By Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo, Technical Advisor, African Rivers | The Zambian Economist Analyst

Aliko Dangote must emulate Alfred Bernhard Nobel and turn industrial wealth into a perpetual legacy.

Dangote’s achievements are admirable and motivate many people across Africa and beyond. Forbes ranks him as the continent’s richest person, with an estimated net worth of US$28.5 billion in its 2026 list (Forbes, 2026). He started a small trading business in Lagos in 1977. He went on to build Africa’s largest cement producer and to commission the 650,000 barrels-per-day Dangote Refinery in Lekki (Dangote Group, 2024). In doing so, he has shown that large-scale, African-led industrialisation is possible.

His journey is about more than accumulating wealth. It is about possibility, and about proving that an African can build at global scale from Africa.

Success as a story others can learn from

African literature has long understood this kind of motivational power. In Things Fall Apart (1958), Chinua Achebe traces how Okonkwo rises from his father’s poverty to prominence in Umuofia through hard work and resilience. Achebe also shows that personal success means little when it is cut off from the community that gives it meaning (Achebe, 1958). Dangote’s story carries the same double lesson.

What sets Dangote apart is his willingness to talk about how he built his fortune. He has spoken at investor forums, universities and policy roundtables about patient capital, reinvestment, managing debt and building despite poor infrastructure. Research on entrepreneurship finds that visible role models reduce the uncertainty that new entrants feel and make wealth creation seem learnable (Bosma et al., 2012).

To emulate, in this context, means to imitate a model and then surpass it. It is not blind copying. It is deliberate learning that turns admiration into a better, locally relevant legacy. That is what Dangote should do with Nobel. Dangote has not published any formal commentary on Nobel, but the stated purpose of his Aliko Dangote Foundation is close to Nobel’s final intent: that private fortune should ultimately serve the public (Bishop and Green, 2008).

How Nobel turned a fortune into a permanent institution

Alfred Nobel (1833 to 1896) was a Swedish chemist, engineer and industrialist. He patented dynamite in 1867, held 355 patents and built an international business in explosives and armaments, with interests in his brothers’ oil company in Baku (Fant, 1993).

According to a widely told account, a French newspaper mistook the 1888 death of his brother Ludvig for his own and ran an obituary describing him as “the merchant of death”. Historians have struggled to locate the original article, but the story captures a real concern: Nobel thought hard about how he would be remembered (Sohlman, 1983).

He signed his last will and testament on 27 November 1895 at the Swedish-Norwegian Club in Paris and died on 10 December 1896. The will left about 94 per cent of his estate, some 31 million Swedish kronor, to a fund whose annual returns would reward those who had “conferred the greatest benefit to humankind” (Nobel Foundation, 2024). Estimates put that sum at more than SEK 2 billion in today’s money. The prizes were to cover five fields: physics, chemistry, physiology or medicine, literature and peace. The Nobel Foundation was set up in 1900 to carry out the will (Lundestad, 2001).

Nobel’s achievement was threefold. He turned unease about his reputation into purpose. He made excellence universal rather than national, since the will specified that nationality should not count. And he made his legacy perpetual by creating an endowment rather than a one-off gift (Nobel Foundation, 2024). He understood that society needs lasting institutional incentives to honour those who move humanity forward.

The uncomfortable question

The question that follows is uncomfortable but necessary. What lasting, inspirational legacy will Aliko Dangote be remembered for in 2126 if he does not establish a “Dangote Prize Laureates” programme?

The Indian author Arundhati Roy has long argued that asking awkward questions is not disloyalty but a way of seeing clearly, because it strips away pretence so that a society can confront an issue honestly (Roy, 2008).

Factories can be nationalised. Refineries can become obsolete. Fortunes can be divided and diluted. A prize endures. In a hundred years, the Dangote Refinery may be a museum. A Dangote Prize for African Industrial Innovation, for Food Security, for Affordable Housing or for Energy Access could still be honouring African talent. Nobel understood that wealth without an institution to carry its purpose dies with its owner.

A challenge to African scholarship

To emulate Nobel, Dangote must institutionalise inspiration. That is also a challenge to academia. Scholars should spend more time analysing the business and investment models Dangote has used and test which of them work in African conditions. Management research on African business still leans heavily on models imported from the West (George et al., 2016).

Dangote’s approach combines vertical integration, backward integration into raw materials, the management of political risk and long-horizon domestic capital. It has drawn both praise and criticism. Akinyoade and Uche (2018), for example, examine how far close ties with the state shaped the growth of Dangote Cement. That debate is itself a reason for serious study. The approach deserves its own body of research, which might be called the Dangote Model of African Industrial Capitalism.

Legacy is also tested now

A prize is about the future, but legacy is also tested in the present.

The World Meteorological Organization expects the strengthening El Niño of 2026/2027 to bring drier conditions and drought risk to much of southern Africa, with above-normal temperatures across the region (WMO, 2026). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has found that El Niño events worsen food insecurity in vulnerable regions (IPCC, 2023). The last El Niño, in 2023/2024, left about 68 million people in the Southern African Development Community in need of help, according to SADC (SADC, 2024). Zambia declared a national disaster during that drought. For more on the current outlook, see our explainer, Understanding the ‘Supersized’ El Niño of 2026/2027, and Dr Kamayoyo’s earlier piece, Supersized El Niño 2026/2027 To Stress Rivers.

The Kenyan Nobel Peace laureate Wangari Maathai, founder of the Green Belt Movement, wrote that environmental damage and poverty feed each other, and that the burden falls hardest on the poor. Her answer was collective resilience: communities planting trees, protecting watersheds and supporting one another (Maathai, 2009). In that spirit, Dangote should consider donating food, children’s books, shoes, clothing and temporary shelter to communities hit by the 2026/2027 El Niño.

Where wealth meets morality

This is where wealth meets humanity. The Scottish-American industrialist Andrew Carnegie set out the duty plainly in his 1889 essay, later known as The Gospel of Wealth. He argued that the rich are trustees of their fortunes and should use them for the good of the community during their lifetimes, warning that “the man who dies thus rich dies disgraced” (Carnegie, 1889). That principle later shaped modern philanthropy, from Rockefeller to Gates (Bishop and Green, 2008). Wealth that does not feed, clothe and shelter people in a climate crisis loses moral legitimacy.

Literature has taught this lesson too. In Schindler’s Ark (1982), the Australian novelist Thomas Keneally tells the story of Oskar Schindler, an industrialist who turned his factory and fortune from war profiteering into a means of rescuing the people who worked for him (Keneally, 1982). Achebe’s No Longer at Ease (1960) returns to the tension between individual advancement and obligation to the community. Both writers show that wealth without moral responsibility destroys, and that wealth with a social conscience rebuilds.

Africa’s Schindler moment

Aliko Dangote has built what no other African has built. He has earned wide admiration. The next step is a kind of immortality: not of the body, but of purpose. Nobel turned dynamite into a peace prize. Dangote can turn cement and petrol into prizes for human progress.

Establishing the Dangote Prize Laureates would be Africa’s own Schindler moment, turning an industrial fortune into permanent moral capital. It would mean that in 2126, young African scientists, writers, industrialists and peacemakers still strive because Dangote once lived. That legacy would be worth more than being the richest person on the continent.

About the author

Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo

Economist, International Trade Law Scholar and Investment Consultant | Lusaka, Zambia

Dr Kelvin Kamayoyo has over 13 years of experience across academia, policy and the private sector. He is Programme Director of the Purposive Mega-Infrastructure Investment Programme and Technical Advisor for African Rivers, and an adjunct lecturer at ESAMI, NIPA and Zambia Open University. A former board member of the Economics Association of Zambia, he writes on economics, international trade, local content, river ecosystems and climate change. He can be reached at kamayoyokm@gmail.com. Meet our contributors.

References

1. Achebe, C. (1958) Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann.
2. Achebe, C. (1960) No Longer at Ease. London: Heinemann.
3. Akinyoade, A. and Uche, C. (2018) ‘Development built on crony capitalism? The case of Dangote Cement’, Business History, 60(6), pp. 833 to 858.
4. Bishop, M. and Green, M. (2008) Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich Can Save the World. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
5. Bosma, N., Hessels, J., Schutjens, V., Van Praag, M. and Verheul, I. (2012) ‘Entrepreneurship and role models’, Journal of Economic Psychology, 33(2), pp. 410 to 424.
6. Carnegie, A. (1889) ‘Wealth’, North American Review, 148(391), pp. 653 to 664.
7. Dangote Group (2024) Annual Report 2023. Lagos: Dangote Industries Limited.
8. Fant, K. (1993) Alfred Nobel: A Biography. New York: Arcade Publishing.
9. Forbes (2026) The World’s Billionaires 2026. New York: Forbes Media.
10. George, G., Corbishley, C., Khayesi, J.N.O., Haas, M.R. and Tihanyi, L. (2016) ‘Bringing Africa in: Promising directions for management research’, Academy of Management Journal, 59(2), pp. 377 to 393.
11. IPCC (2023) Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
12. Keneally, T. (1982) Schindler’s Ark. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
13. Lundestad, G. (2001) ‘The Nobel Peace Prize’, in The Nobel Prize: The First 100 Years. London: Imperial College Press.
14. Maathai, W. (2009) The Challenge for Africa. New York: Pantheon Books.
15. Nobel Foundation (2024) Alfred Nobel’s Will. Available at: https://www.nobelprize.org/alfred-nobel/alfred-nobels-will/ (Accessed: 23 October 2026).
16. Roy, A. (2008) The Shape of the Beast: Conversations with Arundhati Roy. New Delhi: Penguin Books.
17. SADC (2024) Regional Humanitarian Appeal in Response to the 2023/2024 El Niño-Induced Drought and Floods. Gaborone: Southern African Development Community.
18. Sohlman, R. (1983) The Legacy of Alfred Nobel. London: Bodley Head.
19. WMO (2026) ‘El Niño will unleash multiple hazards in South-West Indian Ocean region’, 1 October. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.

