By The Zambian Economist Analyst | Lusaka | 26 October 2026

LUSAKA: The Mayor of Lusaka, Mr Chitambala Mwewa, has called for global partnerships in smart city solutions, waste-to-value innovation and digital destination marketing, positioning the Zambian capital as a city that intends to earn from tourism without wrecking the environment that tourists come to enjoy.

Mr Mwewa made the call when he delivered his Mayoral Statement at the Mayors’ Roundtable during the 2nd Global City Tourism Summit 2026 in Busan, South Korea. The summit, held under the theme “Local Tourism; Connecting Urban Economies and Tourism Innovation”, has drawn mayors and delegates from across the world to share working models for tourism-led growth that spreads benefits beyond hotel lobbies and into townships, markets and small businesses.

Lusaka as a destination, not a stopover

Central to the Mayor’s message is that Lusaka has spent decades being treated as a transit point on the way to Livingstone, South Luangwa or Victoria Falls. That is the framing he wants changed. He told delegates that Lusaka, Zambia’s capital with an estimated 3.1 million people, is positioning itself as a tourism destination in its own right, anchored on culture, heritage, local cuisine and community experiences.

The pitch is already backed by activity on the ground. Mr Mwewa cited the Kabwata Cultural Village, where traditional craft and architecture are on display; city food tours that turn Lusaka’s kitchens and markets into attractions; township arts; and the Make Lusaka Clean, Green and Healthy campaign that targets the state of the city’s streets, parks and public spaces.

The clean city campaign links directly to the argument this publication has made about the environment Lusaka’s residents actually live in. A city that has lost its tree cover and cooks in its own heat does not sell itself to visitors, and the Mayor’s stress on clean, green public spaces acknowledges that the city’s living infrastructure is part of the product, not decoration around it.

Sustainable tourism begins with a clean environment

Mr Mwewa told the roundtable that sustainable city tourism depends on reliable infrastructure, effective waste management, environmental protection and well-maintained public spaces, noting that sustainable tourism begins with a clean environment. It is a statement of the obvious that most city budgets still manage to avoid. A visitor who cannot find a clean public toilet, a litter-free market or a park with shade does not return, and does not recommend.

This is where the Mayor’s three partnership asks fit together. Smart city solutions cover the infrastructure side, from lighting and transport to data that helps a city understand visitor flows. Waste-to-value innovation turns the cost centre of refuse collection into a revenue line, composting and recycling what the city currently burns or buries. Digital destination marketing is how a city of 3.1 million people competes for attention against better-funded rivals without a matching advertising budget.

A common vision for 2040

Mr Mwewa urged cities to work towards a Common Vision for Sustainable City Tourism in 2040, one that promotes vibrant urban economies, innovation and liveable cities. The mayors and delegates at the summit also signed a declaration to reach a shared understanding among global tourism cities on that common vision.

For Lusaka, the value of such a declaration is practical rather than ceremonial. Membership of a global network of tourism cities opens access to the models that have worked elsewhere, from waste-to-energy plants feeding city budgets to cultural districts that lifted township incomes. It also gives the Lusaka City Council a reference point when arguing locally for spending on public spaces that can otherwise be dismissed as cosmetic.

What this means for business and policy

For business: a city that markets food tours, cultural villages and township arts is signalling demand for tour operators, lodges, restaurants, event planners, craft producers and digital marketers. Firms that build products around the initiatives the Mayor cited are moving with the official direction of travel rather than against it.

For policy: the summit commitment will be tested at home. Reliable infrastructure, effective waste management and maintained public spaces are council deliverables that show up in budgets, not in statements. The Make Lusaka Clean, Green and Healthy campaign, and the willingness to chase waste-to-value innovation, are the domestic indicators to watch between now and the summit’s next edition.

For investors: urban tourism infrastructure in a city of 3.1 million people is an under-served market. Convention facilities, hospitality training, waste recycling ventures and digital platforms for destination marketing all sit inside the agenda the Mayor has now taken global.

Related reading

• Super El Niño Makes African Cities Sweat
• Trees Are the Nerves of Planet Earth
• Zambia Agriculture and Mining hub: full coverage

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By Lubinda Sinyani | The Zambian Economist Analyst | 26 October 2026

The kwacha’s closing rate is set by trading between Zambia’s commercial banks on the interbank foreign exchange market, where dealers buy and sell dollars for mining houses, importers, government agencies and their own books. The Bank of Zambia does not decide it. The figure you see at the end of the day is where the last deals were done, and most days it answers one plain question: were there more dollars for sale than people wanting to buy them?

On Friday 23 October the Bank of Zambia’s mid-rate stood at K20.1145 to the dollar. This year has shown how far that number can travel. The kwacha opened 2026 at about K22.19, strengthened to roughly K17.3 by mid-June, and has since given back a large part of the gain. Even so, it remained the best performer among 12 African currencies tracked by The Rio Times, up 14.8% between 31 December and 9 October.

Where the price is actually made

Every bank that deals in foreign currency quotes two prices: a bid, at which it will buy dollars, and an offer, at which it will sell. On a quiet Friday earlier this month, Absa Bank Zambia reported the kwacha trading at K19.85 and K19.90 for the whole session. Nothing moved because the dollars on offer roughly matched the dollars wanted.

The Bank of Zambia sets the rules of this market rather than the price. Under its Interbank Foreign Exchange Market Rules, revised in June 2024, banks must update the rates on their retail boards at 09:30, 12:30 and 15:30, and keep those retail rates wide enough that the interbank price sits inside them. Large deals, above US$5 million since March 2025 when the central bank raised the threshold from US$1 million, can be priced by negotiation between bank and client.

That 09:30 snapshot carries legal weight. Since 26 December 2025, the Bank of Zambia Currency Directives have required domestic transactions to be settled in kwacha. A contract may still be priced in dollars, but where the parties have not agreed which market rate applies, the central bank’s 09:30 mid-rate becomes the reference.

Who walks in with dollars, and who walks in needing them

Think of each trading day as a queue on both sides of the counter.

Timing matters more than volume. Mining houses do not sell dollars every morning. They convert when their own payment calendar requires it, and that calendar bunches up near month-end, when salaries and taxes fall due. Traders polled by Reuters last week expected the kwacha to stay range-bound for exactly that reason, as corporates sold dollars for month-end payments, even though banks were selling the dollar at K20.37, up from K20.18 a week earlier.

