs, and reproduce inequality even when individuals work hard and markets appear open (Stiglitz, 2002). In this view, high prices are not an accident. They are the outcome of how the system is built (Stiglitz, 2002). The same definition is advanced by the famous American economist Daron Acemoglu, author of Why Nations Fail, who argued that structural barriers arise from extractive institutions and concentrated economic power, which protect incumbents, restrict entry, and keep the cost of doing business high for everyone else (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Applied to Zambia’s tourism industry, structural barriers include weak legal enforcement, limited domestic flights, poor road access to tourism sites, high cost of energy, high taxes and levies, limited accommodation diversity, and weak destination marketing.
A behavioural barrier must also be defined precisely, because it explains why even available opportunities are not taken up. Richard Thaler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 2017 and author of Nudge, defined behavioural barriers as systematic biases in human decision making, such as limited information, mistrust, inertia, present bias, and reliance on mental shortcuts, which cause people to act against their own long term interests even when better options exist (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). In tourism, this means consumers may assume local tourism is poor value, avoid it without checking, or postpone it indefinitely. The same point is made by the famous Australian economist John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who argued that behavioural barriers are reinforced by failed ideas and entrenched expectations, such as the belief that local services must be inferior or that tourism is only for wealthy foreigners, which persist long after the evidence has changed (Quiggin, 2010). Applied to Zambia, behavioural barriers include low domestic tourism culture, limited information, mistrust of quality, and pricing practices that assume the tourist is always a wealthy foreigner. These barriers reinforce each other. High costs reduce volumes. Low volumes keep unit costs high. High unit costs justify even higher prices. It is a vicious circle (Tirole, 2017; Stiglitz, 2002).
The case for competition
The case for competition, in terms of fair prices, diversification, and affordability, therefore becomes central to any solution. Increased competition is essential in the tourism sector if the benefits are to manifest and be enjoyed by both local and international tourists. The benefits of competition include fair interaction by market players, product diversification, innovation, and affordable tourism packages for all. Competition forces operators to improve quality, reduce waste, and pass efficiency gains to consumers (Tirole, 2017). To establish the prevailing market conditions and level of competition in the tourism industry, there is need to conduct a sector wide inquiry pursuant to Zambia’s Competition and Consumer Protection Act, No. 24 of 2010. Specifically section 9(1) provides that a horizontal agreement between enterprises is prohibited per se, and void, if the agreement fixes, directly or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading conditions.
A horizontal agreement must be defined clearly, because it is the legal core of the competition problem. Jean Tirole, of France, Nobel Prize in Economics 2014 and author of Economics for the Common Good, defined a horizontal agreement as an arrangement between firms operating at the same level of the market, that is competitors, to coordinate rather than compete, typically by fixing prices, sharing markets, limiting output, or rigging bids (Tirole, 2017). He explained that its negative impact on the economy and consumers is direct and severe. It eliminates the discipline of competition, keeps prices artificially high, reduces choice and innovation, protects inefficient firms, and transfers wealth from consumers to producers (Tirole, 2017). Consumers pay more for less, small entrants are shut out, and the economy loses efficiency and growth (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). This is why the law treats it as prohibited per se, because its harm does not need to be proved case by case. If operators, formally or informally, coordinate prices, allocate markets, or restrict output, consumers pay the price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). It may therefore be challenging to attain and sustain the five million target of tourist arrivals into Zambia, if the industry experiences insufficient or unfair competition. This argument is supported by Jean Tirole, who showed that competition is not automatic (Tirole, 2017). It must be protected by smart regulation that prevents dominant firms from abusing market power while encouraging innovation (Tirole, 2017). His work supports the need for a sector wide inquiry in Zambia’s tourism sector. This is because without active oversight, markets drift towards concentration, high prices, and low innovation (Tirole, 2017; Stigler, 1964). Tirole’s argument is that the state must act as a referee, not a player, to ensure that competition works for consumers (Tirole, 2017). It is also supported by the famous Indian book author Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize in Economics 1998 and author of Development as Freedom, who argued that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, including the freedom to participate in markets on fair terms (Sen, 1999). He emphasised that competition, when properly governed, expands choice and reduces deprivation. Promoting competition in the tourism industry is therefore not a technical legal exercise but it is a development imperative. Arguably fair competition and affordable tourism would expand the freedom of Zambians to enjoy their own country, and expand the freedom of small operators to enter, grow, and compete in the industry.
Time to interrogate the market
When high prices signal a possible cartel or abusive oligopoly, the need for market interrogation becomes even more urgent. In addition, if prices of tourism packages are constantly high, this calls for market interrogation. In terms of market intelligence, this calls for in depth investigation to assess the level of market concentration, the profile of tourism packages and source markets. Under competition and consumer protection law, the alleged prevailing circumstances, characterised by prohibitive consumer prices and fewer market players, are elements that qualify for a comprehensive but rapid anti-trust industry investigation to break down a possible cartel(s). Any market that exhibits such characteristics is capable of harboring a cartel or abusive oligopoly market players.
Abusive oligopoly market players must be defined, because they explain how consumer welfare is eroded without a formal cartel. An abusive oligopoly is a market dominated by a small number of large players who, individually or collectively, hold and abuse market power (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They behave in ways that protect their dominance and erode consumer welfare. They set prices above competitive levels and keep them there, because they know rivals will follow rather than undercut. They restrict output, limit variety, and withhold affordable packages, so consumers have no real alternative. They raise entry barriers through opaque pricing, exclusive deals, control of key inputs such as transport, park access, or prime sites, and by punishing new entrants who try to compete on price (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). They engage in tacit coordination, signalling prices, matching each other, and avoiding aggressive competition, even without a written agreement (Stigler, 1964). The result is that consumers pay more, receive less, lose choice, and lose trust, while small operators are squeezed out, innovation stalls, and society loses jobs, foreign exchange, and inclusive growth (Tirole, 2017; Sen, 1999; Deaton, 2013). This situation was described by George Stigler, of the United States, Nobel Prize in Economics 1982, who provided the classic economic theory of oligopoly and collusion, showing how a small number of firms can sustain high prices without explicit agreement by monitoring each other and punishing deviation (Stigler, 1964). His theory explains why high prices can persist even without a written cartel. In a market with few players, high entry barriers, and opaque pricing, tacit coordination can thrive (Stigler, 1964; Tirole, 2017). Stigler’s work suggests that the remedy is not moral appeal, but investigation, transparency, lower entry barriers, and credible sanctions. The same point is made by the famous Australian book author John Quiggin, author of Zombie Economics, who described how dead ideas continue to shape policy long after they have failed, including the idea that markets self correct without oversight (Quiggin, 2010). He argued that fair competition must be actively protected. When applied to the Zambian tourism, Quiggin’s insight is that waiting for the market to correct itself will not work. The market must be opened up through transparent licensing, support for new entrants, community based tourism, affordable domestic packages, and publication of price benchmarks (Quiggin, 2010; Sen, 1999).
In conclusion, Mizinga Melu is right. Zambia’s tourism is too expensive relative to Dubai and Mauritius, and price matters. The Grow Zambia Agenda has given Zambia a powerful narrative and a clear target of five million tourist headcount arrivals, but narrative alone may not fill hotels. What will fill hotels is affordable air travel, diversified products, strong digital connectivity, reliable infrastructure, transparent pricing, and fair competition. Zambia must interrogate its tourism industry, enforce competition law without fear, and make tourism affordable for Zambians first. If Zambians can afford to enjoy Zambia’s tourism packages, the world will follow.
For comments contact the author and researcher on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com
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