Related reading: Africa Must Prepare Now for the Unrelenting 2026 El Niño Wave.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

Government has called for coordinated action on electronic waste management, linking the safe handling of discarded devices to employment and business opportunities for young Zambians.

At the World E-Waste Day commemoration in Lusaka on 14 October, Green Economy and Environment Minister Gilbert Siame said the growing use of phones, computers, routers and other devices required effective collection, recycling and safe disposal systems. His speech was read by Forestry Director Freddie Siangulube, according to the event briefing supplied to The Zambian Economist.

The briefing identifies Airtel Zambia’s contribution as a donation of electronic waste to support practical skills development. It does not state the quantity or value of the donation.

What is Zambia’s e-waste youth employment project?

The Government is working with the International Labour Organisation under the Sustainable E-Waste Management for Youth Employment Project. The ILO’s project page confirms that the initiative operates in Central Province with funding from Japan.

In a July progress update, the ILO said it aimed to support 100 young women and men, including persons with disabilities, across Chibombo, Chisamba, Kabwe, Kapiri Mposhi and Mumbwa.

That figure describes the intended reach of the programme. It does not establish that 100 participants have secured jobs or started profitable businesses.

How can discarded electronics support livelihoods?

The opportunity extends from collecting old equipment to repairing devices, preparing them for reuse and recovering materials through recycling. The programme combines technical training with business management and financial literacy, according to the event briefing.

Siame said training needed to be complemented by access to employers, work-based learning, equipment, financing and markets. For participants hoping to establish enterprises, those conditions determine whether a skill becomes a source of income.

A donation can provide equipment for practical learning. An ongoing business also needs a dependable supply of discarded devices, the tools to handle them safely and customers willing to pay for repaired products or recovered materials.

The business test comes after training

For Zambia’s repair shops and prospective recycling businesses, the commercial question is whether revenue can cover collection, transport and safe processing costs. Access to finance matters, but so does a market for what an enterprise produces.

The programme’s results should therefore be assessed through paid placements, enterprises still trading after training and participants’ earnings. The quantity of e-waste safely collected and processed would provide a separate environmental measure.

No figures for jobs already created, participant earnings or business survival were provided in the commemoration briefing. These remain measures to track as implementation proceeds.

Why safe handling matters

The minister linked the initiative to protecting public health and the environment. The ILO also includes occupational safety in its programme approach. Expanding collection without safe handling and disposal would leave part of the problem unresolved.

The next test is whether Government, employers and cooperating partners can connect the training to sustained work and viable enterprises. Airtel’s reported contribution provides material for skills development; its employment effect will depend on what follows.

Source note: Ministerial remarks and Airtel donation details are drawn from the event briefing supplied to The Zambian Economist. Programme funding, target and geographical coverage are corroborated by the ILO. The briefing does not provide a verified employment outcome count.

More coverage

Related: Airtel’s K1.22bn Profit: A Signal of Zambia’s Digital Economy Taking Off.

Explore our Technology & Innovation coverage and Entrepreneurship & Startups reporting for more on digital businesses and enterprise development in Zambia.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.
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By The Zambian Economist Analyst

What is happening

Lusaka City Council, working with the Zambia Police Service, will start a joint enforcement operation on Saturday, 3 October 2026, to remove street vendors from unauthorised trading areas. The exercise, code-named “Operation Clear Path”, targets the Central Business District and other affected parts of the city.

Addressing the press, the Mayor of Lusaka, Mr Chitambala Mwewa, said street vendors and bus drivers will no longer be permitted to operate from unauthorised locations from that date, as part of efforts to keep the city clean, healthy, safe and orderly.

The Mayor’s message to traders

The Mayor urged affected traders and bus drivers to cooperate and move to designated markets and bus stations, where they can trade lawfully. He said the Council remains committed to a business-friendly environment, provided trading follows the law.

“This operation is not intended to punish anyone but to restore order and promote sustainable trading practices,” he said. “We encourage all traders and bus drivers to take advantage of the available trading spaces in markets and bus stations provided by the Council and work with us in building a better Lusaka.”

The cholera link

The Council has tied the timing to public health. The Mayor said street vending, together with indiscriminate waste disposal and blocked drainage, poses serious health and environmental risks at a time when Lusaka District has recorded 130 cholera cases. With the rainy season approaching, blocked drains and uncollected waste around trading points become a bigger concern.

Police say rights will be protected

Zambia Police Service spokesperson Godfrey Chilabi said the operation has been planned to ensure legal compliance while protecting human rights and property during the exercise. That assurance matters, because past removals of street traders in Lusaka have at times led to confrontations and losses of goods.

The economics behind the street

For many Lusaka households, street vending is not a choice made against an available formal job. It is the job. Trading close to where customers walk, at bus stops and busy junctions, is how many vendors make enough sales in a day to cover food, rent and school costs. Relocation to a market changes that calculation: stall fees, distance from foot traffic and competition inside the market all affect daily takings.

That is why the success of Operation Clear Path will depend on more than enforcement. Three questions will decide whether traders stay in markets or drift back to the streets:

• Space. Whether designated markets and bus stations have enough room for the traders being moved.
• Customers. Whether those spaces sit where buyers actually pass, so that traders do not lose most of their sales.
• Services. Whether markets offer water, toilets, waste collection and security that make them a better place to trade than the pavement.

Clean, safe streets and a healthy city are reasonable goals, and the cholera numbers give the Council a strong case to act. The longer-term test is whether the city can offer traders a place to earn a living that works as well as the street did, so that order lasts beyond the operation itself.

What traders and commuters should note

• Enforcement begins on Saturday, 3 October 2026.
• Vendors should move to designated markets; bus drivers should load and offload at designated bus stations.
• Traders with questions about available spaces should contact Lusaka City Council.

Related: Where Lusaka Does Lunch: The Business of Fire, Food and Fast Turnover at Longacres Market.

Related: Buseko Market Fire Destroys Traders’ Property in Lusaka.

Related: Lusaka on a Sunday Morning: Intercity Slowly Comes to Life.

Related: Chitambala Mwewa Sworn In as Lusaka Mayor Ahead of Afternoon Installation

Related: Mwewa Installed as Lusaka Mayor, Puts Waste, Drainage and Roads at the Top of His List

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Zambia’s next development challenge is not simply how to finance enterprises, but how to mobilise the savings of its own citizens into productive capital and progressively turn them into owners of the economy. A further strategic implication is the Capitalisation of Home Grown Institutions that can multiply domestic capital. 

The domestic-capital proposition also raises an important question about the role of government and other development actors.

If Zambia’s objective is to mobilise substantially more domestic capital for productive investment, then government should not necessarily limit its intervention to directly financing individual enterprises or creating another stand-alone MSME fund.

There is potentially a more powerful intervention:

Capitalise credible domestic institutions that can mobilise, aggregate, manage and deploy significantly larger pools of capital.

This distinction is important. A government allocation of K100 million to a programme that simply disburses grants or loans may provide immediate assistance to a defined number of enterprises. But a carefully structured capitalisation of a credible institution with the mandate, governance, systems and investment capacity to mobilise member contributions, citizen savings, private investment, diaspora capital and development-partner funding could potentially create a much larger and more sustainable pool of capital.

The public contribution would therefore become catalytic capital rather than merely distributive funding.

The objective should be: 

Public capital to

→ Institutional capitalisation to

→ Citizen/member mobilisation to

→ Private capital mobilisation to

→ Enterprise investment to

→ Enterprise growth to

→ Returns to

→ Capital recycling to

→ Larger investment pool

This is a fundamentally different approach to public financing.

1. Government should increasingly fund capital multipliers, not only individual beneficiaries. 

Zambia already recognises the importance of mechanisms that improve MSME access to finance.

The Zambia Credit Guarantee Scheme, for example, was established specifically to enhance MSME access to finance, while more recent initiatives such as the Small Business Growth Initiative have sought to use risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage financial institutions to lend to MSMEs.

The proposed domestic-capital architecture extends this principle one step further.

Instead of asking only:

“How much money can government put into MSMEs?” the policy question becomes:

“How much additional capital can government cause to flow into productive Zambian enterprises through every kwacha of public capital deployed?”

This introduces the concept of a capital-multiplier institution.

A credible institution could receive public or development-partner capitalisation and use that strengthened balance sheet, investment mandate and institutional credibility to mobilise additional capital from:

• members/citizens;
• cooperatives;
• Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs);
• private investors;
• pension and institutional investors;
• diaspora investors;
• development finance institutions; and
• strategic partners.

Government’s role would therefore be catalytic. It would help create the institutional capacity through which private and citizen capital can be mobilised at scale.

2. This provides a stronger rationale for capitalising institutions such as the Barotse Empowerment Trust Limited (BET) and the creation of its equivalent in every province of Zambia.

Therefore, this principle has particular relevance to institutions such as the Barotse Empowerment Trust (BET) and other credible Zambian development-oriented institutions that already possess organised membership, community networks, enterprise-development objectives or investment facilitation capacity.