Mining tax is a special channel. Under the 2025 directives, mines may pay their taxes by selling foreign currency directly to the Bank of Zambia at its published mid-rate. Those dollars go into the reserves instead of the interbank pool, which gives the central bank more to work with when it decides to step in. Governor Denny Kalyalya told the September policy briefing that about US$1.2 billion in mining sector revenue had added to foreign exchange supply in the third quarter, when the kwacha appreciated 8.3%.

On the buying side, nobody is more regular than the fuel importers. Zambia imports all of its refined petroleum, and the Energy Regulation Board’s October review showed the reference price of petrol rising to US$121.58 a barrel. Every litre sold at a Lusaka pump eventually needs dollars from the interbank market.

What 6 October taught the market

The clearest recent illustration came on Tuesday 6 October. For part of the year, energy importers had operated under temporary foreign exchange waivers. When those ended, their demand arrived in the commercial market all at once. The kwacha fell as much as 6% in a single session, its biggest intraday drop in more than three years, and touched 21 per dollar before recovering to about 19.84, according to Bloomberg. It was the sixth straight day of losses, helped along by a stronger US dollar and high oil prices.

No fundamental changed overnight. Copper was still selling at around US$14,000 a tonne. What changed was the queue: a large group of buyers turned up in a market that was not deep enough to absorb them at the previous price. Once sellers saw the rush, some held back their dollars, expecting a better rate later. That is how a day’s closing price can overshoot, and why the same currency can recover much of the loss before lunch.

The Bank of Zambia’s hand

Zambia runs a floating exchange rate, with the central bank stepping in to smooth sharp swings rather than to defend a particular level. The 2024 rules allow it to tell banks in advance when it will be in the market, and it has more ammunition than in recent years: gross international reserves reached a record US$6.5 billion in February 2026.

Interest rates work more slowly. On 30 September the Monetary Policy Committee cut the policy rate by 250 basis points to 10.75%, from 13.25%, with inflation at 6.1% and inside the 6 to 8% target band. Bloomberg described it as the deepest cut since at least 2012. Lower yields on Treasury bills make kwacha assets less attractive to foreign portfolio investors over time, which can reduce one source of dollar inflow. In my reading, the October weakness owes far more to import demand than to the rate cut, but the cut removes some of the cushion that high yields used to provide.

The world outside Zambia

Copper accounts for roughly seven of every ten dollars Zambia earns from exports, so its price sets how many dollars the mines eventually bring home. Oil works on the other side of the ledger, deciding how much the fuel importers have to buy, and its effect is sharper when the US dollar is rallying against everything. On those days most emerging market currencies weaken together, and the kwacha rarely escapes.

None of these moves the kwacha by itself in a given afternoon. They change the size of the queues. A rise in copper prices today may only show up in the kwacha weeks later, when the extra export earnings are converted.

Why your bank’s rate is not the screen rate

If you buy dollars at a branch or a bureau de change, you will pay more than the interbank figure quoted in the news. Banks add a retail margin, and the rules cap it from both sides: a bank may not buy dollars from retail and corporate clients above its current interbank bid, nor sell to them above its posted board rate. Bureaux set their own prices within the market. The gap between what you pay and the headline number is the cost of being a small buyer in a wholesale market.

Quick answers

Who sets the kwacha exchange rate?

Commercial banks trading with one another on the interbank market. The Bank of Zambia publishes buying, selling and mid-rates and can buy or sell dollars, but it does not fix the price.

What time is the official reference rate set?

The Bank of Zambia’s 09:30 mid-rate is the default reference for contracts settled in kwacha. Banks also update their retail boards at 12:30 and 15:30.

Can anyone predict where the kwacha will close today?

Not with precision. Dealers watch for large known flows, such as month-end conversions, fuel import payments and central bank announcements, which tell them which way the day is likely to lean.

What to watch next

Month-end conversions should keep the kwacha in a narrow band this week. After that, three dates matter. The Energy Regulation Board’s November review will show whether the October fuel increases bit into import volumes. The Monetary Policy Committee meets on 25 and 26 November. And VAT on fuel returns on 1 December, which will push pump prices up and, through them, the cost of almost everything that moves by road.

If you run a business that pays suppliers in dollars, the practical point is about timing. The last days of the month, when mines and large companies convert dollars to meet kwacha bills, are usually when supply in the market is deepest. Watching that calendar, and the date of the next fuel review, will tell you more about your costs than checking the rate every afternoon. A week like 6 October is a reminder that the pattern can break.

Related coverage: The Kwacha’s October Slide: Why Copper Dollars Are Not Enough · Fuel Price Shock Hits Zambia’s Pump Stations, Carrying Multi-Layer Effects · Why the money finishes before the month ends

About the author

Lubinda Sinyani

Economist, Researcher and Governance Specialist | Lusaka, Zambia

Lubinda Sinyani is a Zambian economist and researcher with experience in public sector research, economic policy, auditing and strategic communication. He sits on the Anti-Corruption Commission of Zambia’s Board Technical Committee on Corruption Prevention and Communication, and was Vice Chairperson of the Economics Association of Zambia’s National Economic Summit from 2019 to 2021. He holds a Specialist Degree in Economics and Law from Moscow Region State Institute of Humanities and Social Studies, recognised by ZAQA as equivalent to a Master’s degree.

Read his contributor profile · More by Lubinda Sinyani

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst | Opinion by Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo, Technical Advisor for African Rivers | 25 October 2026

Grand Inga could help reduce Africa’s electricity deficit if generation at the Congo River site is developed alongside the networks and institutions needed to deliver power. Its promise lies in the scale of the resource; its success will be measured by electricity reaching homes and productive businesses.

Africa’s energy challenge, in my view, is a failure to turn abundant natural potential into dependable services. Saying the continent has an energy-harnessing problem draws attention to that gap. It does not remove the need to build generation, strengthen utilities or extend connections to people who remain beyond the grid.

For Zambia, the question is practical. A mine needs power when production is scheduled. A small food processor needs refrigeration that works. An entrepreneur deciding whether to buy equipment needs confidence that electricity will be available at a price the business can afford.

What is Grand Inga, and how much power could it provide?

Grand Inga describes the ambition to develop much more of the hydropower resource at Inga, on the Congo River in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It should not be confused with a completed 42,000 MW power station.

The World Bank’s Inga factsheet, updated in June 2025, puts the site’s potential at around 42,000 MW. It describes a possible sequence of up to eight projects. Existing Inga 1 and Inga 2 plants already operate at the site; Inga 3 would be the next development.

That distinction matters when assessing claims about Africa’s power supply. Potential generating capacity is different from dependable output. Design, river conditions and plant availability affect production, while transmission losses and network constraints affect what reaches customers. The headline capacity figure cannot establish a final tariff or a commissioning date.

What has moved beyond discussion?

In June 2025, the World Bank approved a US$250 million credit as the first phase of a US$1 billion Inga 3 Development Program. The support begins with local development, institutional capacity and preparation rather than the delivery of a finished hydropower plant.

The Bank’s April 2026 implementation report records that the programme became effective on 2 February 2026. It also rates overall risk as high, including governance, institutional capacity and environmental and social risks.

My argument is that Africa should advance credible projects with greater urgency. Urgency must produce better decisions: published studies, accountable procurement and financing arrangements that survive changes of government. It cannot substitute for them.

Why would Zambia need more than a dam?

A power station in the DRC would not automatically end Zambia’s power deficit. Electricity would need an available route through the regional network, and buyers would need contracts they can honour. Utilities and regulators would have to resolve how power is priced, dispatched and paid for across borders.

For Zambia, the investment case should therefore examine the delivered cost of electricity, including transmission and other charges. A low generation cost at the source may still produce an expensive import if the route requires extensive new infrastructure or financing carries a heavy premium.

Long-term imports could support industrial planning if supply is dependable. They should be assessed alongside domestic generation, storage where appropriate and measures to reduce network losses. Zambia cannot postpone investments that can improve supply sooner while waiting for a project of Inga’s scale.

Our coverage of the African Hydro Symposium preparations examines the connection between hydropower, water security and climate resilience. The wider discussion belongs within our Business & Economy coverage and Zambia Economy 2026 series.

How does Inga fit a continental electricity market?

The African Union’s African Single Electricity Market and Continental Power Systems Masterplan provide a framework for connecting national systems and expanding regional trade. The AU linked these initiatives to practical work on distribution-grid loss reduction in Lusaka in April 2026.

The lesson is that new generation and better networks need to advance together. Regional power pools can help countries share resources, but an interconnector is useful only if its operating arrangements work and power can move when buyers need it.

Industrialisation needs those details settled. Processing minerals or agricultural produce closer to their source requires businesses to commit money over many years. Predictable electricity supply helps them make that decision; an unfinanced promise does not.

Can hydropower protect the Congo River?

River health should be a condition of development. It would be misleading, however, to assume that building a dam automatically restores a river, reduces flooding or improves fisheries and navigation. Outcomes depend on the design and its effects across the basin, including downstream.

Studies must establish how altered flows would affect habitats and the livelihoods of river-dependent communities. People facing displacement or loss of access to land and fisheries need meaningful participation, credible compensation arrangements and enforceable remedies.

The IFC’s Performance Standard 6 sets out a mitigation hierarchy: avoid impacts, minimise them, restore where possible and consider offsets for residual harm. Its biodiversity requirements differ by habitat; critical habitat calls for net gains, not merely a blanket promise of “zero net loss”. Meeting safeguards also does not, by itself, guarantee finance.

The Africa Water Vision 2063 and Policy, launched in February 2026, places water security, resilient ecosystems and transboundary cooperation within Africa’s development agenda. Inga should be tested against those aims through evidence and measurable commitments.

Who should benefit first?

Congolese communities must see a credible route from hosting the resource to receiving better services and economic opportunities. Regional exports should form part of a development programme that explains who receives electricity, who pays for the infrastructure and how local livelihoods are protected.

For investors, the questions are equally concrete: who will buy the power, on what terms, and who bears construction, currency and payment risk? Publishing those answers makes the debate more useful than repeating the project’s theoretical capacity.

Africa should pursue Inga’s potential with purpose. The standard of success is affordable electricity delivered to people and enterprises, with the Congo River’s ecological functions protected and affected communities able to hold project institutions to account.

This contributor opinion was edited for clarity and checked against the linked primary sources. Project potential is distinguished from committed capacity and electricity delivered. The policy recommendations are the author’s views.

Featured photograph: existing infrastructure at the Inga site and the Congo River, photographed in March 2019. It does not depict a completed Grand Inga project. Photo: Χρίστος Ιμμανοελ / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0. Cropped and resized; the adapted photograph is available under the same licence.

About the author

Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo

Economist, International Trade Law Scholar and Investment Consultant | Lusaka, Zambia

Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo has over 13 years of experience across academia, policy and the private sector. He is Programme Director of the Purposive Mega-Infrastructure Investment Programme, Lead Consultant at Acacia Trade and Development Consulting Group and Technical Advisor for African Rivers. He is an adjunct lecturer at ESAMI, NIPA and Zambia Open University, and a former board member of the Economics Association of Zambia.

Read his contributor profile · More by Dr Kamayoyo · kamayoyokm@gmail.com

Explore the Business Directory and Events. Read about the publication or contact the newsroom. Third-party photographs retain their stated licences.

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Featured photograph: Dr Denny Kalyalya with the EAZ delegation at the Bank of Zambia, October 2026. Archive image, not the Bangkok meetings. Photo: EAZ.

Bank of Zambia Governor Dr Denny Kalyalya has called for a national focus on delivery, arguing that Zambia’s resources should produce employment and better living standards.

In remarks shared by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning on its official Facebook page, Kalyalya reflected on Thailand’s economic transformation during the 2026 IMF and World Bank Group Annual Meetings in Bangkok. The IMF’s official meeting information gives the dates as 12-18 October.

“We have to change our mindset. We have to be a goal-getting society,” he said. He called for Zambia’s natural resources and workforce to contribute more effectively to economic activity.

What can Zambia learn from Bangkok?

Kalyalya pointed to Bangkok’s functioning urban economy, where food services, transport and logistics help sustain livelihoods. The economic lesson is about connections: one enterprise’s demand can become another enterprise’s income.

A food business needs farmers, delivery services and customers who can reach it. A manufacturer needs dependable electricity and buyers. Training becomes more useful when employers need the skills being taught. These are examples of how productive activity spreads through an economy, rather than claims that a particular Zambian programme has already delivered those results.

Zambia’s circumstances differ from Thailand’s. The comparison offers a way to examine how cities and institutions support enterprise; it does not establish that Zambia can reproduce Thailand’s development path simply by changing attitudes.