Rather than viewing such institutions merely as organisations seeking funding for programmes, they should be developed into domestic-capital mobilisation and enterprise-development platforms.

For example, an institution such as BET could potentially operate across several interconnected functions:

Member mobilisation

→ Member savings/investment contributions

→ Institutional investment pool

→ Enterprise identification

→ EGS-UP assessment and graduation

→ Investment into qualifying enterprises

→ Enterprise growth

→ Returns

→ Capital recycling

This would allow an institution to become a bridge between citizen capital and investable enterprises.

The institution’s value to government and development partners would therefore not be measured only by how much funding it receives. It should increasingly be measured by:

– How much additional capital can it mobilise?

– How many enterprises can it graduate?

– How much productive investment can it generate?

– How many jobs and incomes can it create?

– How much capital can it recycle?

– How much citizen ownership can it facilitate?

That is a substantially stronger development proposition than simply requesting programme funding.

3. Public capital can be designed as catalytic institutional capital

Government and cooperating partners could therefore consider a new category of intervention:

Catalytic Institutional Capitalisation

Instead of providing funding solely for expenditure, capital could be provided to strengthen the institutional balance sheet and investment capacity of credible organisations.

Such capital would potentially support:

– investment funds;

– enterprise -development facilities;

– credit-enhancement mechanisms;

– first-loss or risk-sharing structures;

– investment-readiness programmes;

– technical-assistance facilities;

– project-preparation facilities;

– digital investment platforms;

– enterprise assessment systems; and

– co-investment vehicles.

The fundamental principle would be:

Public capital should be used, where appropriate, to unlock substantially larger pools of private and citizen capital. This is consistent with the broader policy direction already recognised in Zambia’s Investment, Trade and Business Development Act, which calls for catalysing and leveraging private savings, domestic and foreign, into business financing and strengthening capital markets and financial institutions. It is also consistent with the broader development-finance principle that scarce public resources can have greater impact when they are used to crowd-in additional private capital rather than attempting to finance the entire investment requirement themselves.

4. The case for BET and similar institutions should therefore be based on leverage.

The strongest argument for capitalising institutions such as BET should not be:

“Give us money so that we can finance businesses.”

It should be:

“Provide catalytic capital that enables us to mobilise substantially larger pools of member, citizen, private and development-partner capital and channel those resources into investment-ready Zambian enterprises.” That is a much more compelling proposition.

For example, a hypothetical capitalisation of:

K10 million public/development capital could be structured not simply as K10 million available for direct expenditure, but as institutional capital designed to support the mobilisation of:

K10 million public capital + K20 million member/citizen capital + K20 million private/development-partner capital = K50 million investment pool

The actual leverage ratio would depend entirely on the institution, structure, risk profile, regulation and investment performance.

The point is the architecture, not a predetermined multiplier.

Government would therefore be supporting the creation of a mechanism capable of progressively reducing dependence on government funding.

5. Capitalisation should be linked to measurable performance

Such support should not be unconditional.

Institutions receiving catalytic capital should be subject to clearly defined performance and governance requirements.

Potential indicators could include:

– Capital mobilisation – How much additional member, citizen and private capital has been mobilised for every kwacha of catalytic capital?

– Enterprise pipeline – How many enterprises have been assessed through EGS-UP?

– Enterprise graduation – How many enterprises have successfully graduated?

– Investment deployment – How much capital has actually reached investment-ready enterprises?

– Productivity – What improvements have occurred in enterprise productivity and revenues

– Employment- How many sustainable jobs have been created or supported?

– Citizen participation- How many citizens or members have become investors?

– Returns- What financial and economic returns have been generated?

– Capital recycling – How much capital has been returned to the investment pool for redeployment?

This converts public capitalisation from an expenditure programme into a performance-based development investment.

6. Government can therefore support the ecosystem without owning every enterprise

This is particularly important. The objective is not for government to become the owner and manager of thousands of enterprises. Government’s more strategic role can be to create the architecture within which citizens, institutions and private investors can finance those enterprises.

The model becomes:

Government

→ provides catalytic capital, policy support, guarantees and enabling regulation.

Institutions such as BET

→ mobilise members, prepare enterprises, manage investment programmes and connect capital to opportunities.

EGS-UP

→ identifies, strengthens, assesses and graduates enterprises.

Citizens and members

→ provide investment capital and participate in ownership.

Private investors and development partners

→ provide additional capital, expertise and market access.

Enterprises

→ generate production, employment, profits and economic value.

This creates a distributed development model rather than a government-dependent one.

7. Capitalising institutions can address the “missing middle”

One of the weaknesses in many development-finance systems is the gap between very small enterprises and large corporations.

Banks often struggle to finance enterprises that are too risky or too small for conventional commercial lending.

Government programmes may provide grants or relatively small loans.

Large institutional investors may require investment opportunities of significantly greater scale.

The result is a missing middle.

This is precisely where EGS-UP and capitalised domestic institutions can potentially intervene. An institution can aggregate smaller investment opportunities into professionally assessed portfolios and help enterprises move progressively from:

Micro → Small → Growth-stage → Investment-ready → Scalable → Institutional-investment-ready.

EGS-UP therefore becomes the enterprise graduation mechanism, while capitalised institutions become part of the financial bridge across the graduation process.

8. This should give government a stronger reason to support EGS-UP itself

The case for government support of EGS-UP consequently becomes much stronger. EGS-UP should not be viewed simply as another MSME capacity-building programme. It is potentially an enterprise-investment pipeline. Government support for EGS-UP would help create a larger pool of enterprises that are:

• formally organised;
• financially transparent;
• commercially viable;
• productivity-oriented;
• market-connected;
• investment-ready; and
• capable of absorbing growth capital.

That makes the system more attractive to citizen investors, domestic institutions, development-finance institutions and private investors.

The government therefore gains an additional return on its support: It is not simply supporting enterprises.

It is helping create investable enterprises that can absorb and multiply domestic capital.

9. A new partnership model: Government + Institutions + Citizens + EGS-UP

The architecture could therefore evolve into a four-way partnership:

Government

Catalytic capital + guarantees + policy + regulation + infrastructure

↓

Domestic institutions

Capital mobilisation + investment management + enterprise support

↓

EGS-UP

Enterprise identification + capability building + investment readiness + graduation

↓

Citizens and private investors

Investment capital + ownership + market participation

↓

Enterprises

Production + jobs + profits + productive assets

↓

Returns

Investor returns + reinvestment + expanded capital pool

This creates a much more sustainable system than one in which government repeatedly injects money into disconnected programmes.

10. The African Development Bank’s assessment strengthens the case

This proposition is particularly relevant given the African Development Bank’s recent assessment of Zambia’s financing challenge. The Bank’s 2025 Zambia Country Focus Report estimates Zambia’s financing requirement for structural transformation at about US$6.9 billion through 2030, with a critical financing gap of approximately US$5.4 billion, and calls for concerted mobilisation of domestic and external financing as well as innovative financing mechanisms.

That scale of financing need cannot realistically be addressed through government budget allocations alone.

Nor should Zambia assume that external capital will always be available on terms that maximise domestic ownership.

The country therefore needs institutions capable of mobilising multiple sources of capital and allocating them efficiently.

This strengthens the argument for capitalising credible domestic institutions that can serve as part of that mobilisation architecture.

11. The proposition therefore changes the meaning of “government support”

Government support should not be understood only as:

Government → money → beneficiary

It should increasingly become:

Government → catalytic capital → capable institution → citizen/private capital mobilisation → EGS-UP enterprise pipeline → productive investment → growth → returns → reinvestment

This is a fundamentally different model of public intervention.

• The first model consumes public resources.
• The second seeks to multiply public resources.
• The first creates beneficiaries.
• The second seeks to create investors, enterprises and owners.
• The first can create dependency.
• The second is designed to progressively create self-reinforcing domestic capital formation.

12. The ultimate objective: build institutions capable of financing Zambia’s own development

The long-term ambition should therefore be to build a network of credible Zambian institutions capable of performing complementary functions within the domestic-capital ecosystem.

Some may focus on Savings mobilisation; Others on Enterprise development; Others on:

Investment management; Others on Guarantees and risk-sharing; Others on Project preparation; Others on Sector-specific investment. And institutions such as BET could potentially occupy an important position at the intersection of:

• Membership mobilisation
• + enterprise development 
• + investment facilitation 
• + citizen ownership.

The objective would not be for every institution to do everything. The objective would be to create a connected national architecture in which different institutions perform complementary functions.

13. The complete EGS-UP and domestic-capital architecture

The proposition can now be expressed as a much larger cycle:

Government catalytic capital

↓

Capitalised domestic institutions

↓

Member and citizen mobilisation

↓

Savings aggregation

↓

Domestic investment pools

↓

EGS-UP enterprise identification

↓

Capability building

↓

Market access

↓

Investment readiness

↓

Enterprise graduation

↓

Growth capital

↓

Enterprise scale-up

↓

Higher productivity and incomes

↓

Profits and investment returns

↓

Citizen ownership

↓

Capital recycling

↓

Larger investment pools

↓

More enterprises

↓

More graduation

↓

More productive assets

↓

Broader domestic wealth creation

This is the point at which the proposition becomes considerably larger than an MSME financing model.

It becomes a potential national domestic-capital formation architecture.

14. The central proposition

The policy proposition can therefore be sharpened to:

Zambia should not only seek to increase the amount of capital available to MSMEs. It should build an institutional architecture capable of mobilising, aggregating and repeatedly recycling domestic capital into enterprises that can graduate, scale and generate wealth.