Our related coverage examines Zambia’s practical skills and jobs lessons from Thailand. Kalyalya’s remarks extend that discussion to the delivery of economic outcomes.

How should CDF contribute to jobs in Zambia?

The Governor expressed optimism that ongoing development initiatives, supported by the expanded Constituency Development Fund, could improve living standards. The statement did not provide a new funding allocation, project completion figures or a forecast of jobs to be created.

That distinction matters. Spending creates an opportunity to improve services and support businesses, but the amount allocated cannot, on its own, tell citizens whether a project works.

A useful assessment would follow a project beyond disbursement. Is the facility operating? Can people use it? Where enterprise support is involved, does the business remain active after receiving assistance? Has temporary construction work led to any continuing employment?

These are proposed measures of delivery, not outcomes established by the Governor’s statement. Publishing project costs and completion information would help residents judge results in their own constituencies.

What does this mean for small businesses and workers?

For a small business in Lusaka or on the Copperbelt, a call for greater productivity becomes practical when it addresses the cost of operating and the ability to serve customers. Electricity interruptions, expensive finance or delays in payment can prevent a willing entrepreneur from expanding.

A results-driven approach therefore has to include the institutions that shape those conditions. Workers can improve their skills and firms can improve how they operate, while public agencies remain responsible for the services and decisions within their control.

For young people seeking employment opportunities in Zambia, the relevant outcome is work that pays and lasts. Course enrolment, a loan approval or the launch of a project is an intermediate step. Each needs to be assessed against what happens afterwards.

What should investors and policymakers watch?

Businesses considering investment need evidence that infrastructure functions and that suppliers can meet orders. Clear project schedules and reliable services make it easier to decide when to hire or expand.

Policymakers can make Kalyalya’s message concrete by assigning responsibility for delivery and publishing progress against defined targets. Where a programme is intended to support employment, reporting should distinguish short-term work from sustained jobs and explain how the figures were measured.

Readers can follow this discussion through our Business & Economy coverage and Macroeconomy & Policy section.

Kalyalya’s challenge is to make Zambia’s resources work for its people. Citizens should be able to trace that ambition to a functioning service, an enterprise earning income or a job that continues after a project launch.

Sources: Ministry of Finance and National Planning, official Facebook page, statement on Dr Kalyalya’s Bangkok reflections, viewed 25 October 2026; IMF Annual Meetings information. Analysis and proposed delivery measures are The Zambian Economist’s.

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By Dr. Kelvin Kamayoyo, Technical Advisor, African Rivers

24th October, 2026

The world is not facing isolated conflicts. It is facing an unrelenting, mutating pandemic of war, and it is doing so exactly when nature is preparing its own assault, observed Dr. Kelvin Kamayoyo, Technical Advisor for African Rivers. Super El Niño of 2026-2027 is no longer a forecast, it is an incoming global shock. Yet the international system is bankrupt, distracted and defenceless.

A Pandemic of War

On Thursday, 22nd October 2026, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres made a statement that should have shaken every capital. Speaking ahead of his trip to Egypt, he warned: “War travels: through energy markets, shipping lanes, supply chains and financial systems” (Guterres, 2026).

He continued: “We are now witnessing an El Niño of war.” Guterres was right to use the metaphor. He told reporters in New York: “Today, conflicts are not only intensifying. They are expanding.” From the Middle East to Ukraine to Sudan, we are seeing a contagion. This is not an accident. It is a direct failure of preventive diplomacy. The United Nations has not maximized the technique of shuttle diplomacy as a means to prevent and stop conflicts.

The Case for Shuttle Diplomacy

Shuttle diplomacy, where a mediator moves between parties who refuse to meet face-to-face, remains one of the most effective tools to break deadlocks. As Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Henry Kissinger (1973), who pioneered modern shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, argued, sustainable peace is achieved not by demanding public surrender but by creating private space for compromise through persistent, discreet mediation (Kissinger, 1982). The UN must return to that model: less press conference, more shuttle.

This failure has a price. The famous Indian author Arundhati Roy, in The God of Small Things (1997) and later in The Cost of Living (1999), described precisely this moment: how big wars, big dams and big powers crush small lives, and how the poor pay for the violence of the powerful. Roy argued that people must reclaim narrative power and confront empire through determined, non-violent civil resistance that links ecological justice to anti-war struggles (Roy, 1999). Her warning is now reality.

The Blowback on Our Streets

The blowback is already on our streets. Referring to protests in Europe and elsewhere over the rising cost of living, Guterres said, “The violence and destruction we have seen on the streets is unacceptable and those responsible for criminal activities must be held accountable. At the same time, we cannot let intolerable violence obscure the legitimate and very real grievances of the many peaceful protestors.”

This tension between legitimate grievance and illegitimate violence was described with moral clarity by Nobel Peace Laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1984). Tutu maintained that when institutions ignore peaceful protest against injustice and poverty, they breed anger, but that violence can never be the answer and must be answered with justice, not repression (Tutu, 1999). The solution is not to criminalize the protester but to address the cost-of-living crisis that war itself is fuelling.

The spread is deliberate. “From the Middle East to Ukraine to Sudan, we are seeing civilians and civilian infrastructure deliberately thrust into the line of fire,” Guterres warned.

The great Nigerian author Chinua Achebe diagnosed this pathology decades ago. In Things Fall Apart (1958) and There Was a Country (2012), Achebe showed how when the centre cannot hold, when political failure turns people against their own communities, civilians become the battlefield (Achebe, 1958). His counsel remains relevant: societies minimize escalation not through revenge but through restoring community dialogue, truth-telling and inclusive governance.

Guterres was blunt: “Attacks directed against civilians and civilian objects are prohibited under international law. They must stop.” This is not a political opinion; it is law. Nobel Peace Laureate Kofi Annan (2001) consistently defended this principle, arguing that sovereignty can never be a shield for targeting civilians and that the protection of civilians is the core test of international legitimacy (Annan, 2005).

Yemen and Palestine: Where the Test Fails

Nowhere is this test failing more than in Yemen and Palestine. On Yemen, the Secretary-General pointed to “escalating hostilities around the city of Ta’iz and elsewhere” and described continued Houthi attacks against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia as “totally unacceptable. We need restraint and Yemen needs a political horizon.”

We need to move beyond talking in New York to taking action on the ground. We must better appreciate the concerns of all parties to reach an endgame that yields a win-win and secures global peace and stability. As Nobel Peace Laureate President Jimmy Carter (2002) demonstrated through the Camp David Accords and his post-presidency work, lasting peace requires direct engagement with all actors, however difficult, and a commitment to win-win outcomes over zero-sum victories (Carter, 2010).

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Guterres said, “In Gaza, essential aid is still being severely restricted by Israel ahead of the fast-approaching winter.” In the occupied West Bank, “Palestinians continue to suffer daily attacks by Israeli settlers. The clear goal is to drive communities off their land.”

There is an urgent need to innovate ways to promote coexistence in one area and share common prosperity. Nobel Peace Laureate Nelson Mandela (1993) described this challenge best. He argued that true coexistence is not about one group disappearing, but about building a shared future where both peoples enjoy equal dignity, freedom and prosperity in the same land (Mandela, 1994).

The Moral Obscenity of Our Priorities

Finally, the moral obscenity of our priorities. “The situation is out of control,” Guterres said. The World Food Programme “urgently needs 450 million US dollars to feed people in Gaza and the West Bank for the next six months,” an amount equivalent to around 90 minutes of global military spending.

It is sad to learn about this unfortunate comparison. But sadness is not a strategy. The United Nations should call for a 30-day global ceasefire of all wars so that global military savings can be channelled to El Niño response worldwide.

As the renowned Kenyan environmentalist and Nobel Peace Laureate Wangari Maathai (2004) warned, we cannot separate peace from the environment. In Unbowed (2006), Maathai argued that resource scarcity, environmental degradation and conflict form a vicious cycle, and that protecting the environment and feeding people is the most effective peace work (Maathai, 2006).

Super El Niño 2026-2027: The Incoming Shock

This is why the Super El Niño 2026-2027 will be catastrophic. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has confirmed that El Niño amplifies extreme weather which include droughts, floods and food system collapse (IPCC, 2023). The World Meteorological Organization warns that 2026-2027 is likely to be one of the strongest events on record (WMO, 2026).

Africa and the most vulnerable nations will be hit first and worst. With 60% of Africa’s population dependent on rain-fed agriculture, with energy grids already collapsing, with shipping lanes disrupted by war, the continent has no buffer (African Development Bank, 2024). When the rains fail in the Zambezi and the Horn, and floods wash away infrastructure in West Africa, there will be no global supply chain to rescue us because war has already broken it.

And recovery will undoubtedly take longer. A nation at war cannot rebuild a dam, cannot restore a crop, cannot move food aid. War travels, and so will famine. The world must choose to continue funding 90 minutes of war, or fund 6 months of life.

For comments contact the researcher and author on email: kamayoyokm@gmail.com

References

• Achebe, C. (1958) Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann.
• African Development Bank (2024) African Economic Outlook 2024: Climate and Food Security. Abidjan: AfDB.
• Annan, K. (2005) In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. New York: United Nations.
• Carter, J. (2010) White House Diary. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
• Guterres, A. (2026) Statement by UN Secretary-General: War travels through energy markets, shipping lanes, supply chains and financial systems. New York: United Nations, 22 October.
• IPCC (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
• Kissinger, H. (1982) Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown.
• Maathai, W. (2006) Unbowed: A Memoir. New York: Knopf.
• Mandela, N. (1994) Long Walk to Freedom. Boston: Little, Brown.
• Roy, A. (1997) The God of Small Things. New Delhi: IndiaInk.
• Roy, A. (1999) The Cost of Living. New York: Modern Library.
• Tutu, D. (1999) No Future Without Forgiveness. New York: Doubleday.
• WMO (2026) WMO El Niño/La Niña Update October 2026. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Introduction

On the eve of Zambia’s 62nd independence anniversary, President Hakainde Hichilema delivered a national address that looked in two directions at once: backwards to the generation that won sovereignty in 1964, and forwards to an economy he wants growing faster than it has in years.

The speech, delivered on 23 October, comes at a moment when the government believes it has earned the right to talk about growth. “The Grow Zambia Agenda moves us from economic stabilisation to accelerated growth,” the President said, in the line that anchors the whole address.

Honouring the Independence Generation

The President opened by naming the men and women who led Zambia to sovereignty on 24 October 1964: Kenneth David Kaunda, Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, Alexander Grey Zulu, Humphrey Mulemba, Nalumino Mundia, Mama Julia Chikamoneka and Mama Betty Chilombo Chilunga.

The list is notable for its breadth. It spans ruling-party and opposition tradition alike, from Kaunda to Nkumbula, the nationalist leader Kaunda’s UNIP sidelined for decades. It also gives equal standing to women, naming two of them among the heroes of the struggle.

Sixty-Two Years of What, Exactly?

The President’s summary of the national journey emphasised continuity: schools, hospitals, roads, airports and power stations built, and elections held with smooth transfers of power.

The claim about peaceful transitions carries weight. Since 1991 Zambia has changed governing parties three times, each time through the ballot and each time without the unrest that has accompanied comparable moments elsewhere on the continent. Few states founded in the 1960s can say the same.

He also credited the people rather than the state: farmers for their resilience, miners for their labour, youth for their creativity, the armed forces for their courage, women for their resourcefulness and entrepreneurs for their persistence.

The Grow Zambia Agenda: What It Means in Practice

The economic core of the speech is a short list of sectors where the government wants measurable gains: more maize, more wheat and more copper; more electricity generated; more tourists visiting; more exports leaving.

Each target speaks to a known pressure point in the economy. Maize output determines the cost of mealie meal, the single most politically sensitive price in Zambia. Copper still supplies the majority of export earnings. Electricity generation has been stretched in recent drought years, when low Kariba water levels forced load management that cut into mining and manufacturing output. Tourism and non-copper exports are the diversification story every administration since the copper price collapse of the 1970s has tried to write.

The President coupled the growth message with two safeguards: protecting the vulnerable and building strong institutions. He gave no new figures, timelines or budget allocations in the address, which was framed as a reflection rather than a policy speech.

A Message to the Youth

The President devoted a passage to young Zambians, calling them the backbone of the economy, its innovators and its leaders. He reminded the country that young people fought for independence and for democracy, and framed the anniversary as a moment for the young generation to take ownership of what comes next.

With a median age around 17, Zambia is one of the youngest countries in the world. Any growth agenda that works will be carried by that demographic, a fact the speech acknowledged even without naming the number.