Government and development partners can play an important catalytic role by capitalising credible domestic institutions with the capacity to mobilise additional citizen, member, private and development-partner capital.

EGS-UP can provide the enterprise pipeline.

Domestic-capital institutions can provide the investment mechanism. Citizens can provide an increasing share of the capital and ownership.

Government can provide catalytic capital, guarantees, enabling policy and institutional support.

And successful enterprises can generate the returns and productive assets that allow the cycle to continue.

The ultimate transition is therefore:

Government funding → catalytic institutional capital

MSME support → enterprise graduation

Enterprise graduation → investment readiness

Citizen savings → domestic investment

Domestic investment → citizen ownership

Enterprise profits → capital recycling

Capital recycling → successive generations of enterprises

That is how Zambia can begin moving from an economy that repeatedly seeks capital from outside to one that increasingly forms, mobilises, circulates and compounds capital from within. And it provides a much stronger rationale for government, development-finance institutions and cooperating partners to support organisations such as BET, not simply as recipients of grants, but as potential capital-mobilisation and enterprise-development institutions capable of multiplying the impact of the capital entrusted to them.

​Global Model Comparisons & Precedents

​The proposed architecture is grounded in international blended finance, sovereign wealth/capital aggregation models, and cooperative economics.

​1. Capital Multipliers & Catalytic Public Finance

​ Global Precedent: The “Cascade Principles” & Blended Finance (World Bank / IFC)

Mechanism: Using scarce public capital as first-loss protection, equity, or de-risking mechanisms to crowd in private institutional capital (pension funds, DFIs, diaspora).

Comparison: The paper’s formula (K10m \text{ public} \rightarrow K20m \text{ member} + K20m \text{ private} = K50m \text{ pool}) matches international blended finance structures.

​2. Region-Based & Identity-Based Capital Mobilization

​ Global Precedent: Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB)-Malaysia

​Mechanism: Established by the Malaysian government to aggregate savings of the indigenous Bumiputera population and invest them in strategic corporate assets, driving citizen ownership.

​Comparison: Capitalizing local entities like Barotse Empowerment Trust Limited (BET) as provincial investment platforms directly mirrors PNB’s model of combining identity-based/regional social trust with structured capital recycling.

​3. Aggregation of Co-ops and SACCOs

​ Global Precedent: Desjardins Group (Canada) & Mondragon Corporation (Spain)

Mechanism: Community financial cooperatives aggregate micro-savings into massive capital pools, which are then deployed to finance local commercial ventures and enterprise scale-ups.

​Comparison: The paper suggests using provincial trusts/institutions to aggregate savings from cooperatives and SACCOs, bridging the gap between micro-finance and institutional-grade capital.

​4. Enterprise Graduation Mechanisms

​ Global Precedent: BRAC Ultra-Poor Graduation Model (Bangladesh)

​Mechanism: A structured, time-bound pathway that diagnoses constraints, provides skills, builds investment readiness, and graduates informal/micro-entrepreneurs into formal markets.

Comparison: The EGS-UP element adapts this concept specifically for commercial MSMEs moving from Micro \rightarrow Small \rightarrow Scalable \rightarrow Institutional Investment-Ready.

By Steven Mbangu | The Zambian Economist Analyst | Monday, 24 August 2026

Zambia has spent years making the case for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. That case no longer needs much rehearsal. MSMEs provide livelihoods, absorb labour and supply goods and services in almost every district. The harder question is why so few firms move from subsistence and survival into sustained growth.

The central weakness is not a complete absence of policy instruments. Zambia already has development finance institutions, credit guarantees, entrepreneurship programmes, agricultural support, industrial policy, procurement rules and training initiatives. The weakness is that these instruments often operate as separate interventions rather than as stages in one enterprise-growth journey.

What is needed is an Enterprise Graduation and Scale-Up System, or EGS-UP. This is not another fund or agency. It is an operating architecture that would align existing institutions around one test: whether a viable enterprise has moved to the next commercial level.

The shift from support to graduation

Many public programmes count activity. They report the number of people trained, loans approved, grants disbursed or businesses registered. Those figures matter, but they do not show whether a firm became more productive, secured a durable market, hired workers or reduced its dependence on subsidised support.

EGS-UP would change the unit of success. An enterprise entering the system would be assessed, placed on a defined pathway and supported against a time-bound growth plan. Its progress would be measured through turnover, profitability, productivity, employment, formalisation, access to commercial finance, supply-chain participation, domestic value addition and exports.

The practical sequence is straightforward: identify scalable opportunities, select enterprises able to pursue them, diagnose their constraints, build capability, connect them to buyers, unlock appropriate finance, improve productivity and measure graduation. Public support would become a bridge to commercial viability, not a permanent destination.

Start with opportunities, not applicants

The first step should be a National Scalability and Opportunity Assessment. Zambia needs a current map of demand that local firms can realistically serve. That includes procurement by mines, supermarkets, manufacturers, processors, construction companies, utilities, hospitals, schools and tourism operators, as well as opportunities in regional and export markets.

The assessment should identify products and services with credible demand, the standards buyers require, current import dependence, the size of the opportunity and the capabilities local firms would need to compete. Agriculture and agro-processing, building materials, renewable energy services, logistics, digital services, repair and maintenance, tourism inputs, health supplies and light manufacturing are obvious areas to examine, but selection must follow evidence rather than fashion.

This market map would prevent a common policy error: financing an enterprise before establishing who will buy its output. A loan cannot create demand. A credible order, supply contract or route to market gives finance a productive purpose.

Diagnose firms before prescribing support

Not every microenterprise is ready to scale, and policy should not pretend otherwise. EGS-UP would use an Enterprise Growth and Scalability Diagnostic to distinguish among survival enterprises, firms with growth potential and businesses already capable of scaling.

That distinction is not a judgement on the social value of a business. It is a way to match support to need. A survival enterprise may require basic livelihood, social-protection or community-finance interventions. A growth-potential firm may need bookkeeping, standards certification, machinery or a first substantial contract. A scale-up firm may need working capital, professional management, export preparation or investment finance.

Each selected business should then receive an enterprise-specific growth plan. The plan would state the target market, capability gaps, investment required, productivity changes, finance structure, milestones and graduation date. Generic workshops would give way to practical support tied to a commercial objective.

Let markets organise the system

Buyers should sit near the centre of EGS-UP. Large companies and public institutions understand the quality, volume, reliability and compliance standards suppliers must meet. Their procurement pipelines can help identify viable opportunities and give enterprise support agencies a clear specification to work towards.

This requires more than reserving a percentage of procurement for local firms. Supplier-development arrangements should publish opportunities early, break suitable contracts into accessible lots, explain standards, provide transparent feedback and track whether local suppliers progress from one-off orders to repeat business.

For mining, the question is not simply how many local vendors are registered. It is whether Zambian firms move into higher-value activities, improve technical capability and become reliable suppliers across multiple mines. In agriculture, the goal should be movement from irregular spot-market sales to consistent production, aggregation, processing and contracted supply.

Use finance as a progression tool

Credit guarantees can be especially useful when an enterprise has a viable market but lacks collateral or a long borrowing record. Zambia is already expanding this instrument. The 2026 Budget Address allocated K851.7 million to the Zambia Credit Guarantee Scheme, while the International Monetary Fund reported that the scheme issued K1.15 billion in guarantees during 2025.

The policy question is therefore not only how large the guarantee envelope becomes. It is whether guarantees crowd in additional private lending, reach viable firms, support productive investment and eventually allow borrowers to access commercial finance without public backing.

The World Bank’s principles for public credit guarantee schemes stress sound governance, transparent eligibility, risk-based pricing and effective monitoring. Those disciplines should be built into EGS-UP. Guarantees should be targeted, time-bound and linked to a growth plan, not treated as a substitute for credit assessment.

A graduated financing ladder would combine suitable instruments: savings and informal finance at the earliest stage, microfinance and working capital for established small firms, guaranteed bank credit for viable expansion, and longer-term investment or equity for scale-up businesses. Movement along that ladder should be one of the system’s measurable outcomes.

Productivity is the hinge

Finance and markets will not produce durable growth if a firm cannot meet cost, quality and delivery requirements. Productivity support must therefore be practical and enterprise-specific. Advisers should work with firms on production flow, inventory, maintenance, energy use, quality control, digital systems, worker skills and management accounts.

The International Labour Organization’s Productivity Ecosystems for Decent Work programme offers a useful lesson: productivity constraints often sit across firms, sectors and institutions, so solutions must address the wider ecosystem as well as the individual business.

Zambia should build a network of accredited productivity advisers linked to sector bodies, technical colleges, universities and larger companies. Their performance should be judged by verified improvements in output, waste, quality, delivery time, wages and employment, not by advisory visits completed.

Build pathways for sectors and places

Enterprise graduation will look different across sectors. A small farmer may progress from rain-fed production to irrigation, aggregation and supply contracts. A processor may move from informal packaging to certified production and supermarket distribution. A contractor may advance from minor works to larger tenders after improving equipment, records and project management. A digital business may graduate through recurring contracts, export sales and external investment.

EGS-UP should therefore publish sector graduation pathways showing the capabilities, standards, finance and market milestones required at each stage. The pathways would help enterprises understand what comes next and help institutions coordinate their support.

Access must also extend beyond Lusaka. Provincial enterprise hubs could coordinate diagnostics, advisers, finance providers and buyers, while district and community outreach uses radio, SMS, WhatsApp, print and business associations. A national digital portal would be useful, but it cannot be the whole system where connectivity, language and digital literacy remain uneven.