What This Means

For business: A government that says it has moved from stabilisation to growth will be judged on whether doing business gets easier: cheaper and more reliable power, faster customs clearance for exporters and predictable policy in agriculture and mining. Firms in milling, agribusiness, tourism and mining supply chains are the direct beneficiaries if the sector targets are backed by execution.

For investors: The named sectors, maize, wheat, copper, electricity, tourism and exports, map closely to where policy attention and likely spending will concentrate. The absence of numbers in this speech means the real signals will come in the 2027 budget and in the performance of the harvest and copper output over the next two quarters.

For policy: The stabilisation-to-growth framing echoes the language of the International Monetary Fund-supported programme period, in which the priority was debt restructuring and fiscal control. The test of the Grow Zambia Agenda will be whether growth spending can accelerate without reopening the fiscal wounds that made stabilisation necessary.

Conclusion

Eve-of-independence speeches are usually exercises in unity. This one was that, but it also put a name to the government’s next economic chapter. The theme says it plainly: our journey, our growth, our future. From tomorrow, the Grow Zambia Agenda will be measured not in speeches but in maize yields, megawatts, tourist arrivals and the copper price realised on LME contracts.

Happy 62nd Independence Anniversary, Zambia.

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Zambia has disbursed K31.7 million for food relief in prioritised districts across nine provinces as it prepares for the anticipated effects of the 2026/2027 El Niño, according to a government summary of Vice-President Mutale Nalumango’s ministerial statement.

The money is intended to finance the procurement and distribution of food to vulnerable communities. The Ministry of Information and Media published the summary on 23 October.

What does the food security assessment show?

Nalumango cited the 2026 Zambia Vulnerability and Needs Assessment, whose field findings feed the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) analysis for Zambia.

The IPC report projects that 1,253,124 people, about 1.25 million, will be in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or worse between October 2026 and March 2027. That is up from about 698,000 people between April and September 2026.

The 1.25 million figure is 7 per cent of the 19.1 million people living in the 93 districts covered by the analysis. It should not be read as 7 per cent of Zambia’s total population, or as a sign that every one of the 93 districts faces the same level of need.

The ministry’s summary gave the at-risk period as August 2026 to March 2027. The IPC report sets the projection at October 2026 to March 2027, the lean season before the next harvest.

The assessment describes people at risk over a specified period. It does not establish that all those people have already received relief, or that they will all be covered by this particular disbursement.

What will the preparedness plan cover?

The Government is implementing a 2026/2027 El Niño Preparedness and Response Plan to coordinate action on the anticipated effects of the weather phenomenon, including potential droughts and floods.

Measures outlined in the statement include climate-smart farming practices, stronger disease surveillance and protection of water sources. Water and energy conservation, food supplies and the continuity of essential services also form part of the response.

The Government and cooperating partners are mobilising financial, human and material resources. Public information will be distributed through radio, television and community platforms to help people receive early warnings and preparedness advice.

Advice for farmers and households

Nalumango urged MPs to share seasonal forecasts in their constituencies and encourage farmers to follow advice from the Zambia Meteorological Department and agricultural extension officers.

Citizens were also asked to conserve water, use appropriate farming practices and preserve available household food stocks.

For farmers deciding when and what to plant, local forecasts and extension advice matter more than assuming that the same conditions will apply across the country. The seasonal outlook released in September points to normal to above-normal rainfall in the north and below-normal rainfall in the south. The government summary does not provide a district-by-district outlook.

From disbursement to food on the table

The K31.7 million is a reported release of funds for procurement and distribution. That is a different stage from confirming that food has reached households.

The public summary does not identify the recipient districts or explain how the money is divided between food purchases and delivery costs. It also gives no food tonnage, beneficiary total for this release or distribution timetable.

Those details will help communities and MPs track implementation. The immediate measures of delivery are how much food is purchased, where it goes and when eligible households receive it.

For households with limited food stocks, timely assistance could reduce the need to divert scarce cash from other essentials. For public agencies, the practical task is to turn the funding into deliveries before shortages deepen.

Related: Why the 2026/2027 super El Niño threatens Zambia’s food, power and budget | Understanding the supersized El Niño of 2026/2027 | The K19.9 billion supplementary budget and payments to FRA maize farmers

Sources: Ministry of Information and Media summary of the Vice-President’s ministerial statement, 23 October 2026; IPC Zambia Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, April 2026 to March 2027.

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Zambia will prioritise practical technical training over the next five years to help more people secure employment and start businesses, Finance and National Planning Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane has said.

In a statement published by the Ministry of Finance and National Planning on 23 October, Musokotwane said wider access to education must translate into the ability to perform the work required by employers.

His remarks followed the 2026 IMF and World Bank Group Annual Meetings in Bangkok. The meetings ran from 12 to 18 October.

From classroom access to workplace competence

Musokotwane said free education and Constituency Development Fund (CDF) supported training had laid a foundation. The next phase would focus on the quality of training and how beneficiaries apply their skills.

He identified mechanics, electricians, engineers, miners, technicians and clerks among the workers Zambia needs to meet industry requirements and increase production.

Competence in technical occupations does not always depend on holding a university degree, he said. For many jobs, the immediate requirement is the ability to carry out specific tasks accurately and efficiently.

What Zambia can learn from Thailand

The minister pointed to Thailand’s modern infrastructure as evidence of the contribution made by skilled artisans and technicians. Zambia needed a workforce able to produce comparable results in construction, mining, manufacturing and agriculture, he said.

His argument places practical training within the Government’s wider Grow Zambia Agenda. That agenda seeks to turn economic stability and public investment into increased production and private-sector growth. Read our related coverage of the Grow Zambia Agenda at the COMESA summit.

What this could mean for workers and businesses

For a young Zambian choosing a training course, the policy emphasis makes the connection between learning and paid work central. A course’s value depends partly on whether it provides enough workshop practice and teaches skills that employers or customers will pay for.

For businesses, a larger pool of competent workers could reduce recruitment difficulties and the time spent retraining new employees. Self-employment offers another route for tradespeople, although equipment costs and access to customers also affect whether a skill becomes a reliable income.

These are potential benefits rather than guaranteed outcomes. Training alone cannot ensure employment if businesses are not creating jobs or if graduates lack the tools to work independently.

What has been announced, and what remains unclear?

The ministry’s statement describes a policy priority for the next five years. It does not set out a new budget, the number of training places to be funded, an implementation timetable or a forecast of jobs to be created.