Create a graduation index

The system needs a public scoreboard. An Enterprise Graduation Index should track movement from micro to small, small to medium and medium to larger enterprise, while also recognising meaningful progress within a category.

The index should include formalisation, productivity, turnover, profitability, employment, wages, access to commercial finance, reduced reliance on public support, repeat supply contracts, domestic value addition, import substitution and exports. Results should be published by sector, province, institution and programme, with independent checks on reported outcomes.

This would change incentives across government. A training provider would care whether participants used the training to meet a buyer’s standard. A finance institution would care whether supported firms survived, invested and graduated. A procurement entity would care whether local suppliers became more competitive. Policymakers would be able to compare the cost of support with the economic value created.

Implementation without another bureaucracy

EGS-UP should be governed as a shared national system, not established as a large new institution. A small coordinating unit could set standards, maintain the opportunity map and graduation index, accredit diagnostics and advisers, and publish performance data. Existing ministries, agencies, financial institutions, business associations and private buyers would deliver the actual services.

The system should begin with a limited number of sectors where buyer demand and institutional partners are identifiable. Pilots should use clear entry criteria, baseline data and graduation targets. Programmes that work can expand. Those that repeatedly fail to move firms should be redesigned or stopped.

International experience supports this emphasis on scale-up conditions. The OECD’s 2025 report, Unleashing SME Potential to Scale Up, argues that firms need coherent access to finance, skills, networks, technology and markets across stages of growth. Zambia’s challenge is to translate that broad lesson into a locally accountable delivery system.

The measure that matters

Zambia does not need to abandon existing MSME initiatives. It needs to connect them. The proposed system would give public finance, guarantees, training, productivity support and procurement a common destination: enterprises capable of standing on stronger commercial foundations.

The most important annual question should no longer be how much money was disbursed. It should be how many firms upgraded their capability, secured repeat contracts, raised output, created decent jobs, entered commercial finance and moved into a higher enterprise category.

When that becomes the measure, MSME policy will stop being a collection of worthy activities and start functioning as an engine of structural transformation.

Related coverage

Read From Economic Stabilisation to a Broad-Based Economy: The Role of MSMEs in the Next Five Years and The SME Credit Gap: Why Zambian Small Businesses Still Can’t Borrow Affordably.

Related: The Mathematical Derivative of the Torah: What an Ancient Tax Framework Says About Zambia’s Fiscal Choices

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Zambia’s debt restructuring has bought time, not relief. Steven M. Mbangu argues that the country must spend that window on MSME development, building millions of income-earning small businesses before heavier debt payments fall due from 2026.

A recent Katondo Street Journal analysis by economist Kampamba Shula, “What Does HH’s Re-election Mean for the Zambian Economy?”, shared on the Economic Association of Zambia Facebook page, is a timely contribution to the debate on Zambia’s economic direction. It correctly identifies the next challenge as converting macroeconomic stability into jobs, stronger businesses, reliable energy, higher incomes and greater value from Zambia’s natural resources.

I would go further and name the objective that should sit beneath all these priorities. The purpose of economic development is to enable people to live comfortably, with rising and sustainable incomes, and to progressively gain access to the quality of goods, services, technology, infrastructure and opportunities enjoyed in successful economies, without being suffocated by unproductive debt. That is what economic transformation should mean for ordinary Zambians.

The debt-service train is still coming

The metaphor of an oncoming train captures the reality of Zambia’s rescheduled debt-service obligations. Without substantially higher household and national incomes before that train gathers speed, the future debt burden could once again overwhelm the economy.

The G20 Common Framework restructuring bought Zambia breathing space, but it deferred and reprofiled the burden rather than eliminating it. What we do with that space is therefore critical. It must be used to increase productivity, expand enterprise ownership, diversify the economy, deepen value addition and, above all, ensure incomes rise substantially before the heavier obligations crystallise.

The trajectory ahead requires preparation rather than complacency.

2026-2028: Escalation window. Amortisation on restructured Eurobonds begins, with coupon rates stepping up from approximately 5.75% to 7.5%. Annual external debt-service requirements are expected to move into the US$450-650 million range.

2029-2031 and beyond: Peak obligations. Principal repayments under official-creditor arrangements increasingly combine with commercial debt-servicing. Annual obligations could rise towards US$700-750 million or more.

The precise path will depend on final restructuring arrangements, economic performance and market conditions, but the direction is clear. Zambia must deliberately build the income-generating capacity of its economy before the debt-service train arrives.

Why household incomes must become a central policy objective

Relying principally on copper royalties, government borrowing or repeated debt restructuring cannot provide a sustainable long-term solution.

Economic growth becomes hollow if it does not translate into:

• more Zambians earning higher and sustainable incomes;
• greater ownership of productive enterprises;
• more businesses moving from survival into growth;
• broader participation in the tax base;
• increased domestic production; and
• greater purchasing power for households.

The ultimate measure of economic success should therefore not simply be GDP growth. We should be asking: Are households becoming more prosperous? Can families afford better housing, education, healthcare, transport, communications and other essential services? Can ordinary Zambians increasingly access the technology, products and opportunities that people in successful economies take for granted? Are Zambians building assets and productive businesses rather than accumulating debt simply to maintain the most basic standard of living?

This is the human dimension of debt sustainability. A country may have a technically sustainable debt profile while its citizens remain economically constrained. That is not the transformation we should aspire to.

The strong MSME economy we need: why MSME development must move to the centre

This is why MSME development must move from the margins of economic policy to the centre of Zambia’s transformation strategy.

A world-class economy cannot be built exclusively around a handful of large corporations, mines and government institutions. Large enterprises are indispensable; Zambia needs major investment in mining, energy, manufacturing, infrastructure and technology. But large enterprises alone cannot create the breadth of ownership and income generation required to transform the lives of the majority. A strong and resilient MSME base can.

MSMEs distribute economic activity widely across communities, provinces and households. They allow ordinary citizens to become producers, suppliers, contractors, service providers, innovators and, ultimately, owners of productive assets.

The objective should not be merely to have many small businesses. It should be to build productive, resilient and scalable businesses, some of which grow into medium-sized companies and eventually into large Zambian enterprises capable of competing regionally and globally. That is how a broad-based economy develops.

The global evidence

This is not an untested proposition.

Taiwan. In 2024 Taiwan had more than 1.715 million SMEs, representing 98.87% of all enterprises, according to its official SME White Paper. They employed approximately 9.19 million people, nearly 80% of total employment, and accounted for more than half of total enterprise sales. Taiwan’s government explicitly describes SMEs as a cornerstone of economic development and competitiveness.

Germany. The Mittelstand comprises millions of small and medium-sized businesses forming an exceptionally deep industrial and services ecosystem. KfW’s SME Panel reports that Germany had approximately 3.87 million SMEs in 2024, employing 33.01 million people, or 71.6% of total employment.

Japan. Japan’s government identifies SMEs and small businesses as accounting for around 70% of total employment, with expectations that they will continue to contribute significantly to regional and national growth.

Kenya. Closer to home, Kenya’s 2025 Economic Survey reported that of the 782,300 new jobs created in 2024, 703,700 were in the informal sector, predominantly driven by MSMEs. Kenya consequently treats the transformation and formalisation of MSMEs as a core part of its employment strategy.

These countries are very different from one another, but the lesson is common: world-class economies do not depend only on a few world-class companies. They are supported by dense ecosystems of productive businesses. That is the ecosystem Zambia must deliberately build.

From small businesses to globally competitive enterprises

Our ambition should be bigger than helping people establish micro-enterprises. We should be asking how a small Zambian business can become a medium-sized company, then a large company, and ultimately a regional or global competitor.

That requires an environment in which businesses can:

• access appropriate finance;
• obtain affordable and reliable electricity;
• acquire technical and managerial skills;
• adopt modern technology;
• access markets;
• participate in public and private procurement;
• meet quality and international standards;
• access industrial and commercial infrastructure;
• integrate into domestic and international value chains; and
• progressively export their products and services.

Finance is important, but finance without markets, skills, energy, technology and productive capacity simply creates indebted businesses rather than successful ones. The objective should be to finance productive capacity, not merely consumption or survival.

Large investments must create MSME ecosystems

Every major investment in Zambia should be examined for its potential to create an ecosystem of domestic enterprises around it.

If copper production expands, we should measure not only the additional tonnes produced but the number of Zambian businesses created around that production, including enterprises in:

• engineering and fabrication;
• equipment maintenance;
• logistics and transport;
• construction;
• environmental services;
• laboratory and technical services;
• ICT;
• security and specialised services;
• catering and hospitality;
• manufacturing of mining inputs; and
• financial and professional services.

The same principle should apply to agriculture, energy, infrastructure, tourism and manufacturing. Every major investment should become an opportunity to create a constellation of Zambian enterprises.

Reliable energy is fundamental to enterprise development

Reliable and affordable energy must be regarded as an essential component of MSME policy. A manufacturing business cannot compete with persistent power interruptions. A cold-chain agricultural enterprise cannot operate without dependable electricity. A digital business cannot compete globally without reliable power and connectivity.

Energy security is therefore not merely an energy-sector objective. It is an enterprise-development objective, an employment objective and an income objective. Zambia’s investment in solar, hydro, thermal generation, transmission, distribution and storage should be understood as investment in the productive capacity of the economy.

Building beyond copper

Copper remains an enormous opportunity, particularly given global demand from electrification, renewable energy and advanced technologies. But Zambia must capture much more value from every tonne produced. The objective should be to build businesses around the mining economy, not simply to extract and export the resource.

Copper beneficiation, processing and manufacturing should be accompanied by the development of Zambian enterprises providing engineering, logistics, fabrication, maintenance, technology and specialised services.

The same philosophy applies to agriculture. Instead of exporting raw commodities, Zambia should progressively build enterprises around aggregation, storage, processing, packaging, branding, logistics and export marketing. This is how the same resource can generate multiple layers of income and employment.

Broad-based sectors for transformation

The opportunities extend well beyond mining. Particular attention should be given to:

• agriculture and agro-processing;
• food and light manufacturing;
• mineral processing and mining services;
• credible small-scale mining;
• tourism and hospitality;
• construction and allied services;
• ICT and digital services;
• renewable-energy enterprises;
• logistics and transport;
• fisheries and aquaculture; and
• creative and cultural industries.

These sectors accommodate businesses of different sizes and levels of capital intensity, making them particularly important for expanding economic participation.

The objective is prosperity without unproductive debt

This point deserves emphasis. Economic transformation should allow households to consume more because they earn more, not because they borrow more.

Zambians should be able to afford better homes, education, transport, communications, healthcare, financial services and technology because their productivity and incomes have increased.

Debt can be productive when it finances assets and productive capacity. But a society that borrows simply to maintain basic consumption, while its productive capacity remains weak, becomes vulnerable to precisely the kind of debt crisis Zambia has experienced. The objective must be income-led prosperity rather than debt-led consumption. That is why household incomes and productive enterprise ownership should sit at the heart of the next phase of Zambia’s economic policy.

What Zambia should have before the debt peak

The first priority was to stabilise the economy. The next must be to build a broad-based productive economy. By the time the heavier debt-service obligations crystallise, Zambia should have:

• a substantially stronger MSME ecosystem;
• greater Zambian ownership of productive enterprises;
• more reliable and affordable energy;
• deeper agricultural, industrial and mining value chains;
• stronger manufacturing and processing capacity;
• a broader tax-paying population;
• greater export capacity;
• more globally competitive Zambian companies; and, most importantly,
• substantially higher household and national incomes.

That is the real preparation for the debt-service train.

The real test

The next chapter of Zambia’s economic story cannot be about stabilisation alone. It must be about productivity, ownership, enterprise development and rising incomes.

The measure of success should not simply be whether inflation is lower, the exchange rate is more stable or debt ratios have improved. Those are foundations. The deeper test is whether macroeconomic stability has been translated into:

• more productive businesses;
• more jobs and higher household incomes;
• greater ownership of productive assets;
• broader access to global-quality goods and services;
• stronger domestic value chains; and
• a population that can aspire to a better standard of living without being trapped in unproductive debt.

Kampamba Shula’s article is a valuable contribution because it correctly identifies the transition that must now take place: from stabilisation to transformation.

Zambia has been given time through debt restructuring. That time must be used to build the productive and income-generating capacity of the economy before the debt-service train arrives. One of the most inclusive and powerful foundations for doing so is a strong, resilient and globally competitive MSME sector integrated into a modern industrial economy.

The ultimate ambition should be bigger than avoiding another debt crisis. It should be a Zambia in which millions of households participate productively in the economy, earn rising incomes, own productive assets and businesses, and can increasingly enjoy the quality of life available in successful economies, without mortgaging their future to finance their present.

That is the Zambia we should be preparing for.

Related coverage

• The SME Credit Gap: Why Zambian Small Businesses Still Can’t Borrow Affordably
• Hichilema’s Second Term: What It Means for Zambia’s Economy, Markets and Diplomacy
• Two Paths to Capital in Zambia’s Construction Market
• Zambia’s Post-Election Rally Is Economically Sound

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About twenty makeshift trading structures at Kamwala Trading Area in Lusaka were gutted on the night of 18 August, the Zambia Police Service has said. The fire broke out around 20:40 hours behind Downtown Shopping Mall, along the railway line. Officers from Kabwata Police Station rushed to the scene after receiving a report and found several makeshift trading structures already gutted.

The Lusaka City Council Fire Brigade extinguished the blaze. No injuries have been reported, and police say the full extent of the damage is yet to be established. An inquiry file has been opened, with investigations ongoing to determine the exact circumstances.

In a press statement issued by Police Public Relations Officer Godfrey Chilabi, preliminary investigations suggest the fire may have originated from a brazier left burning at a makeshift restaurant. Police have urged traders operating from temporary structures to exercise extreme caution when using braziers and to ensure all sources of fire are completely extinguished before leaving their premises.

Kamwala has burned before

This is not the trading area’s first fire, and the record explains why Tuesday night’s response was quick even if the outcome was not. In April 2008, about 50 Kamwala market stalls burned to rubble in a blaze attributed at the time to a suspected electrical fault, destroying goods worth millions of kwacha. Between April and June 2017, a series of fires swept the same area and destroyed an estimated 120 stalls, part of a wave of blazes across Zambian markets and businesses that authorities then treated as suspected arson.

The wider city record is no better. The July 2017 Lusaka City Market fire, one of the largest in the capital’s recent memory, led to a dozen arrests and a season of sabotage allegations. The common thread across these episodes is structural: rows of timber, cardboard and plastic sheeting built close together, open cooking flames inside them, no fire breaks between stalls, and access lanes too narrow for a fire engine to reach the burning rows quickly.

Fire is also how much of the city’s street food economy cooks. Our feature on the lunchtime trade at Longacres Market set out how braziers underpin thousands of livelihoods in Lusaka, which is exactly why the police advice about extinguishing them matters commercially and not only as a safety slogan.

What the traders are actually losing

Police have not put a kwacha figure on the damage, and the full extent is still being established. For traders in makeshift structures, the stock usually is the business: bales of second-hand clothing in a trading area known for its salaula trade, hardware, prepared food and the day’s cash float. Kamwala’s place in Lusaka’s second-hand clothing economy means some of the lost stock is imported inventory bought at kwacha prices that have since moved.

Insurance is rare in this tier of the market. A single fire therefore resets twenty micro-businesses to zero at once, and stock bought on credit becomes a debt that still has to be settled with the supplier even though the goods no longer exist.

What affected traders should do now

Record everything. Photograph what is left, list the stock lost and pull together supplier invoices and delivery notes. Even where no insurance exists, documentation is the basis for any relief scheme that follows, as one did after the 2017 market fires, and for renegotiating payment terms with suppliers who will otherwise treat the loss as a default.

Engage the inquiry file. Kabwata police are compiling the record through which cause and any liability will be settled. Traders who saw the early stages of the fire should give statements; the file is also the document a council or government relief process will refer back to.

Fix the fire discipline before rebuilding. The police advice is to fully extinguish braziers before leaving. Market committees can go further: no open flames after closing hours, cleared aisles so engines can reach the rows, and sand or water points staged along the busiest stretches.

What to watch

The council’s next move. The railway-line strip behind Downtown Mall is the kind of dense temporary settlement Lusaka has debated regularising for years. Fire breaks, water points and access roads are the difference between a contained blaze and a repeat of 2017.

Relief, if any. Help for fire victims has historically followed political attention. This fire landed in the week a new government is being formed, which can either speed assistance or bury it. Market committees keeping a public register of affected traders will be better placed either way.

Insurance and credit. Episodes like this are the raw material for micro-insurance and inventory finance products aimed at market traders. Until those exist, the SME credit gap we have documented means few of the affected businesses will rebuild with formal credit. Suppliers and bulk buyers who depend on Kamwala traders can keep visibility through our business directory and events page.

The bottom line

Twenty structures is a small number in a city and a large number in a single row of stalls. The inquiry file will settle the cause. The harder question is the one Kamwala has faced since 2008: whether the trading area gets rebuilt with the same materials and the same risks, or to a standard that survives the next unattended brazier.

Related coverage

• Where Lusaka Does Lunch: The Business of Fire, Food and Fast Turnover at Longacres Market
• Salaula: The Economics of Zambia’s Second-Hand Clothing Trade
• The SME Credit Gap: Why Zambian Small Businesses Still Can’t Borrow Affordably

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Zambia’s 2026 general election has produced the kind of week that tests a country’s institutions as much as its candidates. Voting closed on 13 August. By Friday, the Electoral Commission of Zambia had suspended vote counting nationwide, citing reports of violence and ballot theft in a handful of districts, only to lift that suspension hours later once it judged the security threat contained. The Law Association of Zambia questioned the legal basis for a suspension that wide. International observer missions, including from SADC, have issued preliminary statements on the process. And through it all, President Hakainde Hichilema has built a commanding lead, holding close to 59% of the vote with more than half of the country’s 226 constituencies counted, against Brian Mundubile of the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity at around a third. The Commission’s own roadmap points to a presidential declaration this week.

None of that removes the suspense. A widened count, a contested process, and claims of an armed raid on a rival candidate’s home are not the conditions under which businesses like to make decisions. For an economy where small and medium enterprises employ the majority of the workforce and absorb the sharpest edges of every shock first, the question is not whether the election matters. It is how to keep operating while the country waits for it to be settled.

Why this election carries more economic weight than most

Zambia’s 8.79 million registered voters were not just choosing a president. The 2025 constitutional amendments reshaped the National Assembly itself, introducing a mixed system of 226 directly elected seats alongside 40 allocated by proportional representation, a structural change that will influence how quickly a new government can move legislation, including anything touching tax policy, mining royalties, or public procurement. Investors watching the kwacha and the Bank of Zambia’s policy stance are not only pricing in who wins. They are pricing in how cleanly the result is accepted, both by the losing side and by the public.