Those details will matter when assessing delivery. Useful measures would include completion rates, employer assessments of graduates’ skills and how many trainees move into employment or sustained self-employment.

For now, the test Musokotwane has set is practical: whether expanded education and training help Zambians do the work that the economy needs.

Source: Ministry of Finance and National Planning statement, 23 October 2026.

Explore more reporting in Business & Economy and our Business Directory.

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By Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo, Technical Advisor, African Rivers | The Zambian Economist Analyst

Aliko Dangote must emulate Alfred Bernhard Nobel and turn industrial wealth into a perpetual legacy.

Dangote’s achievements are admirable and motivate many people across Africa and beyond. Forbes ranks him as the continent’s richest person, with an estimated net worth of US$28.5 billion in its 2026 list (Forbes, 2026). He started a small trading business in Lagos in 1977. He went on to build Africa’s largest cement producer and to commission the 650,000 barrels-per-day Dangote Refinery in Lekki (Dangote Group, 2024). In doing so, he has shown that large-scale, African-led industrialisation is possible.

His journey is about more than accumulating wealth. It is about possibility, and about proving that an African can build at global scale from Africa.

Success as a story others can learn from

African literature has long understood this kind of motivational power. In Things Fall Apart (1958), Chinua Achebe traces how Okonkwo rises from his father’s poverty to prominence in Umuofia through hard work and resilience. Achebe also shows that personal success means little when it is cut off from the community that gives it meaning (Achebe, 1958). Dangote’s story carries the same double lesson.

What sets Dangote apart is his willingness to talk about how he built his fortune. He has spoken at investor forums, universities and policy roundtables about patient capital, reinvestment, managing debt and building despite poor infrastructure. Research on entrepreneurship finds that visible role models reduce the uncertainty that new entrants feel and make wealth creation seem learnable (Bosma et al., 2012).

To emulate, in this context, means to imitate a model and then surpass it. It is not blind copying. It is deliberate learning that turns admiration into a better, locally relevant legacy. That is what Dangote should do with Nobel. Dangote has not published any formal commentary on Nobel, but the stated purpose of his Aliko Dangote Foundation is close to Nobel’s final intent: that private fortune should ultimately serve the public (Bishop and Green, 2008).

How Nobel turned a fortune into a permanent institution

Alfred Nobel (1833 to 1896) was a Swedish chemist, engineer and industrialist. He patented dynamite in 1867, held 355 patents and built an international business in explosives and armaments, with interests in his brothers’ oil company in Baku (Fant, 1993).

According to a widely told account, a French newspaper mistook the 1888 death of his brother Ludvig for his own and ran an obituary describing him as “the merchant of death”. Historians have struggled to locate the original article, but the story captures a real concern: Nobel thought hard about how he would be remembered (Sohlman, 1983).

He signed his last will and testament on 27 November 1895 at the Swedish-Norwegian Club in Paris and died on 10 December 1896. The will left about 94 per cent of his estate, some 31 million Swedish kronor, to a fund whose annual returns would reward those who had “conferred the greatest benefit to humankind” (Nobel Foundation, 2024). Estimates put that sum at more than SEK 2 billion in today’s money. The prizes were to cover five fields: physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature and peace. The Nobel Foundation was set up in 1900 to carry out the will (Lundestad, 2001).

Nobel’s achievement was threefold. He turned unease about his reputation into purpose. He made excellence universal rather than national, since the will specified that nationality should not count. And he made his legacy perpetual by creating an endowment rather than a one-off gift (Nobel Foundation, 2024). He understood that society needs lasting institutional incentives to honour those who move humanity forward.

The uncomfortable question

The question that follows is uncomfortable but necessary. What lasting, inspirational legacy will Aliko Dangote be remembered for in 2126 if he does not establish a “Dangote Prize Laureates” programme?

The Indian author Arundhati Roy has long argued that asking awkward questions is not disloyalty but a way of seeing clearly, because it strips away pretence so that a society can confront an issue honestly (Roy, 2008).

Factories can be nationalised. Refineries can become obsolete. Fortunes can be divided and diluted. A prize endures. In a hundred years, the Dangote Refinery may be a museum. A Dangote Prize for African Industrial Innovation, for Food Security, for Affordable Housing or for Energy Access could still be honouring African talent. Nobel understood that wealth without an institution to carry its purpose dies with its owner.

A challenge to African scholarship

To emulate Nobel, Dangote must institutionalise inspiration. That is also a challenge to academia. Scholars should spend more time analysing the business and investment models Dangote has used and test which of them work in African conditions. Management research on African business still leans heavily on models imported from the West (George et al., 2016).

Dangote’s approach combines vertical integration, backward integration into raw materials, the management of political risk and long-horizon domestic capital. It has drawn both praise and criticism. Akinyoade and Uche (2018), for example, examine how far close ties with the state shaped the growth of Dangote Cement. That debate is itself a reason for serious study. The approach deserves its own body of research, which might be called the Dangote Model of African Industrial Capitalism.

Legacy is also tested now

A prize is about the future, but legacy is also tested in the present.

The World Meteorological Organization expects the strengthening El Niño of 2026/2027 to bring drier conditions and drought risk to much of southern Africa, with above-normal temperatures across the region (WMO, 2026). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has found that El Niño events worsen food insecurity in vulnerable regions (IPCC, 2023). The last El Niño, in 2023/2024, left about 68 million people in the Southern African Development Community in need of help, according to SADC (SADC, 2024). Zambia declared a national disaster during that drought. For more on the current outlook, see our explainer, Understanding the ‘Supersized’ El Niño of 2026/2027, and Dr Kamayoyo’s earlier piece, Supersized El Niño 2026/2027 To Stress Rivers.

The Kenyan Nobel Peace laureate Wangari Maathai, founder of the Green Belt Movement, wrote that environmental damage and poverty feed each other, and that the burden falls hardest on the poor. Her answer was collective resilience: communities planting trees, protecting watersheds and supporting one another (Maathai, 2009). In that spirit, Dangote should consider donating food, children’s books, shoes, clothing and temporary shelter to communities hit by the 2026/2027 El Niño.

Where wealth meets morality

This is where wealth meets humanity. The Scottish-American industrialist Andrew Carnegie set out the duty plainly in his 1889 essay, later known as The Gospel of Wealth. He argued that the rich are trustees of their fortunes and should use them for the good of the community during their lifetimes, warning that “the man who dies thus rich dies disgraced” (Carnegie, 1889). That principle later shaped modern philanthropy, from Rockefeller to Gates (Bishop and Green, 2008). Wealth that does not feed, clothe and shelter people in a climate crisis loses moral legitimacy.