That is the real source of the suspense. A large margin narrows the room for dispute over who won. It does not, on its own, settle questions about how the count was conducted, and Zambia has just spent several days finding that out in real time.

What the uncertainty is actually doing to businesses right now

Three effects are already visible, and SMEs are more exposed to each of them than large corporates with deeper cash reserves and hedging tools.

Cash flow has gone quiet. Retailers, transporters and service providers report the same pattern every election cycle: consumers hold cash back until the picture clarifies, and business-to-business payments slow as companies wait to see what changes at the top. A supplier owed by a government department or parastatal is especially exposed if procurement decisions pause during a transition.

The kwacha has become harder to plan around. Currency markets dislike ambiguity more than they dislike bad news. A firm importing inputs, whether cement, packaging, or spare parts, is now managing exchange rate risk on top of the usual cost pressures, at exactly the moment banks may also tighten short-term lending until the political picture is clear.

Physical disruption has been real, not hypothetical. Reports of violence and ballot theft in some districts, and a counting suspension that reached the whole country even where nothing had gone wrong locally, show how a localised problem can ripple into a national one. A transporter with a delivery route through an affected district, or a trader whose shop sits near a contested collation centre, has had to make real-time calls about safety and stock.

How SMEs can navigate the coming days

Build a short cash buffer, not a long one. This is a liquidity event measured in days to a few weeks, not months. Owners should know their break-even runway for the next fortnight and hold back non-essential spending until the declaration and its immediate aftermath have passed.

Separate currency exposure from everything else. Where possible, delay large kwacha-to-dollar conversions that are not time-critical, and get firm, written pricing from suppliers rather than relying on quotes that assume today’s exchange rate holds.

Talk to customers and suppliers directly rather than guessing at their plans. A short message confirming delivery schedules or payment timing does more to protect a relationship than silence does. Uncertainty is easier to manage when it is shared rather than assumed.

Keep a record of any disruption. Businesses that lost trading days to security concerns or logistics delays should log dates, locations and losses. This matters for insurance claims where cover exists, and for any government or industry-association support that may follow a disputed election period, as it has in past cycles.

Watch the declaration, not the rumours. Zambia’s WhatsApp networks moved faster than official channels for much of this week, circulating constituency tallies that in several cases could not be verified against the Commission’s own results portal. Businesses making decisions on the strength of an unconfirmed screenshot are taking on risk they do not need to. The Commission’s results platform and its scheduled briefings remain the only reliable source until a declaration is made.

The bigger picture

Once a president is declared, and Zambia’s institutions have absorbed a genuine stress test this week in the form of a counting suspension, a legal challenge to it, and a swift reversal, the more consequential economic story begins. Fiscal discipline, follow-through on investment commitments, and the pace of any post-election policy signalling will matter far more to Zambia’s SMEs over the coming year than the noise of results week itself. What businesses do in the meantime is protect their cash, verify before they act, and get ready to move quickly once the picture is confirmed.

Related coverage

• ECZ Suspends Vote Counting Nationwide After Reports of Violence and Ballot Theft
• LAZ Challenges Legality of ECZ’s Nationwide Vote-Counting Suspension
• ECZ Lifts Vote-Count Suspension as Zambia’s Election Stays Unsettled Between Rival Claims
• Zambia’s Post-Election Rally Is Economically Sound
• The SME Credit Gap: Why Zambian Small Businesses Still Can’t Borrow Affordably
• Emoluments Commission Congratulates President-Elect
• Teachers’ Union ZUPED Congratulates Hichilema and Nalumango on Re-Election Win

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

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Related: Hichilema’s Second Term: What It Means for Zambia’s Economy, Markets and Diplomacy

Update: African leaders have begun congratulating President Hichilema on his re-election. Read: Somalia’s Mohamud congratulates Hichilema, pledges stronger Zambia ties.

Related analysis: Zambia’s Turnaround Won the Election. Now It Has to Deliver.

Update: read our follow-up, Ten Days That Tested Zambia, covering the declaration, the sealed courts and the economic data released between 18 and 28 August 2026.

By The Zambian Economist Analyst

SouthGrid Engineering Consultants Limited has, by its own account, existed for less than three years. In that time the small Lusaka firm has put its name on the detailed design of a 52 metre steel concrete composite bridge over the Bweengwa River, contributed engineering drawings for roughly 19 township roads in Chipata and Chadiza, and worked on rehabilitation designs for more than 10 kilometres of urban roads in Mazabuka, all as a sub consultant inside larger, multi firm teams delivering for the Road Development Agency (RDA) and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

The firm’s Founder, Chief Executive Officer and Lead Consultant is Willings Sichalwe, a Registered Professional Civil Engineer with the Engineers Registration Board of Zambia (EngRB No. SMENG202101790) and a full member of the Engineering Institution of Zambia. His career, and the firm he built around it, offer a specific answer to a question that has become louder in Zambia’s infrastructure sector in 2026: what does it take for a citizen owned engineering consultancy to win a seat at the table on donor funded and government infrastructure programmes still dominated by larger regional and international firms.

A Small Firm With a Big Portfolio

That combination, a five person technical team credited with more than 127 kilometres of road works and a landmark bridge design, only makes sense once the firm’s business model is understood. SouthGrid has not competed for RDA or ministry contracts on its own. It has won work as a sub consultant, most often alongside Kaplum and Associates Limited, a larger consulting engineering, architecture and project management practice where Sichalwe has separately worked as Design Engineer and Projects Manager since June 2024, and on two projects alongside a firm called ARZ.

Five Projects That Show the Model

• Chipata and Chadiza township roads, RDA. Detailed engineering design of about 19 urban and township roads, roughly 16.7 km in total, in Eastern Province. Sub consultant to lead consultant Kaplum and Associates, in joint venture with Finix Engineering Solutions. March to July 2025. Scope covered hydrology, drainage assessment, pavement investigation, and geometric and structural design.
• Bweengwa River crossing bridge, RDA. Detailed engineering design of a 52 metre steel concrete composite I-girder bridge in Southern Province. Sub consultant to Kaplum and Associates. January to July 2025. Included geotechnical investigation, evaluation of bridge options, hydraulic clearance and pier design, cost estimation, and road safety upgrades on the approach roads.
• Mazabuka township roads, Lot 5, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Rehabilitation and upgrading to bituminous standard of about 10.7 km of township roads across eight named routes. Sub consultant to Kaplum and Associates. June 2024 to July 2025. Included topographic survey, traffic studies and preparation of tender documentation.
• Sinazongwe Road, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. Geometric engineering design and construction drawings for upgrading to bituminous standard, including the section leading to the civic centre. Sub consultant to lead consultant ARZ. April to May 2024.
• Zambia Sugar Plc internal roads, Nakambala Estate. Geometric design and construction drawings for selected internal estate roads for the private client. Design consultant to lead consultant ARZ. August to September 2023, the year SouthGrid states it was founded.

Eleven Disciplines Under One Roof

SouthGrid’s capability statement lists eleven engineering disciplines in total, running from civil, structural and transport infrastructure engineering through water resources and hydraulic engineering, dam engineering, hydrology and geotechnical work, to environmental and social advisory services and project management and construction supervision. Six areas are singled out in its own marketing as specialisms that set it apart on assignment: hydrology and flood modelling, dam safety and hydraulic analysis, bridge and structural engineering, GIS and digital engineering, geotechnical and foundation work, and a track record operating inside multi firm joint ventures.

Digital tools, computer aided design, geographic information systems, hydrological and hydraulic modelling, and Building Information Modelling where applicable, are presented as running through every discipline rather than sitting as a separate service line, a reflection of how much of SouthGrid’s actual project work to date, drainage assessments, flood and hydraulic analysis for the Bweengwa bridge, catchment studies for road corridors, has been water and hydrology led.

The Engineer Behind the Firm

Sichalwe’s path into engineering started outside Zambia. He earned a Bachelor of Engineering in Civil and Environmental Engineering from the Russian State Agrarian University (MSUEE) in Moscow in 2015, after A Level and Russian language study at Voronezh State University of Engineering Technologies. He is now completing a Master of Engineering in Structural Engineering at the University of Zambia, with a thesis comparing how traffic load variations affect the structural performance of rigid and flexible pavements.

His CV lists just over a decade of practice. Between 2015 and 2019 he worked as a Water and Sanitation Junior Design Engineer at Andosa Consulting Engineers on feasibility studies and designs for water supply, sewer systems and treatment works, and separately as an Inspector of Works on the 122 km, US$142 million Kawambwa to Mporokoso Road, and as a Roads and Drainage Engineer for Chinsali Municipal Council on a ZMW294.3 million urban roads programme.

From May 2021 to June 2024 he worked at Bicon Zambia Consulting Engineers across several World Bank IDA funded Output and Performance based Road Contracts, among them Quality Assurance Engineer on Package 17 in Western Province (ZMW120.9 million), Materials and Pavement Engineer on Package 6 in Northwestern Province (ZMW169.7 million), Drainage and Hydrology Engineer on Package 3 in Eastern Province (ZMW180.7 million), and Assistant Resident Engineer on the T6 Katete to Chanida (55 km, ZMW256.9 million) and M12 Chipata to Lundazi (90 km, ZMW369.4 million) emergency maintenance programmes.

Since June 2024 he has held a design engineer and projects manager role at Kaplum and Associates, where his responsibilities include acting as Engineer’s Representative under FIDIC MDB Harmonised Conditions of Contract and leading hydrological and hydraulic design for two large dams and four bridges, including the Bweengwa crossing. He founded SouthGrid in the same period and, per his CV, took up the role of Founder, Chief Executive Officer and Lead Consultant full time from August 2025, a role he now holds alongside his position at Kaplum.

Beyond project work, Sichalwe serves as a Council Member of the Future Leaders Committee under the Association of Consulting Engineers of Zambia (ACEZ). He has also written for The Zambian Economist on ethical leadership and institutional integrity in the engineering profession, and on the financing structures he argues put Zambian owned contractors at a disadvantage against state backed foreign competitors.

Local Capacity in a Market Built on Joint Ventures

None of SouthGrid’s five representative projects were won outright. Every one lists a larger firm, Kaplum and Associates on three, ARZ on the other two, as lead consultant, with SouthGrid credited as sub consultant or design consultant. That looks like a deliberate entry strategy rather than an incidental detail. Zambia’s donor funded road and bridge programmes are typically procured at a scale that favours firms with established track records and balance sheets, and a two year old, five person practice has little chance of qualifying as lead consultant on an RDA or World Bank tender in its own right. Working inside multi firm consortia lets a young firm like SouthGrid put real, attributable technical work, a bridge design here, a drainage assessment there, on a record that can eventually support an independent bid.

It is also the same market dynamic Sichalwe has written about directly. In a July 2026 analysis for The Zambian Economist, The Economics of Exclusion: How Financing Asymmetry Is Squeezing Zambian Contractors Out of Their Own Market, he argued that financing structures favouring foreign, state backed contractors over Zambian firms are squeezing local capacity out of a construction sector Zambia will eventually need to run itself. SouthGrid’s own project list, assembled almost entirely through sub consultant roles inside joint ventures, reads as one small firm’s practical response to the problem its founder describes at a policy level.

What This Means

For Zambia’s infrastructure pipeline

SouthGrid’s project list is a reminder that even signature assets, a 52 metre bridge, kilometres of rehabilitated urban roads, are frequently the product of several firms working under one lead consultant, not a single named contractor. Understanding who actually did the technical work, not just who signed the contract, matters for anyone assessing where domestic engineering capacity is genuinely being built.

For local contractors and financiers

The sub consultant route SouthGrid has used mirrors a local content debate already playing out in mining under Statutory Instrument No. 68 of 2025, which requires large miners to lift local procurement from around 20% toward 40%. Construction has no equivalent binding local content rule. The financing gap that keeps many small Zambian firms locked out of larger, longer dated contracts, the same gap that leaves SME borrowers paying rates in the low to mid 30s percent against a 14% Bank of Zambia policy rate, is one reason firms like SouthGrid rely on joint ventures rather than standalone bids.

For policymakers

If Zambia wants more locally owned firms capable of leading, rather than sub contracting on, major infrastructure programmes, the joint venture route SouthGrid has taken shows both that the pathway exists and that it is slow. Three years and five credited projects is a realistic pace for a small firm building a track record inside the current procurement and financing environment, not evidence that the environment itself needs no attention.

What Comes Next

SouthGrid’s own materials set out ambitions beyond its current five projects: regional growth across the Southern African Development Community, a broader base of engineering and technical staff, and continued investment in digital engineering tools. The firm frames its environmental, social and governance approach around climate resilient design and stakeholder engagement, and lists the World Bank, the African Development Bank and KfW among its target funding partners, alongside the RDA and the Ministries of Infrastructure, Housing and Urban Development and of Local Government and Rural Development.

Whether SouthGrid moves from sub consultant to lead consultant on a major programme will depend on factors well outside any one firm’s control: financing structures, procurement rules, and the pace at which Zambia’s construction sector opens up to smaller, citizen owned practices. For now, the firm’s own numbers, more than 127 kilometres of roads, a 52 metre bridge, five projects across four clients in under three years, are the clearest evidence of what a young Zambian engineering firm can build inside the joint venture model as it currently exists.

Related reading: The Economics of Exclusion: How Financing Asymmetry Is Squeezing Zambian Contractors Out of Their Own Market and Ethics as Infrastructure: The Economic Case for Integrity in Zambia’s Engineering Sector, both by Eng. Willings Sichalwe.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

WhatsApp: +260775574228 | Email: info@zambianeconomist.com
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Related reading: Beyond the Ballot Box: How Patronage, Nepotism and Political Appointments Undermine Hope in Zambia, Eng. Willings Sichalwe on what the 2026 result must now deliver.

By The Zambian Economist Analyst

By midday, the smoke rising from the braziers at Longacres Market has become an advertisement of its own.

Whole fish, coated in seasoning, cook slowly over charcoal. Nearby, cuts of meat hiss on a wide grill as vendors turn them over the fire. Customers arrive from surrounding offices and businesses, drawn by the smell and the promise of a hot meal prepared within their lunch hour.

During a visit on Tuesday, 11 August 2026, The Zambian Economist Analyst found a market operating at full lunchtime speed. Orders moved quickly, grills remained busy and food preparation happened in full view of customers.

Longacres Market may be known primarily as a place to eat, but its lunchtime trade also offers a close look at how Lusaka’s small-business economy works.

A lunchtime economy powered by convenience

For workers with limited time between meetings, errands and afternoon assignments, convenience matters almost as much as taste.

Longacres Market responds to that demand with a direct model: customers select their food, vendors prepare it and meals are served without the formality or waiting time associated with many conventional restaurants.

This creates a short but commercially important trading period. A vendor’s daily performance can depend heavily on how many customers can be served between noon and the early afternoon.

The economics are straightforward. High customer turnover allows traders to spread the cost of charcoal, ingredients, transport and labour across more meals. Empty grills, by contrast, mean lost sales and food that may not retain the same value later in the day.

Speed is therefore part of the product.

From the grill to a wider supply chain

Every plate sold at Longacres supports economic activity beyond the market.

Fish must be sourced and transported. Meat passes through farmers, processors, butcheries or wholesalers before reaching the grill. Vegetables, mealie meal, cooking oil, spices, charcoal, packaging and beverages come from their own networks of producers and distributors.

There are also workers preparing food, carrying supplies, cleaning cooking areas and serving customers.

A busy lunch service compresses this supply chain into a single plate. The customer sees grilled fish or meat. The economist sees agriculture, transport, energy, retail and labour meeting at the point of sale.

This is one reason urban food markets deserve more attention in discussions about doing business in Zambia. They convert local demand into daily cash flow and create accessible entry points for people building businesses with limited capital.

The attraction is in the experience

Longacres Market offers something that is difficult to reproduce behind a restaurant kitchen door: customers can watch their lunch being cooked.

There is an immediacy to seeing seasoned fish placed over the coals or hearing meat sizzle as smoke rises from the grill. The aromas travel beyond the cooking area, pulling customers towards the stalls before they have inspected a menu.

That visibility also creates a direct relationship between buyer and seller. Customers can ask questions, choose what they want and observe the preparation process.

For vendors, the grill is both production equipment and shopfront.

What the market teaches Lusaka’s food businesses

The lunchtime success of Longacres Market rests on several practical advantages.

Location brings the market close to offices, shops and institutions. Product visibility stimulates demand. A wide selection allows customers with different budgets and preferences to eat in the same place. Fast service makes the market compatible with a working day.

Consistency, however, remains central to repeat business. Customers are more likely to return when portions, preparation times, cleanliness and service standards meet their expectations.

There is also room for operators to improve how they capture demand. Clearly displayed prices could help customers make faster decisions. Mobile-money payment options can reduce friction. Telephone or WhatsApp pre-orders could allow office workers to collect meals without spending much of their lunch break waiting.

These are modest changes, but in a high-turnover food business, a few additional orders each day can make a meaningful difference to monthly revenue. Operators seeking wider visibility can also explore The Zambian Economist’s business listing platform.

Why you should visit Longacres Market at lunchtime

Come hungry and give yourself enough time to walk through the food section before deciding.

The pleasure of Longacres lies partly in the choice and partly in the theatre of the grill. The smoke, heat and movement create an atmosphere that a packaged takeaway cannot provide.

For the curious visitor, lunch also becomes a chance to observe Lusaka’s economy at close range. Traders compete for attention, customers compare value and money moves through several small businesses within minutes.

Longacres Market is busiest at lunch because it understands its customer: someone who wants a filling meal, prepared over fire, without losing the entire afternoon.

That combination is worth experiencing.

Takeaways

• Longacres Market’s lunch trade is driven by location, convenience and rapid customer turnover.
• Food vendors support wider supply chains covering farming, fishing, transport, charcoal, retail and casual employment.
• Visible preparation gives the market an experiential advantage over ordinary takeaway services.
• Pricing displays, mobile payments and pre-orders could help traders serve more office customers.
• A lunchtime visit offers both a satisfying meal and a view of Lusaka’s everyday enterprise in action.

Related: Operation Clear Path: LCC and Police to Remove Street Vendors From Lusaka CBD From 3 October.

WARNING! All rights reserved. This material and all other digital content on this website may not be reproduced, published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the prior express permission of The Zambian Economist. Where permission is granted, the content must be clearly credited to “The Zambian Economist,” with “www.zambianeconomist.com” prominently displayed.

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Related: Kamwala Fire Destroys 20 Trading Structures as Police Point to a Brazier