Literature has taught this lesson too. In Schindler’s Ark (1982), the Australian novelist Thomas Keneally tells the story of Oskar Schindler, an industrialist who turned his factory and fortune from war profiteering into a means of rescuing the people who worked for him (Keneally, 1982). Achebe’s No Longer at Ease (1960) returns to the tension between individual advancement and obligation to the community. Both writers show that wealth without moral responsibility destroys, and that wealth with a social conscience rebuilds.

Africa’s Schindler moment

Aliko Dangote has built what no other African has built. He has earned wide admiration. The next step is a kind of immortality: not of the body, but of purpose. Nobel turned dynamite into a peace prize. Dangote can turn cement and petrol into prizes for human progress.

Establishing the Dangote Prize Laureates would be Africa’s own Schindler moment, turning an industrial fortune into permanent moral capital. It would mean that in 2126, young African scientists, writers, industrialists and peacemakers still strive because Dangote once lived. That legacy would be worth more than being the richest person on the continent.

About the author

Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo

Economist, International Trade Law Scholar and Investment Consultant | Lusaka, Zambia

Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo has over 13 years of experience across academia, policy and the private sector. He is Programme Director of the Purposive Mega-Infrastructure Investment Programme and Technical Advisor for African Rivers, and an adjunct lecturer at ESAMI, NIPA and Zambia Open University. A former board member of the Economics Association of Zambia, he writes on economics, international trade, local content, river ecosystems and climate change. He can be reached at kamayoyokm@gmail.com. Meet our contributors.

References

1. Achebe, C. (1958) Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann.
2. Achebe, C. (1960) No Longer at Ease. London: Heinemann.
3. Akinyoade, A. and Uche, C. (2018) ‘Development built on crony capitalism? The case of Dangote Cement’, Business History, 60(6), pp. 833 to 858.
4. Bishop, M. and Green, M. (2008) Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
5. Bosma, N., Hessels, J., Schutjens, V., Van Praag, M. and Verheul, I. (2012) ‘Entrepreneurship and role models’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(2), pp. 410 to 424.
6. Carnegie, A. (1889) ‘Wealth’, North American Review, 148(391), pp. 653 to 664.
7. Dangote Group (2024) Annual Report 2023. Lagos: Dangote Industries Limited.
8. Fant, K. (1993) Alfred Nobel: A Biography. New York: Arcade Publishing.
9. Forbes (2026) The World’s Billionaires 2026. New York: Forbes Media.
10. George, G., Corbishley, C., Khayesi, J.N.O., Haas, M.R. and Tihanyi, L. (2016) ‘Bringing Africa in: Promising directions for management research’, Academy of Management Journal, 59(2), pp. 377 to 393.
11. IPCC (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
12. Keneally, T. (1982) Schindler’s Ark. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
13. Lundestad, G. (2001) ‘The Nobel Peace Prize’, in The Nobel Prize: The First 100 Years. London: Imperial College Press.
14. Maathai, W. (2009) The Challenge for Africa. New York: Pantheon Books.
15. Nobel Foundation (2024) Alfred Nobel’s Will. Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/alfred-nobel/alfred-nobels-will/ (Accessed: 23 October 2026).
16. Roy, A. (2008) The Shape of the Beast: Conversations with Arundhati Roy. New Delhi: Penguin Books.
17. SADC (2024) Regional Humanitarian Appeal in Response to the 2023/2024 El Niño-Induced Drought and Floods. Gaborone: Southern African Development Community.
18. Sohlman, R. (1983) The Legacy of Alfred Nobel. London: Bodley Head.
19. WMO (2026) ‘El Niño will unleash multiple hazards in South-West Indian Ocean region’, 1 October. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.

Related reading: Africa Must Prepare Now for the Unrelenting 2026 El Niño Wave.

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

President Hakainde Hichilema has returned to Lusaka from Harare after the 25th Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Heads of State and Government Summit, where Zambia took up the role of Vice-Chairperson and formally committed land for a new headquarters for the bloc.

In a statement after the summit, the President said he had called on all 21 member states “to trade more with each other before looking elsewhere,” arguing that this would create more jobs and business opportunities across the region. He said the Grow Zambia Agenda had also featured in his discussions.

A new seat for the Secretariat

During the summit, Zambia handed over a certificate of title deed for the member states to build a new COMESA headquarters in Lusaka. The Secretariat has been based in Lusaka since the bloc was established, so the title deed secures that position for the long term rather than creating it.

A purpose-built headquarters brings practical benefits for the host city: construction work, regional staff based in Lusaka, and a steady flow of meetings, delegations and technical missions. Those gains will depend on member states agreeing the financing and getting the building done, which the summit did not settle publicly.

Vice-Chair to Zimbabwe’s chairmanship

President Ruto of Kenya handed the COMESA chairmanship to President Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, the summit host. Zambia, which chaired the bloc after hosting the 22nd Summit in Lusaka in 2023, now sits as Vice-Chairperson. The role keeps Lusaka at the centre of the bloc’s leadership over the coming year.

The trade gap behind the call

The President’s appeal reflects a long-standing weakness. Member states still trade far more with markets outside the bloc than with each other. A ZimTrade brief published in October estimates that intra-COMESA exports peaked at about US$18 billion in 2023 before falling to about US$13 billion in 2025, and that goods from other members make up only around 4 percent of imports.

For Zambian producers, the regional market is close and large. Copper dominates exports to the rest of the world, but processed foods, cement, fertiliser, sugar and manufactured goods are the kinds of products that tend to find buyers in neighbouring markets first. Selling more of them into the region is one of the more realistic ways to widen the export base that the Grow Zambia Agenda is targeting.

Words at a summit do not remove the obstacles. Slow border clearance, non-tariff barriers, poor rail and road links, and payment and currency frictions keep regional trade expensive. Progress on those points will show whether the call to trade with each other first turns into more trucks, trains and invoices crossing COMESA borders.

Related: Hichilema Takes Grow Zambia Agenda to 25th COMESA Summit in Harare.

Related: Hichilema Heads to Harare for 25th COMESA Summit as Zimbabwe Takes the Chair.

Related: Zambia’s manufacturing vision: turning local production into jobs and exports.

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